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 By the end of World War II, the waters of North Carolina were littered with the hulks of 
merchant vessels and German U-boats as well as the bodies of sailors from many different 
nationalities.  This wreckage and loss of life attest to the carnage wrought by the German 
submarines in the waters of North Carolina, which were the deadliest waters along the American 
East Coast during the war.  Although much previous study into the Battle of the Atlantic has 
focused on the vessels lost along the American Coast, the battle was not devoid of other 
phenomenal accounts of survival, defensive operations, and additional war-related tragedies.  It 
is the compilation of all of these events that provide a broader understanding of the U-boat war 
off the coast of North Carolina. 
 This thesis uses statistical and geospatial analysis of the events occurring offshore to 
provide a more complete view of the battle and to determine the boundaries of this maritime 
battlefield.  Through the use of tangible evidence of the war such as shipwreck locations in 
conjunction with the intangible evidence of the battle including routing orders, attack reports, 
 
 
and survivor rescues, this thesis examines the historical events and behavioral trends that shaped 
the geographical extents of the engagement.      
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
 
After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the United States had no 
choice but to enter into World War II.  In the wake of this epic tragedy and devastating attack on 
American soil, a longer lasting and more widespread conflict is often overlooked.  This conflict 
was one waged along the entire eastern seaboard of North America, ranging from Nova Scotia all 
the way to the Gulf of Mexico.  This battle, however, was not between aircraft carriers and 
battleships, or even between America and Japan.  The conflict instead was waged between 
Hitler‘s Gray Wolves and the merchant and naval vessels of any nation unfortunate enough to 
find themselves in the field of view of the German U-boat periscopes.  By the end of August 
1942 alone, German submarines had attacked 285 vessels in North American waters while losing 
only seven of their own (Hickam Jr. 1989:329-338).  At the center of this conflict lay the waters 
of North Carolina, a zone that teemed with U-boat activity.  Allied losses off Cape Hatteras were 
so numerous that the aptly named ―Graveyard of the Atlantic, was being called a new name by 
the freighter and tanker crews: ‗Torpedo Junction‘‖ (Hickam Jr. 1989:22).   
 It is in these waters off North Carolina, once covered with oil and strewn with wreckage, 
that the archaeological remains of many once-proud vessels and the bodies of their unfortunate 
crewmembers rest.  While the battle is long since over, the vessels‘ remains as well as the 
locations of their attacks and other war related events can provide a detailed and previously 
unknown view of what the Battle of the Atlantic looked like geographically and can shed light on 
how much of North Carolina‘s seascape truly was commandeered by this German naval 
offensive.  Even though the Battle of the Atlantic‘s U-boat attacks off the North Carolina coast 
are by no means lacking previous research and writings, an attempt to use GIS software to reveal 
the boundaries of the battleground had not been attempted before this study.  Similarly, while 
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many site maps and sketches of World War II shipwrecks off the coast have been created by 
sport divers and archaeologists alike, no study had formerly addressed each vessel and the events 
it contributed to the battle as individual archaeological features that, when added to a GIS, can 
compose an entire site plan or battleground for the waters of North Carolina. 
Previous Research 
 
Research on vessels lost along the North Carolina seaboard has been quite extensive as 
the state has some of the best shipwreck diving in the world.  Diving enthusiasts have produced 
popular books with research on many vessels in the waters off North Carolina.  These secondary 
sources include books such as Gary Gentile‘s Track of the Gray Wolf: U-boat Warfare on the 
U.S. Eastern Seaboard 1942-1945 (1989), Shipwrecks of North Carolina from Hatteras Inlet 
South (1992), Shipwrecks of North Carolina from the Diamond Shoals North (1993), and The 
Fuhrer’s U-boats in American Waters (2006).  Additional publications relating to shipwrecks off 
North Carolina, Allied losses, and the Battle of the Atlantic include Edwin Hoyt‘s U-Boats 
Offshore: When Hitler Struck America (1978), Roderick Farb‘s Shipwrecks: Diving the 
Graveyard of the Atlantic (1985), Homer Hickam Jr.‘s Torpedo Junction: U-boat War off 
America’s East Coast, 1942 (1989), and David Stick‘s Graveyard of the Atlantic: Shipwrecks of 
the North Carolina Coast (1989).  While many of these sources rely on the same primary source 
documents, each author presents information in a new light and often highlights parts of the 
conflict that might otherwise be overlooked.    
 Additional recent research into the Battle of the Atlantic off the North Carolina seaboard 
has included the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration‘s (NOAA) ―Battle of the 
Atlantic Expeditions‖ that surveyed and documented the remains of U-85, U-352, and U-701 in 
July 2008 and the remains of HMT Bedfordshire in August 2009 (NOAA 2008,2009).  This 
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expedition provided historical information about these German submarines and this British 
armed trawler and generated site plans, photographs, and video of each vessel to establish 
benchmark conditions with which to monitor site formation processes.  Following the 2008 
expedition, East Carolina University Professor, Dr. Nathan Richards, began creating a database 
of ferrous World War II shipwrecks.   
This database was expanded during the Fall 2008 Semester when Dr. Richard‘s History 
6850 course produced reports on ferrous vessels in North Carolina waters, ten of which were 
sunk offshore during World War II (Campbell 2008; Hayman 2008; MacKenzie 2008; Morra 
2008; Ray 2008; Smith 2008; Steinmetz 2008; Thompson 2008; Wagner 2008; Wyllie 2008).  
These combined reports and popular books provide valuable information about vessels sunk 
within North Carolina waters; however, they focus on individual ships and the information that 
can be obtained from site specific archaeological surveys of those vessels and not the battlefield 
in its entirety.  This is largely because the extent of the battlefield or even the extent of the 
territorial waters of North Carolina during the war have never been studied on a regional and 
geographic level to determine which events actually transpired within North Carolina waters.  
The objectives of this study focus on delineating these particular boundaries. 
Objectives 
 
This study compiles many primary and secondary sources pertaining to events occurring 
off the North Carolina coast during the Battle of the Atlantic and attempts to use the events and 
characteristics of the battle that have known or speculated geographical locations to delineate the 
battle‘s extents.  This thesis further focuses on what types of events occurred within the waters of 
North Carolina, what types of vessels are represented in the battlefield, what nations contributed 
to events occurring within the battleground, and how many U-boats made successful sorties into 
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the state‘s waters.  By revealing these battle elements and revealing the number of events, the 
number of vessels involved, and the nationalities of those vessels, it is possible to obtain a 
broader understanding of the battle.  This understanding can help expose overall trends on a 
regional level as the battle transpired and can serve as the basis for comparative studies in the 
waters of other American states, or other international regions.  In order to provide information 
about the events occurring within North Carolina waters and to determine the battlefield 
boundaries, one specific primary research question and multiple secondary research questions 
were used to guide the research of this thesis.    
Research Questions 
 
 In a study as broad as the one detailed in this thesis, it was important to formulate a 
careful research plan to keep research focused on the major characteristics of the battle pertinent 
to revealing a broader understanding and ultimately delineating the boundaries of the battlefield.  
While there are many fascinating accounts of survivor rescues, U-boat attacks on vessels, and 
allied attacks on U-boats that can lead a researcher down a number of different paths, detailed 
research questions helped keep the study focused on historic events and the geographic extent of 
those events.  The research questions upon which this study revolved are: 
     Primary- 
 Can the boundaries of North Carolina‘s Battle of the Atlantic be determined based 
upon the archaeological remains of the vessels sunk throughout World War II 
whether by U-boat attacks, collisions, mines, or wartime patrols, as well as the 
coordinates of U-boat attacks on Allied vessels not resulting in a wartime casualty?  
     Secondary- 
 Did the North Carolina seascape dictate where attacks took place? 
 Were there differing trends in U-boat attack locations as the war progressed? 
 Is it possible to reconstruct the geographic battle area of a naval confrontation that 
lasted throughout World War II?  
 If the entire battle cannot be represented, is there a representative sample of vessels 
that clearly portray the confrontation? 
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 Do any of these wartime events or archaeological sites fully embody or represent 
the behavioral, strategic, technological, and economic contexts underlying the 
Battle of the Atlantic?  
 What are the main causes of vessel losses off North Carolina during World War II? 
o How many vessels were lost to U-boat attacks? 
o How many were lost to Allied accidents? 
o How many were simply lost due to troubles during wartime patrols? 
o How many vessels lost were enemy vessels? 
 Can a geographic model be constructed that can ultimately be expanded to all 
sectors of the Battle of the Atlantic including the U-boat war as a whole? 
 Can the accuracy of coordinates relayed in distress calls and German sinking 
reports be verified or disputed through shipwreck sites and extrapolated to test the 
accuracy of the possible whereabouts of vessels still not located? 
 Can these boundaries be utilized for future management plans to protect the 
material culture of World War II.  
 
By concentrating on these research questions and allowing them to guide the study, it was 
possible to keep focused on answering the primary research question and to keep the study 
centered on the waters of North Carolina.  One important issue that should also be addressed, 
however, is why the waters of North Carolina were chosen for study when the Battle of the 
Atlantic was waged all along America‘s eastern seaboard.   
Importance 
 
The waters of North Carolina were chosen since more merchant vessels were destroyed 
here than in the waters of any other state during World War II, and many rest in depths that 
render them accessible to most intermediate or advanced level divers.  Similarly, there are three 
known U-boats in diveable depths and potentially a fourth that is within the diving range of 
many technical divers.  Some of these are the same divers who think ―nothing of whipping out a 
sledgehammer and beating a porthole from the side of a ship‖ simply because ―[u]nderwater, 
rules of possession ben[d] with the light; some divers cut prizes from the mesh goody bags of 
other divers, following the motto ‗He who floats it owns it‘‖ (Kurson 2005:6).  With so many 
shipwrecks accessible to divers with malicious intent and those looking to take home souvenirs 
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simply because ―if someone had been to this ship‘s wheelhouse before me, he would not have 
left this telegraph behind‖ (Kurson 2005:7), the need to protect our nation‘s cultural heritage is 
readily apparent.  The ability to do so is another thing, however.   
Although many terrestrial battlefields have been protected and carry significant federal 
punishments for those found looting the sites, the idea of defining and protecting a maritime 
battlefield has previously seemed quite abstract.  This thesis, however, attempts to provide a 
model for defining maritime battlefields based upon the locations of vessels sunk in the naval 
engagement as well as events occurring within the seascape that do not leave evidence in the 
archaeological record but are reported in the historic records of an engagement.  By creating a 
battlefield around the tangible cultural heritage of ships lost in naval engagements and the 
locations of events including survivor rescues, shipping routes, and attack locations that can best 
be described as intangible heritage, it is possible to ensure that the majority of events transpiring 
during the battle fall within the battlefield boundaries.  By presenting a model for defining a 
maritime battlefield in the waters of the state with the most U-boat attacks, this study may help 
additional regional studies to be undertaken in the waters of states that witnessed less U-boat 
activity.  By demonstrating the feasibility of defining the extent of a maritime battlefield in the 
broadest sense, it is the author‘s hope that additional similar models will be applied to the battle 
in other regions and that the feasibility of protecting our nation‘s WWII cultural heritage for 
future generations will be addressed.  
Although there are potentially other ways to define a maritime battlefield, this thesis 
draws upon the theories of multiple sub disciplines of archaeology as well as some GIS theories 
to present a model for defining the Battle of the Atlantic in the waters of North Carolina. 
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Generalist Archaeology Theory 
 
 The theoretical framework underlying this study attempts to transition away from the 
site-specific approaches of many shipwreck archaeology surveys to provide a generalized 
comparative analysis of the Battle of the Atlantic off North Carolina.  While undoubtedly many 
questions about seafaring and the wrecking events of vessels covered in this study can be 
revealed through the site and artifact specific studies common to maritime historical 
particularism (Richards 2008:38), this theoretical avenue does not allow for general and regional 
observations.  For this reason, this study moves away from the historical particularism that 
―justifies much of the current work in shipwreck archaeology‖ (Gould 1983:4), and attempts to 
study the battle as an entire entity of historical events and activities that can ―inform and enlarge 
our general view of man‘s relationship to his maritime environment, especially with respect to 
voyaging and matters of commerce, warfare, and other relevant factors‖ (Gould 1983:5).  
 Although there is nothing wrong with evaluating a particular site in order to glean as 
much information as possible, the long history of maritime archaeologists viewing shipwreck 
sites as isolated ―time capsules‖ has meant that few convincing generalist studies have been 
published.  This is in stark contrast to the often well-documented and thoroughly published site 
and event specific studies of many maritime archaeologists.  The lack of convincing generalist 
studies has unfortunately contributed to the belief that ―generalists have yet to prove themselves 
by designing projects, carrying them out, and publishing them in detail so the results can be 
evaluated and used by interested experts and scholars of all kinds‖ (Watson 1983:36).  Since few 
generalist studies have been conducted and seen through to completion, the field of maritime 
archaeology has been dominated by particularistic event-based studies.  This is also because the 
―principal limitation of the contribution of shipwrecks to the body of data on human social 
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processes has been the approach of investigators.  Most shipwreck archaeology has been 
intensely particularistic and without a problem orientation‖ (Murphy 1983:70).  Simply put, this 
means that ―[s]hipwreck archaeologists need to develop and implement broadly conceived 
research designs asking significant questions of a general nature about human social behavior, or 
the contribution of shipwrecks to knowledge will only be the generation of historical detail‖ 
(Murphy 1989:70).    
 As previously stated, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with the historical particularistic 
study of shipwrecks.  It is just that examining shipwrecks as event specific and occurring within 
a vacuum devoid of social, economic, and behavioral factors has its pitfalls, or as Gould (2000:2) 
puts it, the ―historical-particularistic perspective, though legitimate, is inadequate to the task of 
interpreting archaeological results‖.  It is instead increasingly by ―deemphasizing the importance 
of events, and by thinking about process‖ that ―archaeologists have come to see ships as more 
than just the paraphernalia of human activity…[and] have come to see watercraft from a range of 
creative perspectives‖ (Richards 2008:44).  Since an event-specific approach to maritime 
archaeology necessitates an in-depth study of one particular event or site, this archaeological 
method is simply not fitting for the study of a maritime battle. 
 For this reason, this study is based on comparative and generalist theories.  By making 
broad observations about the battle and the events occurring during it, the underlying social and 
behavioral factors of the battle can be analyzed, providing far more information about the 
engagement in North Carolina waters than a site-specific survey of one wartime casualty ever 
could.  Furthermore, since ―a comparative study undertakes the task of synthesizing particularist 
studies into the larger framework of anthropology and history,‖ this ―broad approach is 
applicable to lost watercraft because their archaeological value is greater than what can be 
 
 
9 
 
learned from a particularistic study alone‖ (Price 2006:10).  Although this study follows a 
generalist approach towards understanding the Battle of the Atlantic in North Carolina waters, it 
differs from previous generalist studies.  Previous studies including Murphy (1983), Price 
(2006), and Richards (2008) have focused on the idea of the ship as a single artifact that can be 
compared in numerous ways to other ships viewed as artifacts.   
This study, however, focuses on historic battle events and features ranging from attack 
locations to survivor rescues, to shipping routes, to minefield locations as artifacts, or pieces of 
intangible heritage, of human and social interaction.  By treating the intangible characteristics of 
the vessels involved in each event as attributes of that historical artifact, this study makes broad 
observations and generalizations about the battle.  Similarly, treating the events as part of an 
interrelated social network helps one to better understand the battle.  This closely follows 
Murphy‘s view that 
[w]hen considering ships as part of a cultural system, it may be profitable to view them as 
similar to hunting-gathering or trading parties.  These groups are organized and sent out for 
the benefit of the parent society and are normally composed of, or at least led by, individuals 
experienced in and prepared for the task.  The advantage of the hunting-gathering/trading 
analogy is that it focuses on the social nature of the effort and forces corollary considerations 
such as the interrelationship of the parent and satellite groups.  The materials and labor efforts 
expended by the parent group stem from conscious decisions and should naturally reflect the 
technical and economic capabilities and goals of the society, as well as its organizational 
concepts (Murphy 1983:85-86). 
 
By viewing battle-related events as expressions of the goals of combatants, a wider behavioral 
understanding of the war can be obtained.  In order to adhere to a generalist approach to the 
battle and obtain this broad understanding, this study also maintains strong underpinnings to the 
theoretical framework endorsed in an emerging subfield of archaeology, that of battlefield 
archaeology. 
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Battlefield Archaeology Theory 
 
This area of archaeology where much of the theory employed in this study comes from is 
the growing discipline of battlefield archaeology.  This subfield, which originally began as a 
―method to find relics or gun emplacements,‖ has materialized ―to its present form where the 
archaeological record is viewed as an independent data set that can be compared to historical 
documents, participant accounts, maps, and other sources to build a more complete and accurate 
picture of an event or develop new views of strategy and tactics‖ (Scott et al. 2009:429).  The 
need for this type of archaeology has arisen from the frequency of times that wartime 
recollections are different and incomplete due to the chaos of battle (Freeman 2007).  This field 
has further shown that ―an integrated and careful (re-) survey of such sites [previously studied or 
relic hunted battlefields] can reveal much about the location and course of a battle simply from 
the distribution of artifacts‖ (Freeman and Pollard 2001:8).  These artifacts can then be placed 
into ―distribution maps that can demonstrate the location and relative density of battlefield 
artifacts, which in turn define the limits of the site and indicate levels of activity‖ (Scott et al. 
2009:25).  
 Despite the continued beliefs of some that the term ―battlefield archaeology‖ may be too 
restrictive in terrestrial archaeology because it suggests a focus only on the battle and fails to 
regard any other archaeological remains encountered during a project (Southerland and Holst, 
2005:2), this term may prove to be an excellent moniker for maritime battlegrounds in which no 
additional archaeological remains are to be encountered.  In a study such as the one conducted 
here, which entails treating each site as an individual artifact and requires no excavation or 
evaluations of the site, the term ―battlefield archaeology‖ and the theories presented within the 
discipline may best define large-scale maritime battle seascapes.  Although it may appear strange 
 
 
11 
 
to some that an area of ocean can be deemed a battlefield, and despite the fact that battlefield 
archaeology surveys have traditionally been rooted in terrestrial landscapes, the sub discipline 
has already successfully been applied towards several naval seascapes. 
   Many of these successful studies have been based upon the precepts of battlefield 
archaeology first laid out by Douglas Scott and Richard Fox during their 1984-1985 intensive 
archaeological survey of the Little Bighorn Battle site.  Drawing upon the tenant of archaeology 
that human behavior is patterned, Scott and Fox speculated that battlefields should contain 
patterned physical remains because combatants fight in specific formations and behave in a 
manner conforming to their training.  By studying the Little Bighorn Battle site in view of these 
guidelines, Scott and Fox were able to successfully survey the battleground and offer startling 
new interpretations of the way the battle transpired (Fox 2003:xii,xv; Scott et al.2009:431).  
Through the work on the Little Bighorn site, Fox was able to show that 
[w]ar, though hardly a credit to humanity, is a distinctly human enterprise.  Combat behavior 
is, from the archaeological perspective, no more and no less susceptible to analyses than any 
other form of human endeavor.  Battlefields, the theaters for war, represent the sites at which 
armed adversaries engaged in combat.  Armaments—weapons and equipment—are the 
implements of war, and few battles have been fought without them.  It is thus not asking too 
much to expect that battlefields are replete with the remains of armament.  These are the 
residues of warring behavior, the records of tactics and strategies, of decisions and responses, 
of successes and failures (Fox 2003:5). 
 
Since this intensive battlefield survey, battlefield archaeology projects have been carried out in a 
number of countries and have covered a multitude of different wars to test the historic record and 
offer new interpretations based upon the physical remains left on the battleground.  Recently, 
however, archaeologists have taken the concepts of regulated and patterned behaviors apparent 
in terrestrial battles and have applied the same precepts to naval battles to document and provide 
insight into engagements that took place at sea.  Since ―[a] ‗historic battlefield‘ is a defined space 
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in which organized groups of armed people did regulated violence upon on another‖ (Schofield 
et al. 2002:9), there is no reason why that ―defined space‖ cannot represent an area of sea. 
 Even though surveys of sunken naval vessels like USS Monitor and the submarine H.L. 
Hunley have been conducted off  North American shores and several surveys have been 
undertaken on warships sunk during World War II, many of these surveys have been site specific 
and intended to assess the condition of shipwrecks or recover them for preservation and study 
(Friends of the Hunley 2005; NOAA 2008, 2009; The Mariners‘ Museum [2010]).  A recent 
reexamination of the Hunley site by Matt Russell and Dave Conlin, however, has sought to study 
holistically the engagement between Hunley and Housatonic as an interrelated battle and to 
examine the wreck sites of each vessel in relation to one another (Russell and Conlin [2010]).   
 By restudying the relation of the wreck sites of these two vessels, Russell and Conlin 
have been able to make some interesting observations and generalizations about the engagement 
between them.  Historic documents coupled with archaeological research have shown that the 
crew of Hunley carefully planned the attack on Housatonic and chose to torpedo the Union ship 
towards the stern even with the mizzen mast, where the sharp deadrise of Housatonic would 
prevent its crew from exchanging small arms fire with the submarine.  Further archaeological 
examination revealed that the torpedo spar of Hunley was mounted on the bottom of the 
submarine, contrary to historical documents that situated the torpedo spar atop the submarine.  
This placement of the torpedo ensured that the explosion occurred well below Housatonic’s 
waterline and resulted in a successful sinking with only one torpedo.  While the physical remains 
of the vessels offer valuable insight into the attack, the spatial orientations of each vessel also 
provide an opportunity for analysis of the event.   
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Russell and Conlin discovered that both Hunley and Housatonic sank while facing into 
the ebbing tide coming out of Charleston Harbor.  Hunley sank nearly 1000 feet due east of 
Housatonic.  These vessel orientations provide the opportunity for continued analysis of the 
event and can provide hypotheses for why Hunley ended up sinking.  This can also help 
archaeologists seek to answer the question of why Hunley rests eastward of Housatonic and 
whether the ebbing tide was too strong for the men of Hunley to maneuver against or if they took 
the submarine to the seabed to wait for the tides to change and were unable to resurface (Russell 
and Conlin [2010]).  By following Scott and Fox‘s principles of battlefield archaeology, Russell 
and Conlin have been able to re-approach the Hunley/Housatonic battle from an entirely 
different perspective and have been able to show how battlefield archaeology concepts can be 
applied to a small-scale battle between two vessels.   
 On a larger scale, John Broadwater‘s work on interpreting the battle of Yorktown as one 
in which terrestrial and maritime components come into equal play has shown that naval battles 
and terrestrial landscapes are often interrelated.  Broadwater argues that, even though naval 
battles often occur many miles away from land and over many miles of sea, the battle is often 
shaped by the geography and political ideals of the warring nations (Broadwater [2010]).  
Broadwater further asserts that ―naval battles can only be fully interpreted and given historic 
meaning by studying them as individual events within the larger context of natural, military, and 
political events within which they took place‖ (Broadwater [2010]).  By archaeologically 
examining commonly researched and historically chronicled battlefields, Broadwater has shown 
that material remains of a battle can help shed new light and offer new interpretations to battles 
previously thought to be completely understood. 
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 It is in the same footsteps of these successful naval battlefield surveys that this study falls 
and, drawing upon much of the theory generated within battlefield archaeology, hopes to 
illuminate the Battle of the Atlantic off North Carolina with a new and exciting light.  
Unfortunately, however, for a battlefield archaeology survey to confirm or dispute the historic 
record, an actual archaeological survey must be conducted to reveal any disparities between the 
written and physical records.  This is where this study differs from the actual field of battlefield 
archaeology.  Since a survey to ground-truth each event location presented here is far beyond the 
scope of this thesis, and many of the historic events related, such as attack locations and survivor 
rescue locations, have not left any physical traces, each historic coordinate is treated as an 
intangible archaeological and geographical ―artifact‖ that can be mapped using GIS software to 
show areas of battle activity. This is possible since the events that have not left physical 
remnants in the study area have often left behind tangible traces in the form of historical 
accounts and geographical coordinates that can be mapped into the battlefield GIS.     
While these historical coordinates can add error to the finalized GIS, only the actual 
sinking locations of vessels may differ when they are discovered, since any historic event that 
does not leave a physical trace in the archaeological record must be accepted as accurate and will 
not be changed by future shipwreck discoveries.  As noted by Schofield (et al. 2002:16), ―the 
majority of these [historical events] are conceptual or technological rather than physical ‗terrain‘ 
to be experienced directly,‖ they nevertheless represent a ―surprisingly large number of 
‗features‘ present in the battlespace which played a large part in the battle as it unfurled‖ and 
must therefore be mapped to represent the extent of the battle.  This will effectively allow two 
different battlefield maps to be generated using GIS.  One will be a historical map of the battle 
revealing all historic events of the Battle of the Atlantic in North Carolina waters, while the other 
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will be an archaeological battlefield map revealing known and speculated final resting locations 
of war casualties.  Once definitive locations of war casualties are discovered through future 
surveys, only one point in the GIS database will potentially need to be changed to reveal 
discrepancies between historic sinking locations and the actual locations of the vessels.      
Furthermore, since coastal waters under United States jurisdiction during World War II, 
as well as shipping routes, convoy routes, and zones of Allied patrol, follow real-world 
coordinate systems, these can also be mapped to represent the battlefield in its entirety without 
defining the battlefield simply in terms of where ships sank.  Another distinction between this 
study and terrestrial battlefield archaeology is that battlefield surveys are generally conducted 
where ―armed adversaries engaged in combat‖ (Fox 2003:5), whilst the Battle of the Atlantic 
revolves around an armed adversary attacking a generally unarmed merchant marine.  This 
thesis, however, posits that since the merchant marine is bounded by travel regulations, 
especially during times of war, and that since these wartime regulations are often governed by 
military bodies, a great degree of artifact patterning should exist.  Similarly, while the objective 
of a submarine is to remain elusive and undetected, the U-boats attacking merchant shipping off 
North Carolina had to sacrifice complete safety for the possibility of sinking merchant vessels, 
which necessarily mandated that the German submarines follow predictable and patterned paths 
to maximize successes.       
 While shipping routes represent the ideal, merchant shipmasters undoubtedly exercised 
some leeway in how strictly they followed these routes and, similarly, the U-boat captains had 
the freedom to maneuver their boats in response to shipping densities, which caused individual 
behavioral patterns to exist across the battleground as evidenced by the coordinates of events 
occurring offshore.  It is by mapping these individual behavior patterns in relation to one another 
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that the entirety of the battle can be represented through the anthropological concept of ―the 
battlefield pattern‖ created by Scott and Fox (1987:126).  The battlefield pattern 
is based on the recognition of individual behaviors as they are represented in the artifactual 
record.  The integration of individual behavior patterns results in the identification of unit 
patterns…The battlefield pattern, then, integrates unit patterns to provide general behavioral 
aspects relevant to the progress or chronology of the fight…Thus the battlefield pattern is 
formed from a composite analysis of all artifacts in the archaeological record…These traces 
are left behind in patterns that can be interpreted (Scott and Fox 1987:126). 
 
In order to effectively track the patterns of battle activity and provide analysis of ―behavioral 
aspects‖ of the Battle of the Atlantic in the waters of North Carolina, the theoretical framework 
of another discipline had to be employed. 
GIS Theory 
 
The additional theory utilized in this study revolves around the use of GIS for historical 
studies.  GIS software has allowed historians and archaeologists to perform research in relation 
to geographic references and has augmented their work by allowing the spatial analysis of 
patterns, people, and even archaeological features.  By creating multiple GIS layers, a researcher 
can present the attributes of the particular item being added to the dataset.  Through the 
presentation of the location and attributes of a historical or archaeological feature, a much more 
in-depth view of that particular event or artifact can be ascertained (Knowles 2002:viii).  GIS 
software thus ―digitally links locations and their attributes so that they can be displayed in maps 
and analyzed‖ (Knowles 2002:xiv).  It is this spatial linking of events to their geographic 
locations that separates GIS from other relational databases and that allows spatial analysis of 
events and locations to be conducted (Conolly and Lake 2006:3). 
In order to analyze events spatially, however, the theoretical description of space used in 
the analysis must be known.  The Western world has been strongly influenced by two main 
visions of space.  One view is that ―the relative concept views space as a positional quality of 
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the world of material objects or events‖ (Conolly and Lake 2006:3).  The other viewpoint 
maintains that ―[t]he absolute concept views space as a container of all material objects, which 
exists independently of any objects that might fill it‖ (Conolly and Lake 2006:3).  These 
concepts can be explained simply by picturing adjoining earthworks on a battlefield.  The 
relative concept of those earthworks would be that they are next to each other.  If a non-scaled 
map of the earthworks were drawn, the two earthworks would still appear relative to one another 
but without dimensional data.  The absolute concept would view those same earthworks as 
appearing next to each other but would also factor the distance between them into the equation.  
This would be similar to redrawing that same map but drawing it to scale.  Now both earthworks 
would appear in an absolute relation to one another and not simply in a relative orientation. 
In the application of GIS to archaeology, these two concepts of space most commonly 
manifest themselves into two types of spatial geometrics, those of topology and those of 
Euclidean geometry.  These spatial geometrics differ in that, 
Topology distinguishes spatial objects that should be considered different on account of the 
way in which they relate to their neighbors and, for that reason, it has a close affinity with the 
relative model of space.  For example, suppose an excavation plan were drawn on a rubber 
sheet, then topology is concerned with those aspects of the recorded features that remain 
invariant when the sheet is stretched or knotted, but not cut or folded.  These include 
stratigraphic relations such as ‗contains‘ and ‗abuts‘, but not the areas covered by different 
deposits (Conolly and Lake 2006:4).   
 
On the other hand,  
      
Euclidean geometry is the geometry that most of us are taught at school.  Devised by Euclid 
around 300 BC, it is an example of a metric geometric, that is, one which includes the concept 
of distance between points such that the distance from point A to point B is the same as that 
from B to A.  Euclidean geometry has long been associated with the absolute concept of 
space…Returning to the example of an excavation plan, Euclidean geometry allows one to 
measure the areas covered by different deposits as well as to state the stratigraphic relations 
between those deposits (Conolly and Lake 2006:4). 
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Since this study is concerned with the overall boundaries of a maritime battle as well as the 
distances between events, shipping routes, minefields, and state borders, the analysis used in this 
study will be based on Euclidean geometry, and by default, upon the concept of absolute space.  
This is appropriate, however, ―[s]ince Euclidean geometry allows one to distinguish a larger 
number of transformations than topology it may be considered more ‗specific‘‖ and since, ―[i]n 
GIS terms, a more specific geometry supports a larger number of meaningful questions about the 
spatial relations in a database‖ (Conolly and Lake 2006:4). 
 It is important to realize that while a GIS digitally links events to their geographic 
locations, the theoretical premise behind using GIS software is far more comprehensive than 
simply creating geographic maps.  This is because the 
advantage of a GIS over traditional mapping is that a GIS permits the organization of different 
components of the same map into different thematic map layers (and thus [is] often referred to 
as thematic mapping), which is the basic way that spatial data are organized within a GIS 
environment.  In practice this means that in one GIS digital display many different elements 
may be combined, each of which may be individually turned on or off, queried, modified, 
reclassified, and edited.  Many analytical functions, such as spatial queries, can operate across 
one or more layers depending on the need of the GIS analyst.  Map layers, or subsets of 
individual layers, can also be combined to produce new maps at will, providing potential 
insight into relationships between elements on different themes (Conolly and Lake 2006:17). 
 
It is for this theoretical background and for the powerful analytical and display capabilities that 
GIS software was chosen for this study rather than simpler mapping software that could 
geographically represent the battlefield, but that would fail to provide the diagnostic capabilities 
of a GIS. 
Thesis Structure 
 
The broad nature of this study has mandated research at multiple archival repositories, 
study of many historical documents, and the use of multiple computer software programs to 
determine the overall extent of the Battle of the Atlantic in the waters of North Carolina.  
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Chapter Two, Methodology, identifies the different avenues of historical and cartographical 
research conducted during this study as well as details the creation of the battlefield GIS and the 
types of analysis conducted using historical documents and the GIS.  Although this chapter 
reveals where historical research was conducted, it does not provide insight into what the 
historical documents reveal about the battlefield.  This is instead discussed in Chapter Three and 
Chapter Four. 
 Chapter Three, The Germans Attack, provides a historical account of the initial U-boat 
operations off the American coast and traces their attacks along the American coastline until 
their captains discovered the productive waters of North Carolina.  At this point, the chapter 
chronicles the battle as it pertains to the waters off North Carolina.  Chapter Four, America 
Fights Back, discusses America‘s desperate struggle to counter the U-boat threat wreaking havoc 
along the coastal shipping routes.  This chapter reveals major historical components of the 
battlefield and ultimately reveals how the U-boats were defeated along the American Coast.  
This background history provides the basic framework for the analyses of the following chapters. 
 Chapter Five, Understanding the Battlefield, is a statistical breakdown of major themes 
and key components of the engagement.  These statistical analyses provide a greater 
understanding of which nations contributed to events within the study area, how many vessels 
were involved, and what types of vessels were involved in the battle.  Although many additional 
statistical observations could be made about the battlefield, this information provides the basic 
knowledge of the battlefield required to understand the spatial analyses of Chapter Six. 
 This chapter, The Geography of the Battlefield, reveals geographical trends apparent 
within the battlefield and uses geospatial analytical tools to depict the individual spatial elements 
of the battlefield that contribute to the battlefield as a whole.  These analyses also attempt to 
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provide a visual representation of the historic events discussed in the history chapters as well as 
provide geographical boundaries to the statistical analyses conducted in the proceeding chapter.  
These supplemental geographical analyses then provide the grounds for examining the full extent 
of the battlefield and for answering the primary research question of this study and for providing 
some conclusions about the battle in the waters off North Carolina.  These conclusions are 
discussed in the final chapter of the thesis along with limitations to the study, the potential 
implications of the study, and avenues for further research.          
Conclusion 
 
 As a wide-ranging study attempting to delineate boundaries of the Battle of the Atlantic 
in North Carolina waters and provide insight into the events contained within the battleground, 
this thesis has drawn upon the theoretical framework of generalist archaeological studies, 
battlefield archaeology, and GIS as a means of archaeological analysis.  Expanding upon the 
notion of ships viewed as artifacts utilized by Murphy, Price, and Richards, this study focuses on 
events and features of a maritime battle as individual artifacts that can be analyzed to show 
widespread trends and patterns of the naval engagement as well as isolate the boundaries of the 
Battle of the Atlantic in one geographical region.  Furthermore, this study finds its basis in the 
recent successful maritime battlefield archaeology surveys of Russell, Conlin, and Broadwater, 
which provide some of the precedent for the application of battlefield archaeology theory to 
maritime engagements.    
Even though defining the boundaries of the battlefield could be accomplished through 
simple mapping software, GIS theory is employed in this study so that additional meaningful 
analysis of the battlefield, combatant vessels, and events within the battlefield can be conducted.  
It is through this analysis, and by spatially linking all known wartime incidents off the North 
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Carolina coast during World War II, that it is possible to present North Carolina‘s Battle of the 
Atlantic and its geographical boundaries in an entirely new and exciting light.  In order to present 
these events and geographical boundaries, however, a careful research plan was followed to 
ensure that battle specific events and features were fully researched so they could be added to the 
GIS.  The historical research and creation of the GIS are chronicled in the subsequent chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
 
In order to reveal the extent of the Battle of the Atlantic as it occurred off North Carolina 
fully and accurately, much research had to be conducted that spanned several disciplines.  With a 
large amount of coastline and a large dataset of U-boat attacks, vessel losses, survivor rescues, 
convoy routing changes, and coastal defense installations to analyze, the project quickly became 
multifaceted, requiring historical research, geographic research, and archaeological theory to 
produce a GIS model that would accurately depict North Carolina‘s waters during World War II.  
To make this undertaking more manageable, the study was broken into several different stages of 
historical research, GIS creation, and analysis.  The historical research phase consisted of 
collecting pertinent historical documents from multiple archival repositories and secondary 
sources.  The second phase consisted of converting historic coordinates of events and attributes 
into shapefiles for incorporation into the battlefield GIS.  Finally, the third phase of the study 
entailed the statistical and spatial analysis of events and attributes so as to provide a wider 
understanding and answer research questions posed by this study.  This chapter chronicles the 
phases of the study in the order they were undertaken beginning with historical research.   
Historical Research 
 
 Before undertaking any research in the National Archives, a list of merchant vessels and 
U-boats sunk or attacked in North Carolina waters had to be created so that time could be 
maximized by searching for records pertaining to events specific to North Carolina.  An initial 
search was conducted through a list of allied merchant vessels attacked during World War II on 
the website uboat.net.  This website chronicles the U-boat war in many aspects, and the 
information contained within its pages comes from archival resources and painstaking research.  
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Unfortunately, the website fails to list which archives were used for research and which record 
groups each primary document came from.  This shortcoming meant that the website could only 
be used to obtain a listing of vessels attacked or sunk off North Carolina.  Once names of vessels 
believed to have been attacked or sunk were obtained, they were transferred to a list used during 
archival searches and compared to the listing of vessels attacked and sunk during 1942 contained 
in the book Torpedo Junction (Hickam Jr. 1989:329-338).  Additionally, tables of vessels lost in 
Freeman‘s (1987) edited version of the Eastern Sea Frontier (ESF) War Diaries from January to 
August 1942 and Rohwer‘s  Axis Submarine Successes of World War II (1999) helped confirm 
that the vessels placed into the study list was comprehensive and included all known vessels 
attacked or sunk due to the war or to accidents occurring while on wartime patrols.  This 
information allowed structured primary research to be conducted.    
Primary Sources 
 
Once the list of vessels believed to have taken part in events within the study area had 
been created, vessels were added to a Microsoft Access database that was generated with empty 
fields for information obtained about each vessel ranging from former names, to build 
characteristics, and ultimately to coordinates of various actions along the vessel‘s route that 
could be displayed within the GIS.  Many specifications of each ship were added using the 
searchable Lloyds Register of British and Foreign Shipping, available for the years from 1930 
to1945, on plimsollshipdata.org.  This searchable register covered most vessels in the database 
and allowed many database fields to be populated before archival research commenced. 
The next phase of historical research consisted of research at both National Archives I 
and National Archives II.  Prior research projects revealed that the Archives I building in 
Washing D.C. contained vessel sinking reports of the United States Coast Guard (USCG) and 
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that the National Archives II building contained information from the United States Navy 
pertaining to U-boat actions along the East Coast.  This knowledge enabled quick retrieval of 
record group boxes and allowed more time to be spent searching archival material and less spent 
searching through finding aids.  While at the National Archives I building, fellow Program in 
Maritime Studies student Eric Ray, who helped with archival research as a research assistant, 
searched boxes from Record Group 26, Records of the U.S. Coast Guard, for information 
pertaining to vessels in the database.  Several boxed series within this record group provided 
information for this study.  These series included: World War II Reports Concerning Merchant 
Vessels sinking, 1938-2002; War Casualty Section Survivor‘s Statements, 1941-1945; and War 
Casualty Section Casualty Reports 1941-1946.  These documents greatly supplemented those 
gathered from the Archives II building. 
 Research in Archives II concentrated on Record Group 38, (Records of the Office of the 
Chief of Naval Operations, 1875-2006), and Record Group 428, (General Records of the 
Department of the Navy, 1947-).  Series of boxes in Record Group 38 that contained valuable 
information pertaining to attacks on merchant vessels and locations of engagements included: 
Tenth Fleet Convoy & Routing Casualty Files; the Office of Naval Intelligence Security 
Classified Administrative Correspondence 1942-1946; and the Records Relating to Naval 
Activity During World War II, World War II War Diaries.  An additional series from this record 
group that provided detailed routing information for 1943 was the Office of Naval Intelligence 
Planning Branch (Op 16X/op 23X/op 32X) Reference File 1941-45 – Naval District Orgn. & 
Personnel & Convoy Routing Instructions.  From Record Group 428, the boxes in the series 
Office of Information Ship Files 1940-1958, proved helpful for obtaining newspaper articles 
written about torpedoed ships as well as articles about how the German submarine threat was 
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countered by Allied forces.  While much of the research at the archives was conducted in these 
record groups, additional research was undertaken in the cartographic records branch of Archives 
II.   
The cartographic section of Archives II revealed charts of American shipping routes 
during peacetime that could be compared with changes made to shipping and convoy routes 
during the war.  An additional fascinating find came in the form of captured U-boat manuals 
containing information about the American East Coast (Figure 2.1).  These manuals contained 
landmarks for navigation, locations of coastal defenses, and extensive charts of shipping routes, 
ocean depths, and currents along the coast.  These charts even included the type of ocean bottom 
sediments found at different depths, allowing U-boat officers to rest their vessels on a sandy 
ocean floor during daylight hours when Allied defensive forces were able to spot them on the 
surface.  Any useful, or potentially useful, item found in the National Archives was 
photographed using a digital camera.   
These images, along with a photograph of the record group box of each document 
recorded, were added to an individual digital folder for each vessel, chart, or u-boat handbook on 
a laptop computer.  This allowed information for each event to be accessed quickly for each area 
of the Access database and the GIS.  Using these sources in conjunction with one another 
provided many attack, sinking, and rescue details.  Since a battlefield is not simply delineated by 
where victims fall, additional historical sources had to be consulted in order to plot other 
elements of the Battle of the Atlantic, including changes in shipping routes, locations of 
minefields and anchorages, and zones of aerial coverage.  
Fortunately, much of this information comes from the same sources.  Information about 
changes in shipping routes early in the war is included in the ESF War Diaries located at the 
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National Archives, and Freeman‘s edited volume of the months from January 1942 to August 
1942 allows the changes in routes to be easily identified (1987).  Unfortunately, Freeman‘s 
(1987) edited volume of the ESF War Diaries does not include the appendices of the diaries, 
which are where changes in shipping routes are commonly located.  For this reason, the website 
uboatarchive.net became invaluable.  This website contains transcribed and searchable copies of 
the ESF War Diaries for the first five months of the war including the diaries‘ appendices.  
Multiple changes in merchant shipping routes are found within these war diaries.  These changes 
occurred in December 1941, and the end of February 1942 (NANCF 1941:21-24,ch. 3; ESF 
1942a:1,chap. 4; ESF 1942a:1-4,Appendix I).   
After the completion of the Cape Hatteras minefield and implementation of the coastal 
convoy system in May 1942, the routes were undoubtedly changed since the old routes traversed 
through the minefield (ESF 1942a:1-4,Appendix I; ESF 1943:6-7,chap. 5).  Unfortunately, these 
specific routing instructions have remained elusive despite all research.  These routes, however, 
are presumably identical or very similar to those documented in May 1943 by the United States 
Fleet Headquarters, which began supplying coastal convoy routing data in 1943 and for which 
routing instructions were discovered at National Archives II (United States Fleet Headquarters 
1943).  These documents allowed the changes in routes, from merchant vessels sailing along the 
coast unescorted to the implementation of convoy routes, to be added to the GIS to observe how 
the activity of the battlefield changed when the routing of merchant vessels changed. 
 In addition to supplying information for shipping routes, the ESF War Diaries also 
revealed the boundaries of the ESF, the location of the Cape Hatteras Minefield, and the safe 
anchorage contained within the minefield (NANCF 1942b:1,chap. 1; ESF 1943:1-13,chap. 5; 
Freeman 1987:1).  Each month of the War Diary also lists the types of aircraft available at the 
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different air bases along the coast allowing the aerial coverage off North Carolina to be plotted.  
By researching all historical elements that contributed to the campaign off North Carolina, it is 
possible to generate various GIS layers that represent the battlefield in its entirety.  While this 
primary historical research is invaluable, it unfortunately did not allow coordinates for each 
vessel in the study area to be added to the Access database.  
 
FIGURE 2.1.  Captured German U-boat handbook for the East Coast of North America (National 
Archives II, College Park, MD.) 
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Secondary Sources 
 
Since, reports for roughly six percent of the total number of vessels studied were not 
found at the National Archives, information for those vessels had to be obtained from secondary 
sources.  The majority of these remaining vessel coordinates were populated using the list of U-
boat attacks provided as an appendix to the book Torpedo Junction (Hickam Jr. 1989:329-338).  
These coordinates are presented in the form of German B.d.U. quadrants exactly as Hickam Jr. 
transcribed them from German Records.  The B.d.U. quadrants are overlays of the world‘s 
oceans using a grid system that breaks apart latitude and longitude into a series of letters 
followed by several numbers that corresponded to coordinates around the world.  These grids 
allowed the U-boat command to track its U-boats and permitted vessel commanders to relay their 
locations without having to broadcast their position in the clear (Hickam Jr. 1989:328).  The 
gridded quadrants were then converted using a downloadable German MQK (Marine 
Quadratkarte) converter available on the Spanish website u-historia.com (2008).  The accuracy 
of this conversion software was checked using vessels for which the latitude and longitude were 
known and comparing these coordinates to software conversions of the grid system in Hickam 
Jr.‘s book.  Once the program‘s accuracy had been verified, coordinates for those vessels not 
located in the National Archives were added to the database by converting their grid locations to 
latitude and longitude.  After converting the grid locations to latitude and longitude, the database 
contained at least one event location for almost all vessels in the database. 
 The remaining few vessels for which no information was found included the USCG 
Vessels Jackson and Bedloe, which were sunk by a hurricane in 1944 while on a war patrol 
(Hagner 1944:1).  Recreational divers have since discovered these ships, but they do not 
commonly publish the coordinates.  For this reason, NOAA‘s Automated Wreck and Obstruction 
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Information System (AWOIS) Database was consulted for coordinates for these shipwrecks.  
This database was also used to obtain coordinates for the wreck of U-701, also discovered by 
divers who have not published exact coordinates, and for which historical coordinates provided 
by the airplane that sunk U-701 place the event too far out to sea (First Bomber Command 
1942:1).  To supplement the historical research undertaken at the National Archives and through 
secondary sources, cartographic and geographic research had to be conducted to give meaning to 
coordinates obtained from the historical documents. 
Cartographic Research 
 
           Since the overall objective of this study focuses of defining the geographical extent of the 
Battle of the Atlantic off North Carolina, the collection of large amounts of geographic 
information and charts was done to ensure the finalized GIS represents all geographic 
components of the battle.  While these charts are useful because they can be georectified and 
overlaid as layers into the GIS, they also provide invaluable information about the shipwreck 
locations, navigational buoys, and danger areas.  This helps convey the historic information 
found through textual research in an easy-to-understand visual format.  Although different GIS 
clearinghouses and internet servers provide charts that can be incorporated into the study area 
GIS, the importance of using contemporary charts to understand the seascape as it appeared 
during the war cannot be understated.  For this very reason, multiple contemporary charts and 
geographic coordinates were collected so that a greater understanding of the study area could be 
obtained. 
Charts 
 
Cartographic research consisted of collecting charts of shipping, charts of vessel casualties, 
charts of ports of call, and German U-boat manual charts from the cartographic records section at 
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National Archives II as well as obtaining historic NOAA charts from the years 1939-1945.  
Charts found at the National Archives can be overlaid into the GIS as a layer to visually depict 
changes in shipping routes as well as the number of vessels sunk along the coast as the war 
progressed.  The NOAA historic charts were useful for locating buoys that the navy used as 
reference points when they created merchant vessel shipping routes.  Some charts from 1945-
1947 also give more accurate locations of the final resting spot of some vessels in the database 
(Figure 2.2). 
 FIGURE 2.2.  Chart of North Carolina with the coordinates of shipwrecks listed (shipwreck 
coordinates highlighted by author) (NOAA Historical Chart Collection, Cape Hatteras to 
Charleston Light, Chart No. 1110A, April 1947). 
 
These resting locations were placed into the database to give more precise sinking 
locations to vessels that were surveyed or remained partially above water shortly after their 
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sinking, allowing the navy to accurately plot merchant vessel hulk locations.  These charts also 
provide a visual representation of the Cape Hatteras Minefield that could be compared to the one 
plotted into GIS using coordinates from the ESF War Diaries. 
USCG Light Lists 
 
While the NOAA charts provided a visual representation of where some navigational 
buoys were located, they failed to provide accurate coordinates for those buoys.  Tracing a 
straight line from the chart margins to see which coordinates intersected with the buoy location 
would induce too much error into the study and would misrepresent their actual locations in the 
GIS.  This meant that the actual geographic coordinates of each buoy had to be discovered.  
After additional research into the East Coast buoy system and a helpful pointer from Maritime 
Studies student Nat Howe, it was discovered that the Coast Guard produces lists of aids to 
navigation in their annual Light List.  By searching through online library databases such as 
WorldCat, several copies of the 1942 Light List were discovered.  Unfortunately, due to financial 
constraints, East Carolina University‘s Joyner Library was not able to request the Light List 
publications through inter-library loan.  After additional search, a 1945 Light List was 
discovered for sale through an online retailer and purchased in the hopes that the buoy locations 
had not changed since 1942. 
 Upon receipt of the 1945 Light List, the author discovered that the publication contained 
a column for each buoy that showed the date of the last time the buoy‘s location was changed 
(United States Coast Guard [USCG] 1945).  This allowed each navigational buoy‘s location to 
be verified and plotted into an Excel spreadsheet and stored for use when shipping routes were 
mapped into the GIS.  Fortunately, several weeks into the Fall 2009 semester, Joyner Library 
managed to allocate additional funds to inter-library loan and the author received a copy of the 
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1942 Light List (USCG 1942).  This allowed a final check to ensure that the locations of the 
navigational buoys remained constant throughout World War II before all the routes were 
created as GIS shapefiles.  Once all the project‘s historical and cartographic research was 
completed, the painstaking processes of visually depicting each battle-related event and 
statistically and geographically analyzing it to delineate battlefield boundaries began. 
Analysis 
 
The analytical component of this study revolved around three different aspects.  The first 
phase consisted of creating an overall ―site map‖ of all battle related events and features that 
shaped the way the battle transpired.  The second phase of archaeological investigation and 
interpretation revolved around statistically examining prominent themes and characteristics 
evident within the battlefield.  The final component included taking each different historic event 
occurring within the battlefield and plotting it in maps that display historic trends in their 
geographic extents.     
GIS Creation 
 
To effectively create an overall map of battle-related events, many GIS shapefiles had to 
be created to incorporate events and characteristics of the battlefield ranging from shipping 
routes, to minefields, to areas of aerial patrol, to coastal boundaries, and eventually to all battle 
related events for which historical coordinates were recorded.  Although the end product of 
mapping each element was easy to visualize, the steps required to achieve that end goal required 
the use of multiple computer software programs and the transcription of many geographic 
coordinates and event characteristics into those programs.   
To map each change to the shipping routes, the ESF war diaries and the Mercantile 
Atlantic Coastal Routing Instructions (United States Fleet Headquarters 1943) were first 
 
 
33 
 
searched in order to find which buoys were used for navigation at various points throughout the 
war.  Each of these buoys and the distance and direction that a ship was to pass them by was then 
transcribed into an Excel spreadsheet.  The Coast Guard Light Lists (1942, 1944) were then 
consulted for the historic locations of each buoy used in coastal navigation.  Once the locations 
were found, they were added to an overall spreadsheet of buoy locations in degrees, minutes, and 
seconds.  Next, a separate spreadsheet was made for each northbound and southbound route 
change, and the coordinates of each buoy were converted from degrees, minutes, and seconds 
into decimal degrees to make them easier to place into the GIS.  Locations of each buoy were 
then mapped in Google Earth.  Since the shipping routes were based upon passing the buoys at a 
specific distance and direction, measurements had to be taken off the buoys for every stage in 
each route.  This was done using Earth’s ruler tool, which gives measurements in distances and 
angles so that the coordinates through which the vessel was required to pass could be plotted.   
Once these coordinates were discovered they were added to a finalized Excel spreadsheet 
for each shipping route.  Finalized points were then plotted in GIS as different types of 
shapefiles.  For routes used at the end of 1941, which routed vessels through corridors, polygon 
shapefiles were created to depict the width of the shipping routes.  After U-boats began attacking 
vessels along the American coast, the routes were moved and no longer allowed shipmasters to 
proceed within a several mile wide corridor but required them to precisely follow a direct route 
leading from navigational buoy to navigational buoy.  Since these routes were much narrower 
than the shipping corridors of late 1941, polyline shapefiles were used to represent each route.  
This remains true for convoy routes initiated after May 1942.  Since the changes in routes for 
February 1942 required shipmasters to follow different ocean depth contours between 
navigational buoys, a 1942 NOAA historical chart was georectified in GIS and overlaid over the 
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study area.  This allowed the routing lines between buoys to be modified so that they followed 
the differing depth contours.  After each shipping route had been mapped, boundary lines for 
American coastal defenses were plotted. 
 This element of the GIS was relatively easy to create as a shapefile.  This is because the 
American coastal defense boundaries encompassing North Carolina were only changed twice 
during the war.  The initial boundaries were established when the North Atlantic Naval Coastal 
Frontier (NANCF) was created at the end of 1941 and extended from the border of Maine and 
Canada to the southern border of Onslow County, NC.  The eastern boundary was set by drawing 
a line that connected a series of offshore coordinates between the northbound and southbound 
boundaries.  These boundaries meant that the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Naval Districts 
belonged to the NANCF (NANCF 1941:4,chap. 1,10,Appendix III).  In February 1942, the 
NANCF was renamed the Eastern Sea Frontier (ESF) after the Sixth Naval District was added to 
this Frontier, extending the Frontier‘s southern boundary to a point between St. Johns and Duval 
Counties in Florida, and making it easier for the ESF to route ships along most of the east coast 
(NANCF 1942b:1,chap. 1).  Since coordinates of both coastal boundaries are included in the 
NANCF War Diaries and the ESF War Diaries, it was simple to convert the coordinates into 
decimal degrees and place them into an Excel spreadsheet.   
After the coordinates were placed into a spreadsheet, the coordinates were mapped in 
ArcMap as polyline shapefiles to delineate boundaries of the NANCF and ESF.  Since the 
polyline shapefiles did not allow much analysis of the waters contained within the polyline to be 
conducted, the polylines were then converted into polygon shapefiles so that the area of the 
frontiers and the events that took place within these boundaries could be analyzed.  This was 
done by keeping the northern, southern, and eastern boundaries the same as the polyline 
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shapefile and by adding points along America‘s eastern coastline to represent the western 
boundary of the frontier.  Once these boundaries were created, it was possible to begin mapping 
all historical events for which coordinates were known and to determine which events occurred 
within zones that American coastal defenses patrolled. 
 The plotting of each historical event for which coordinates are known was the most 
difficult aspect of creating the GIS of the battle in North Carolina waters.  This step required 
many different phases of study and transcription to make certain that battle-related events were 
plotted correctly.  The initial portion of this element required creating empty fields within the 
Access database in which coordinates of historical events believed to have occurred in the waters 
off North Carolina could be entered.  Additional empty fields were generated next to the 
coordinate fields so that any specific actions that occurred at those coordinates could be defined 
along with their date and time.  Once several blank fields had been created within the database, 
documents photographed at the National Archives for each vessel were searched for any mention 
of coordinates and actions so that they could be transcribed into the database in chronological 
order.   
Unfortunately, not every action listed, ranging from sinking reports to radio intercepts of 
distress calls, revealed the location where the action occurred.  This meant that only the events 
for which coordinates were given could be added to the database along with the corresponding 
detail of what type of event occurred.  Once the historic documents had been consulted and the 
events added to the database in chronological order, coordinates for each event were converted 
into decimal degrees.  Next, a list of each vessel in the Access database, and the locations and 
dates of each event along those vessel‘s routes, was exported into an Excel spreadsheet. 
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 By exporting this list into an Excel spreadsheet, the spreadsheet data could be added 
directly to the GIS using the ―add data‖ function in ArcMap.  Since the spreadsheet contained the 
latitude and longitude of each event in separate columns, it was easy to select these columns as 
the ones that ArcMap would plot as X and Y.  By repeating the process multiple times and 
selecting different columns containing event coordinates each time the process was repeated, it 
was possible to quickly add all events to the GIS.  Unfortunately, simply adding all of these 
points to the GIS as point shapefiles severely limited the amount of information gleaned from the 
points.  This is because the points simply represented events occurring during the war and 
provided no way of observing the paths of individual vessels as they traversed the waters of 
North Carolina from one known event location to another.  This method also only allowed the 
events that occurred during the war to be viewed at one time and did not allow the events for 
each month to be observed in order to analyze any shifts in battle activity as the war progressed.  
For these reasons, many more shapefiles were created depicting different types of information to 
make future analysis and manipulation of the data easier. 
 The first modification done to the data consisted of making a point shapefile for each 
vessel in the database.  RENCI graduate student, Laurynas Gedminas, who helped with much of 
the GIS setup and analysis, did this step of the process.  By creating a separate shapefile for each 
vessel, events for that specific vessel could be viewed without the added clutter of all other 
events.  This also meant that a polyline shapefile could be created that connected each of the 
different event points so a vessel‘s path could be mapped.  The lines could also be broken apart 
into multiple segments so event points along the line could be time stamped and the line 
animated to draw through each point as it occurred in history.  Although the animation tool of the 
GIS software is an excellent instrument to use for public outreach and visualization, it did not 
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allow all of the research questions to be tested and was therefore not completed for this study. 
Once each vessel‘s route was generated by completing the line shapefiles, additional point 
shapefiles were created to depict events occurring by month. 
 Since the shapefile representing all events occurring within the battle area would limit the 
number of analyses that could be conducted, additional point files were created for the months of 
January 1942 through July 1942 so that the center of activity for the battle could be plotted for 
each month.  Since there are few events occurring after July 1942, events for the remaining years 
of the war were grouped onto three different point files depicting events occurring in 1943, 1944, 
and 1945.  Upon completing these shapefiles, battle analysis could be conducted for each month 
and year of the war.  Since these shapefiles represented all events occurring during the battle, and 
not just those that would leave behind physical remains, additional shapefiles were created to 
depict areas where large accumulations of archaeological features could be expected. 
This was done by taking the Excel spreadsheet of all events and modifying it to only 
contain locations of known or speculated resting locations of war casualties.  Once this had been 
done, the known and speculated locations were added to the GIS as point shapefiles representing 
known and potential locations of archaeological features still remaining in the battlefield.  To 
allow further analysis of vessel losses throughout the war, these locations were further divided 
into months and years in the same fashion as the shapefiles representing all events.  Once these 
different shapefiles and map overlays were created, it was possible to move on to the second 
phase of archaeological study, which consisted of statistically analyzing the events within the 
study area. 
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Statistical Analysis 
 
Although the events and characteristics of the battlefield can be analyzed in numerous 
ways, several important battle elements and vessels that could provide a greater understanding of 
the battlefield were chosen for analysis.  In order to begin this analysis, however, the study area 
needed to defined using ArcMap since many events were initially included in the Access 
database because events were referred to as ―occurring east of Hatteras‖ in historical documents.  
Once the borders of North Carolina and the boundaries of the ESF were created in ArcMap, it 
was discovered that many of these historic events actually occurred beyond the North Carolina‘s 
territorial waters and the ESF boundaries.  After the events were filtered to only include events 
occurring within the northern and southern borders of North Carolina and within the eastern 
borders of the ESF, it was possible to examine the action types, nationalities, and vessels present 
within the study area so that statistical observations could be made.        
 This was done by exporting the attribute table of all the events occurring within the study 
area and the characteristics of each vessel contributing to those events back into an Excel 
spreadsheet of pertinent information.  Once this overall spreadsheet had been created, it was 
possible to copy the spreadsheet‘s columns into additional spreadsheets depicting information to 
be statistically analyzed.  This allowed characteristics of vessels ranging from nationality, to 
vessel type, to gross tonnage, and to date of build to be analyzed, allowing portrayal of overall 
characteristics and observations about key components of the battle to be made.  Similarly, these 
Excel spreadsheets allowed data to be arranged in a chronological order to determine if the 
characteristics of the battle within North Carolina‘s regional waters followed the same patterns 
reported by the ESF for the entire coast.  Finally, the spreadsheets allowed the most successful 
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U-boats to be compared in terms of vessels attacked versus vessels sunk as well as gross 
tonnages destroyed by each individual U-boat.   
 In order to portray this information in an attractive and easily understandable manner, the 
Excel spreadsheets were exported into a student version of OriginPro 8.1, which is a data 
analysis and graphing software package (OriginLab, Northampton, MA).  This software package 
allowed statistical information to be presented in the visual form of charts and graphs that 
convey a large amount of information very quickly.  The power of these charts in presenting 
statistical characteristics comes from their ability to depict multiple variables in relation to one 
another and to show the trends that are discussed throughout historic documents.  These statistics 
then provide a greater understanding of the events, nationalities, and vessel types within the 
study area.  This understanding then provides the basic knowledge required to begin visualizing 
how the battle played out and allows the geographic locations and geographic analysis of the 
battle to carry more meaning. 
Spatial Analysis 
 
 Although the main question driving this thesis focused on the feasibility of mapping the 
boundaries of a naval battle that spanned from 1942 to 1945, multiple other geographical 
analyses were conducted to represent smaller aspects of the battle that contributed to the overall 
extent of the engagement.  To do this successfully, several different battlefield maps were 
created in ArcMap, each requiring the use of different geospatial analysis tools and different 
shapefiles created throughout the process of generating the GIS.  Although many of these 
analyses rely upon the same dataset, the different maps portray diverse ways of observing the 
battlefield in relation to historic trends in activity, shipping routes, and U-boat attacks.   
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Despite the fact that the seascape and the events contained within it could also be 
analyzed in numerous other geographical ways that depict additional spatial trends, these 
analyses provide a basic glimpse of the trends occurring and allow the overall seascape affected 
by the battle to be observed.  Similarly, while other increasingly sophisticated geostatistical 
analyses could be run on the datasets, the amount of information pertinent to this study gleaned 
from these analyses became muddled.  For this reason, the temptation to run geostatistical 
analyses solely for the sake of running them was resisted so that only information crucial to this 
study would be depicted.  While this does not mean that additional analysis cannot be conducted 
to answer different research questions, it does mean that only the analyses that contributed 
directly to the research questions are mapped and included here.  It is these simple analyses that 
allow the overall geographical trends in the battle to be understood and provide the information 
required to delineate the extents of the entire battlefield.      
Conclusion 
 
 Taking a broad approach to the data collected through historical research and statistically 
and geospatially analyzing it allows for a comprehensive overview of the Battle of the Atlantic 
as it transpired off North Carolina.  By using the geographical extents of the battlefield and 
specific locations of events occurring within it, historic trends in the battle could be observed, 
and trends occurring within North Carolina‘s waters compared to trends in the entire battle off 
the American coast.  Similarly, preliminary statistical observations were made about the 
battlefield that have opened venues for future comparative analysis with other regions where the 
Battle of the Atlantic took place.  By following a structured methodology and resisting the 
temptation to become too focused on specific sites and events occurring within the battle a model 
for mapping naval battlefields based upon their material remains as well as the intangible 
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evidence of battle event locations only left behind in the historic documents has been made.  It is 
these historic documents and the events they reveal about the Battle of the Atlantic that will be 
addressed in the following chapters.         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE: THE GERMANS ATTACK 
 
Background 
 
On March 16, 1935, Hitler proclaimed military independence and began rebuilding the 
German U-boat fleet despite sanctions banning U-boat construction set by the Treaty of 
Versailles (League of Nations 1919; Bekker 1974:26).  By doing so, he set in motion the events 
that would lead to the loss of 787 U-boats and the lives of over 30,000 German officers and 
sailors sent to submerged graves in waters around the world during World War II (Kemp 1997:7-
8).  These losses deprived Germany of nearly 60 percent of all U-boats constructed before and 
during the war (Botting 1979:16).  While the loss of lives and U-boats is massive, it seems 
somewhat miniscule when compared to the damage these submarines inflicted on the merchant 
marine of Allied and neutral nations throughout the war.   
This is especially impressive since U-boat captains began the war at a severe 
disadvantage since Hitler imposed strict regulations on their use.  These restrictions included 
requiring U-boat crews to warn any boats that were not armed merchant ships or escorted by 
warships before firing upon them and placing passenger ships off limits to submarines.  Despite 
these limitations, U-boat crews obtained great successes (Ruge 1957:60-61).  As early as 
September 1939, U-boats managed to sink 40 ships amounting to 153,000 gross tons through 
direct engagement and another 31,000 gross tons by laying mines.  In October 1939, U-boats 
managed to sink an additional 135,000 gross tons with torpedoes and 29,000 gross tons with 
mines (Ruge 1957:60-61).  By June 1940, Germany finally possessed enough U-boats to 
implement a new tactic designed to inflict maximal damage on the Allied convoy system.  This 
tactic, aptly named ―wolf-pack,‖ called for U-boat commanders to delay attacking convoys until 
multiple U-boats closed on the convoy‘s position (Busch 1955:40-41).  With these new tactics, 
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Donitz boasted, ―I will show that the U-boat alone can win this war‖ (Editors of Navy Times 
1962:104).  As if to prove this point, multiple U-boats attacked Convoy HX-72 on September 20, 
1940, sinking 11 merchant ships.  In October 1940, another two convoys were attacked by U-
boats resulting in the loss of 31 ships, bringing the total number of losses for that month to 63 
ships totaling 352,000 gross tons.  On December 1 and 2, 1940 Convoy HX-90 was attacked five 
times resulting in the loss of 10 ships and an escort vessel.  This brought the total losses since 
beginning the war to 1,026 Allied and neutral ships weighing over 4 million gross tons (Editors 
of Navy Times 1962:107-108).  
Despite foul weather in the Atlantic limiting attacks at the beginning of 1941, the U-boats 
were able to maintain an average of 225,000 gross tons sunk through March 1941.  Then from 
March through May, the U-boats destroyed 818,000 tons of Allied shipping (Editors of Navy 
Times 1962:108-109).  As 1941 started to come to a close and Allied shipping losses continued 
to climb America managed to preserve a neutral stance in the war.  Despite hiding behind the 
façade of neutrality early in the war, however, America had already aggravated Germany by 
sending fifty destroyers to England in return for a 99-year lease on Bermuda, as well as openly 
radioing positions of German fleets to England (Busch 1955:41-42).  It is partially because of 
these actions that Germany was so eager to bring the war to America as soon as America‘s veil 
of neutrality was lifted one ―infamous‖ day in December 1941. 
The Battle Comes to America 
 
 On December 7, 1941, when Japan bombed Pearl Harbor, it became evident that the 
United States would no longer remain diplomatically neutral in the war and that the spread of 
aggression across the globe was inevitable.  On December 8, the U-boat Befehlshaber der 
Unterseeboote (B.d.U.), which gave operational commands and recorded the locations of U-
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boats at sea, acknowledged this fact and noted in its command diary that, ―Japan has started 
hostilities against England and USA--an event of great importance which must also, in a very 
short time, affect the former restriction of U-boat warfare in the Atlantic‖ (Befehlshaber der 
Unterseeboote [B.d.U.] 1941:254).  Just one day later, all German U-boats received Standing 
Order No.14, which gave them operational freedom to attack and sink any American vessel or 
any vessel assisting the United States in its war against Germany.  Furthermore, lifting 
restrictions against American vessels allowed the German B.d.U. to begin planning an attack on 
American waters.  Pleased with the thought of attacking the United States on its home front, 
Admiral Karl Doenitz, the acting commander of the B.d.U., quickly requested twelve large U-
boats from the Naval War Staff for an offensive against the American Coast. In his plea to obtain 
these U-boats, Doenitz explained, 
The lifting of all restrictions regarding U.S.A. ships and the so-called Pan-American safety 
zone has been ordered by the Führer.  Therefore, the whole area of the American coasts will 
become open for operations by U-boats, an area in which the assembly of ships takes place in 
single traffic at the few points of departure of Atlantic convoys.  There is an opportunity here, 
therefore, of intercepting enemy merchant ships under conditions which have ceased almost 
completely for some time.  Further, there will hardly be any question of an efficient patrol in 
the American coastal area, at least of a patrol used to U-boats.  Attempts must be made to 
utilize as quickly as possible these advantages, which will disappear very shortly, and to 
achieve a "spectacular success" on the American coast (B.d.U. 1941:255). 
  
On December 10, the Naval War Staff informed Doenitz that he could have six U-boats for his 
attack against America, but that the remainder of the requested U-boats would be kept along the 
Mediterranean and Gibraltar shipping routes (B.d.U. 1941:257).   
With the number of U-boats available to Doenitz cut in half, he regretted that he would 
not be able to achieve the ―spectacular success‖ originally hoped for, but continued to plan an 
attack on America nevertheless.  As he weighed options for attack, Doenitz concluded that with 
just six U-boats the best course of action would be to spread them along the American Coast to 
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take advantage of America‘s inexperienced forces.  He also reasoned that if he spread out his 
attacking U-boats too much, American defenses would be strengthened along the entire coast 
resulting in spoiled hunting grounds and no chance of shifting operations later.  Doenitz, 
therefore, concluded that initial operations would take place along the northern half of the 
American East Coast.  He believed that if the U-boats struck first in the Caribbean and Gulf of 
Mexico, the United States would still buffer defenses in northern waters that were closer to 
Germany.  If the U-boats attacked in northern waters first, however, Doenitz believed the 
Americans would not know the true capabilities of the German submarines and would not 
strengthen their southern defenses, allowing the U-boats‘ theater of operations to be shifted later 
in the war in order to continually obtain success in American waters (B.d.U. 1941:258).      
 On December 19, the Naval War Staff gave Admiral Doenitz permission to send U-67, 
U-107, and U-108 to American waters once these three submarines finished their current 
operations, and were refitted and refueled at Lorient.  The same day, Doenitz revealed that U-128 
would also be refueled in Lorient and should be ready to sail in Operation Paukenschlag or 
―Drum-roll,‖ the aptly named attack on shipping off the American coast (B.d.U. 1941:274-275; 
Hickam Jr. 1989:2).  The addition of U-128 to the list of submarines sailing in Paukenschlag 
gave Doenitz his final U-boat for the offensive against America.  U-66, U-109, U-123, U-125, 
and U-130, were the other vessels chosen for the cross-Atlantic voyage.  After much preparation, 
U-125 left port on December 18 and U-123 departed on December 23 as the two lead vessels in 
the fleet.  U-66 followed on Christmas Day, U-109 and U-130 left on December 27.  To the 
chagrin of Doenitz, who already sent far fewer submarines than he wanted, U-128 did not return 
for refueling until December 24 and could not join Operation Paukenschlag (B.d.U. 
1941:271,279,281,282,284).  
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 Following Doenitz‘s strict orders to stay out of sight as long as possible and to 
commence operations only after they received word to initiate hostilities, the submarines of 
Operation Paukenschlag began their voyage across the Atlantic to patrol American waters 
between the St. Lawrence and Cape Hatteras.  The five U-boat commanders received orders 
halfway through the voyage that the commencement date of Paukenschlag was January 13, 
1942, unless a particularly valuable Allied naval vessel or merchant vessel over 10,000 tons 
could be sunk during the voyage (Hickam Jr. 1989:4,8).  At midnight, January 1, 1942, 
Kapitänleutnant Reinhard Hardegen, commander of U-123, noted in his Kriegstagebüch (KTB), 
the patrol diary of the U-boat arm, that it was the ―[b]eginning of a new year in the North 
Atlantic‖ and that the ―boat can look back on a successful year and we all go confidently into the 
new year in the hope of new successes, which will contribute to the end of the war‖ (Hardegen 
1941-1942:4).  It is unlikely that Hardegen could have predicted the extent of the ―new 
successes‖ he would encounter along the American Coast. 
 On the night of January 11, Eastern War Time (EWT), (the morning of January 12 in 
German time) two days before Paukenschlag was to begin, Hardegen and the crew of U-123 
spotted a large steamer they believed belonged to the Holt Shipping Company and weighed over 
10,000 gross tons.  Figuring he was still some distance from American waters and probably 
would not alert American defenses to the incoming U-boats, Hardegen decided to attack.  After 
planning his attack and getting his submarine into position, Hardegen fired a well-placed G7a 
torpedo from tube three that caught the merchant vessel just aft of its funnel.  As the merchant 
vessel began settling by the stern, the radioman sent out a distress signal that said Cyclops of 
9,076 gross tons was sinking and needed assistance.  After it became apparent that the vessel 
would not immediately sink, Hardegen fired a Coup de Grace from 600 meters, which broke 
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Cyclops in half and sent it to the bottom.  While the vessel was slightly lighter than the 10,000 
gross tons Hardegen hoped for, a valuable target had been sunk nevertheless.  Hardegen quickly 
fled the area and continued on course toward the American coast hopeful of arriving at his patrol 
area in time to commence Operation Paukenschlag.  Unfortunately, for Hardegen, the attack on 
Cyclops put him behind schedule and another U-boat captain would be the first to draw blood in 
North American waters (Hardegen 1941-1942:10-12; Hickam Jr. 1989:8). 
 The early morning of December 13, according to the German time kept in the U-boats, 
found Korvettenkapitän Ernst Kals, commander of U-130, already following and plotting an 
attack on a merchant vessel in the waters off Newfoundland.  Once ahead of the vessel, Kals set 
up his shot and attacked in ―the first beat of the drum‖ (Kals 1941-1942:11).  The torpedo, fired 
from tube one, struck Frisco after 72 seconds.  The crew of Frisco quickly began sending 
distress messages, so Kals hurriedly fired a Coup de Grace, at the vessel he believed to be a 
6,000 gross ton tanker, which set Frisco ablaze, and sped away.  Just over eight-and-a-half hours 
later, U-130 loosed another torpedo at a roughly 7,000 gross ton vessel.  After 54 seconds, the 
torpedo stuck its target, causing the merchant ship stop moving and to list slightly to starboard.  
Realizing that the vessel would not sink, Kals decided to fire another torpedo.   
While the torpedo was underway, the merchant vessel suddenly sprang back to life and 
began making headway, causing the torpedo to miss.  Immediately, Kals set up for another shot 
and fired a Coup de Grace from tube 2.  After 24 seconds, the torpedo stuck the merchant vessel 
between its bridge and funnel.  Quickly the stern of the vessel rose out of the water and the entire 
ship slipped beneath the surface leaving a growing oil slick in the water.  Satisfied with his 
second kill, Kals turned his submarine away, leaving another vessel, Friar Rock, on the bottom 
of the Atlantic (Kals 1941-1942:11-12).  In the course of a day, Kals sank two merchant ships 
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without exposing his submarine to any danger, something Germany‘s U-boat arm had ceased to 
experience in waters throughout most of the rest of the world.  Unfortunately, for Kals, he was 
somewhat rusty in his estimations of gross tonnage.  It turned out the vessel Frisco that he 
believed to be of 6,000 gross tons was only 1,582 gross tons, and Friar Rock was only 5,427 
gross tons (Lloyds Register of Shipping 1942-1943:FRI-FRO, 1942-1943:FRE-FRI).  Although 
these first three attacks occurred in waters off Canada and not within boundaries of the United 
States‘ NANCF (Figure 3.1), US coastal waters would soon become the German stalking 
grounds (Freeman 1987:1). 
 
FIGURE 3.1.  Initial Boundary Line of the North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier, Google Earth 
Image Adapted by Author from Coordinates Provided in the North Atlantic Naval Coastal 
Frontier War Diary (Freeman 1987:1). 
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Not to be outdone by Kals, Reinhard Hardegen quickly recovered the ground he lost 
attacking Cyclops and entered his patrol area off New York on January 14.  Upon arriving off the 
coast, Hardegen was surprised to see lights coming from towns around Narragansett Bay and the 
Montauk Lighthouse beacon still brightly burning.  Even more surprising, however, was the 
large tanker Hardegen spotted leaving port with its lights illuminated.  Incredulous that the 
Americans were still acting as if they were not at war, Hardegen decided not to press his luck 
and to sink the tanker with a spread of two torpedoes.  Unfortunately, for Hardegen, the first 
torpedo either missed the tanker or did not explode, and the second torpedo, despite exploding in 
a terrific column of fire and mushroom cloud of smoke, left the vessel afloat.  Almost instantly, 
the crew of the merchant ship sent out a distress message on the 41-meter short-wave signal 
stating that they had been torpedoed or struck a mine and identifying the vessel as the 9,577 
gross ton Norness.  
Realizing the size of the vessel, Hardegen ordered another torpedo fired at the ship.  
Again, a tremendous flare and column of smoke rose skyward, but the hardy merchant vessel 
remained on an even keel.  The crew of U-123 fired yet a forth torpedo and after counting down 
the seconds could not believe their luck, there were no sounds of impact.  Aghast at what was 
occurring, Hardegen noted that ―[m]issing a stopped target is not possible.  Now I have to 
sacrifice a fifth torpedo…‖ (Hardegen 1941-1942:12).  The fifth torpedo quickly found its target 
and sent the stern of Norness to the bottom of the Atlantic, causing its bow to point 30 meters 
skyward, as an ―interesting menace to navigation, which surely has to be dispersed by the 
Americans‖ (Hardegen 1941-1942:12-13).  Early the next morning, German time, Hardegen 
proceeded closer to the New York coastline observing tugs and trawlers moving about with 
lights illuminated and could spot the lights inland continuing to burn.  Soon he picked up a 
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distress message from the 4,113 gross ton Dayrose which was sinking off Cape Race, Canada, 
the victim of U-552 which had recently entered Canadian waters separate from the Paukenschlag 
group (Hardegen 1941-1942:13-14; Hickam Jr. 1989:329).   
 By 0941 German Time or 0341 Eastern War Time (EWT) on December 15, Hardegen 
had found another target, this time the steamer Coimbra.  The steamer‘s brightly lit lights helped 
Hardegen swing 123 into position for an attack.  When the steamer was 800 meters distant, 
Hardegen ordered a G7e torpedo fired.  Again, the torpedoes of U-123 caused a dramatic display, 
lighting up the sky and silhouetting everything on the ocean in an explosion that made the 
Norness attack appear to be ―mediocre fireworks‖ (Hardegen 1941-1942:14-15).  A quick Coup 
de Grace was then fired, causing the vessel to sink by the stern and leaving the bow sticking out 
of the water much like Norness.  Amused by his own handiwork, Hardegen noted, in his KTB for 
January 15 that ―[t]hese are some pretty buoys we are leaving for the Yankees in the harbor 
approaches as replacement for the lightships‖ (Hardegen 1941-1942:15).  Feeling that he had 
warned enough vessels of the dangers of travelling on the east/west shipping routes, Hardegen 
decided to move his submarine along the north/south routes off the New Jersey coast.  Only once 
in this transition did Hardegen have to crash-dive for an aircraft that dropped four poorly aimed 
bombs, prompting Hardegen to claim that the ―Yankees have much to learn‖ (Hardegen 
1942:15).   
All too eager to teach the Yankees some lessons, Hardegen continued his patrol close 
inshore along shipping routes running from Cape Hatteras to New York and Delaware Bay.  Just 
before dawn on January 17, the crew of U-123 spotted a freighter and decided to use their last 
loaded stern torpedo before heading out to deeper water to spend daylight hours on the ocean 
bottom and reload torpedoes.  Although the freighter only had one lamp on its mast and was 
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travelling with darkened navigational lights the early morning glow made it an easy target for 
123.  Hardegen cut across the vessel‘s bow 600 meters ahead of it and then waited until the 
freighter was directly astern before firing a torpedo.  After nearly a minute, the torpedo struck 
and sent the vessel to the ocean bottom before smoke generated by the torpedo impact settled.  
Feeling confident about the lack of defenses in American waters, Hardegen decided to keep his 
submarine on the surface and head for waters further south where radio messages revealed more 
shipping crossed.  After crash-diving five times to evade aircraft, U-123 finally reached its 
destination.  Soon after arriving, U-123 was welcomed to the area by the sight of a giant fireball 
and the sounds of two of U-66’s torpedoes striking the tanker Allan Jackson in the coastal waters 
that would become synonymous with U-boat attacks and the most dangerous waters in the world 
for merchant ships (Hardegen 1941-1942:16-18; Hickam Jr. 1989:11). 
The North Carolina Hunting Grounds 
 
 After leaving port on Christmas Day, Korvettenkapitän Richard Zapp had taken his 
submarine U-66 straight across the Atlantic, attempting to remain out of sight of any Allied 
vessels and not attacking any ships during his voyage.  On January 9, Admiral Doenitz sent a 
message to all submarines involved in Operation Paukenschlag revealing patrol areas for each 
vessel.  The grids given to Richard Zapp for his patrol included the waters along the North 
Carolina coast, particularly those around Cape Hatteras (B.d.U. 1942:11).  These waters 
geographically presented submarines with great chances for success as ―[h]undreds of ships used 
the wide, warm Gulf Stream that swerved near Cape Hatteras to sail north to the ports of North 
America and Europe.  Southbound ships, not wanting to sail against the Gulf Stream or swing 
too far out into the open ocean, were forced near the jutting North Carolina Coast.  It was a 
natural choke point‖ (Hickam Jr. 1989:11).  Since arriving in his patrol area on January 13, Zapp 
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had remained quiet, not sinking any vessels and monitoring merchant vessel activity in his grids.  
The United States Navy was about to make his task of finding ships much easier, however.  On 
January 17, the German B.d.U. intercepted an American radio message ordering steamers 
heading to northern ports to aim for Cape Hatteras, or as close inshore as they could safely 
navigate.  The Americans had just routed northbound vessels into the waters where U-66 lay 
waiting (B.d.U. 1942a:22).        
 The crew of U-66 did not have to wait much longer for its first target to enter their patrol 
area.  Early in the morning on January 18, the 6,635 gross ton Allan Jackson, loaded with 72,870 
barrels of crude oil, passed 50 miles seaward of Cape Hatteras on a clear calm night.  Since 
leaving Cartagena, Columbia, the master of Allan Jackson had not received any information 
about U-boats in American waters and continued to travel without zigzagging.  Unfortunately, 
for the crew of Allan Jackson, this straight path of travel and the ships‘ speed of ten knots made 
it an easy and appealing target for the crew of U-66.  After carefully planning his attack and 
exploiting the moonless night to get into position, Zapp unleashed his first two torpedoes of 
Operation Paukenschlag.  Several seconds later, the first torpedo found its mark, striking Allan 
Jackson forward of the bridge on the starboard side.   Before the crew of Allan Jackson could 
respond, the second of Zapp‘s torpedoes struck behind the deckhouse and broke the stricken 
merchant vessel in half, causing it to sink within five minutes as the first vessel sunk east of 
North Carolina.  Unfortunately, it would not be the last sunk in these waters, as the lingering 
smoke and flames of Allan Jackson had already served as a beacon to guide U-123 into the 
waters off Hatteras (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations [OCNO]:1942d; United States 
Coast Guard [USCG] 1944a:1; Hickam Jr. 1989:11-13).         
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 Despite spotting several tankers that morning, Hardegen was not able to get 123 into 
position before daylight and decided to spend the day submerged and resume his hunt at 
nightfall.  Coming to the surface on the night of January 18, Hardegen felt confident he could use 
his remaining torpedoes in the calm starlit conditions that greeted him and began taking his 
submarine back towards Cape Hatteras on a voyage of  unprecedented destruction off the 
American Coast.  Within three hours of beginning the evenings‘ patrol, Hardegen spotted the 
lights of another steamer and set up an attack.  Before firing a torpedo, he spotted an additional 
three steamers he hoped he could catch after sinking his current target.  Just after 2315 EWT, one 
of U-123‘s torpedoes struck Norvana just aft of its funnel from close range.  Almost 
immediately, Norvana plunged into the Atlantic stern first, taking its entire crew of 29 sailors to 
the bottom.  The only evidence the United States Navy received suggesting Norvana had been 
sunk was a battered and empty lifeboat from the ship found at sea four days later.  Hardegen, 
understanding that his duty was to sink Allied ships, did not stop to look for survivors and 
proceeded to follow the other three steamers at maximum speed.  While tracking these three 
vessels, the crew of 123 spotted another vessel off their starboard side and decided to set up for 
an attack since they were already ahead of it.  When it came closer, they discovered that it was a 
very small ship and decided not to waste one of their last three torpedoes on it.  Although the 
other three steamers escaped, Hardegen learned a valuable lesson while following them.  He 
discovered that the merchant vessels were navigating using the lighted buoys posted along the 
coast.  Deciding to exploit this newly gained knowledge, he began following the buoys 
(Hardegen 1941-1942:19; USCG 1944q:1-2; Rohwer 1999:74). 
 Hardegen‘s discovery of the navigational buoys soon paid off as he found another target 
within a mere half hour of following the buoys.  After following this vessel for almost three 
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hours, the crew of U-123 set up for a shot and eased to within 250 meters of the merchant ship to 
avoid missing with the few remaining torpedoes.  Hardegen ordered the torpedoes set to a 
running depth of two meters to prevent them from running into the bottom since the submarine 
was operating in a scant seven to eight meters, not nearly deep enough to crash dive.  Once 
everything had been calibrated, Hardegen ordered one torpedo fired at 0309 EWT on January 19, 
and watched it jump out of the water twice and skim along the surface until it struck its target 
and exploded with such force that debris from the torpedo and the merchant ship City of Atlanta 
rained down on the submarine‘s deck.  As Hardegen took his submarine on a ―victory lap,‖ City 
of Atlanta capsized to port and sank with its bow protruding out of the water.  Spotting additional 
steamer lights on the horizon, Hardegen sped off to intercept them leaving City of Atlanta 
burning and three survivors, of the original crew of 49, clinging to wreckage for six hours until 
they were finally rescued (Hardegen 1941-1942:19; USCG 1944n:1-2).        
 Within a short amount of time, U-123 caught up to the vessels on the horizon and the 
lights onshore backlighted the silhouettes of five different ships.  Hardegen decided to save his 
torpedoes and to attack the lead vessel with his deck gun.  After swinging his submarine into the 
wake of the tanker Malay, Hardegen ordered the tanker shelled just an hour and a half after U-
123 had claimed its last victim.  After several successful hits on Malay’s engine room, the tanker 
ceased progress and began to burn.  Feeling the tanker had enough for the time being, Hardegen 
started chasing the other steamers in an attempt to sink them with his remaining two torpedoes.  
After two of these proved to be too fast for the submarine to catch, the crew of U-123 intercepted 
a distress message from Malay revealing its size as 8,207 gross tons.  Astounded that the vessel 
was actually that large, Hardegen decided to head back to it and finish it off with a Coup de 
Grace.  Before turning back, however, Hardegen waited to destroy another merchant vessel that 
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he spotted heading his way.  Since one of his engines was acting up because of a broken cooling 
hose, Hardegen had to get into position using only one engine.   
Despite this problem, Hardegen still managed to loose a torpedo at 0600 EWT.  The 
torpedo quickly travelled the 450 meters to Ciltviara and broke the vessel‘s back.  Satisfied with 
yet another kill, Hardegen began to head back towards Malay, which had just radioed that it had 
put the onboard fire out and was operational again.  Guessing the direction of the vessel, 
Hardegen proceeded at full speed until his crew could smell the burning tanker in the distance.  
As Malay came into sight, Hardegen also spotted City of Delhi entirely stopped as it recovered 
one of its lifeboats (Hardegen 1941-1942:19-22).  Despite this being the easier target, Hardegen 
sped towards Malay noting that it ―annoyed me that the tanker was underway again and I wanted 
to spoil his joy over it‖ (Hardegen 1941-1942:20).  Soon the crew of Malay spotted U-123 in the 
early morning light and attempted to outmaneuver the submarine.   
At 0645 EWT, Hardegen fired his final torpedo and caught the fleeing tanker just ahead 
of the engine room telling it to ―[b]lame yourself for sending a hasty report of about [sic] being 
operational‖ (Hardegen 1941-1942:21).  Certain that he destroyed the tanker, Hardegen 
proceeded to deeper waters before the morning became too bright.  Soon, however, the men 
aboard the 16,966 gross ton Kosmos II spotted the submarine on the surface and thinking it was 
damaged attempted to ram it.  Hardegen, wishing that he had torpedoes remaining, decided it 
best to outrun the merchant ship since both engines were operational again and he needed to 
enter deeper waters where he could crash dive in the event his submarine was spotted by an 
aircraft. 
While Malay never did sink, Hardegen nevertheless delivered a hefty blow to merchant 
shipping along the Eastern Seaboard and quickly reported his success to Doenitz who replied 
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with the message, ―To the Paukenschläger Hardegen. Bravo! Very well drummed‖ (Hardegen 
1941-1942:22; Hickam Jr. 1989:16-17).  On January 24, Hardegen received another message 
from B.d.U., revealing that he would receive the Knight‘s Cross for his patrol and in a ceremony 
that took place within 123’s control room, Hardegen‘s crew presented him with a temporary 
medal made by the crew.  Emboldened by his success and the prestige given him, Hardegen sank 
two more vessels with gunfire alone while crossing the Atlantic and speeding for a homeport to 
receive his actual Knight‘s Cross (Hardegen 1941-1942:24-29).  Although Hardegen 
immediately expressed regret that the attack on the American Coast had to be conducted with so 
few U-boats, he hoped that the other Paukenschlag U-boats still in American waters were having 
as much success as his crew and submarine had.                  
 Hardegen did not need to wish for success for his fellow U-boatmen too hard, as they 
were finding similar unchallenging conditions all along the American Coast.  Just over an hour 
before Hardegen sunk City of Atlanta, Zapp struck again, sending the Canadian Passenger Liner 
Lady Hawkins to the bottom.  Of the approximately 300 Lady Hawkins passengers and crew 
members who entered the water that morning of January 19, only 71 were rescued on January 28 
(Freeman 1987:34,40; Hickam Jr. 1989:13).  On January 22, Zapp most likely sent the 5,335 
gross ton Olympic to the bottom with two stern fired torpedoes.  Olympic disappeared without a 
trace but was travelling from Curacao to Baltimore and likely crossing the area Zapp was 
patrolling when he reported firing two torpedoes and that the targeted ―Steamer breaks apart 
midships and sinks within one minute‖ (Hickam Jr. 1989:19; Rowher 1999:74).  Late the next 
evening, EWT, Zapp finished his Paukenschlag patrol with his own dramatic finale.  Taking his 
submarine on patrol a few miles southeast of the Diamond Shoals Light Buoy, Zapp managed to 
place his vessel in the path of two northbound merchant vessels, one the 8,017 gross ton Venore, 
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and the other the 8,139 gross ton Empire Gem (Lloyd‘s Register 1941-1942:VEN, 1942-
1943:EMP).   
As Venore approached the Diamond Shoals Light Buoy, Empire Gem, which had been 
visible astern since noon, continued to gain on Venore until it was only a mile or two astern.  
Seizing the opportunity to catch two ships travelling close together, Zapp acted quickly and fired 
at Empire Gem.  U-66‘s torpedoes struck Empire Gem and set it ablaze.  Feeling the shock 
aboard Venore and spotting the other merchant vessel burning, the crew of Venore began to 
panic.  Without permission, the crew, some of whom had seen the submarine motor past the 
burning Empire Gem, began to ready the lifeboats while the captain radioed the engine room for 
more speed.  When one of U-66’s torpedoes struck Venore, any remaining semblance of 
composure left the crew.  One member jumped off the stern of the merchant vessel, while three 
lifeboats where launched.  Since the vessel was travelling at a speed of over ten knots, two of the 
lifeboats were destroyed once they touched the water and the other barely managed to escape 
with two crewmembers aboard.  Shortly after, another of U-66’s torpedoes caught Venore‘s 
number nine ballast tank and severely rocked the vessel.  Quickly the vessel‘s engines were cut 
and the remainder of the crew began abandoning ship, leaving the Venore in a sinking condition.  
Satisfied with his kills, Zapp took his submarine to deeper waters to prepare for the return 
voyage to France, leaving two more merchant vessel hulks littering the ocean bottom off North 
Carolina (OCNO 1942a; USCG 1944s:1-2; Freeman 1987:16-19; Hickam Jr. 1989:19-21).   
 Both U-109 and U-130 also recorded more kills along the American coast before they 
ended their patrols.  U-109, after being plagued with a faulty gyrocompass, poor weather, and six 
torpedo misses, finally claimed its first success on January 23 when it sank Thirlby.  U-109 
struck again on the last day of the month sending Tacoma Star to the bottom.  With its American 
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coastal patrol over, U-109 began its trip back across the ocean, sinking Montrolite and Halcyon 
on the way (Bleichrodt 1941-1942:1-36; Freeman 1989:329-330; Rohwer 1999:76-77).  U-130, 
which had not had any success in northern waters after January 13, began moving south along 
the East Coast and sank Alexandra Höegh on January 21, Veranger on January 25, and Francis 
E. Powell on January 27 (Kals 1941-1942:19,22,23; Hickam Jr. 1989:22,329).  While none of 
these attacks occurred in North Carolina waters, some believe U-130 also attacked Halo with its 
deck gun off Diamond Shoals on January 27 (Hickam Jr. 1989:22,329; Rohwer 1999:76).  This 
seems extraordinarily unlikely, however, as Kals KTB for the same day does not record an attack 
with the submarine‘s deck gun.  Furthermore, the KTB states that Kals was in a different grid 
than the attack occurred and had grounded his boat at a depth of 52 meters to avoid two surface 
vessels with Asdic during the entire duration of the attack (Kals 1941-1942:24).  While the attack 
on Halo remains a mystery, the final Paukenschlag U-boat, U-125, definitively sank its only 
victim in waters east of North Carolina on January 26.                      
 Despite Doenitz ordering Kapitänleutnant Ulrich Folkers U-125 into Grid CA, which 
included the heavily travelled waters off North Carolina, U-125 had not sunk any Allied vessels 
by January 22 (B.d.U. 1942:11,29).  Upset that he had not destroyed any ships, despite firing six 
torpedoes at potential targets, Folkers radioed that he was going to patrol further south in Grid 
DC in hopes of finding new targets.  Before reaching the DC grid, however, Folkers stumbled 
upon dense southbound shipping traffic in grids CA 58 through CA 88 (B.d.U. 1942:38).  
Despite reporting that U-125 had three bow torpedo tubes out of order and an empty stern tube, 
Folkers managed to attack a stopped tanker, Olney on January 25 with two torpedoes.  One 
torpedo was a dud, but Folkers radioed that the detonation of the other torpedo could be heard 
aboard 125 and counted the attack successful.  Unfortunately for Folkers, the crew of Olney 
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reported being attacked by a submarine, but sustaining no damage to their ship (B.d.U. 1942a:38; 
Rohwer 1999:76).  Possibly gaining a boost of confidence from this attack, Folkers managed to 
get his submarine into position for another attack four minutes after midnight, EWT, on January 
26.  The outcome of this attack was not in question, as the crew of U-125 watched West Notus 
slip beneath the waves, and reported to B.d.U. ―Sank a 7000 ton freighter in CA 8797 on 26 
January‖ (B.d.U. 1942a:38; Hickam Jr. 1989:22).  Unfortunately, for the crew of West Notus, 
their ship was reported as lost somewhere in the Caribbean during the month of February, long 
after survivors of the attack perished just miles off the coast of North Carolina (Coman Jr. and 
Gibbs 1949:317; Rohwer 1999:76).  On January 28, Folkers received orders to return to port and 
began his trek across the Atlantic (B.d.U. 1942a:40).   
Although the Paukenschlag boats began heading to their homeports after their 
extraordinary success, the American coast would not receive any respite from the U-boat 
onslaught.  Just one day after Paukenschlag officially began, additional smaller U-boats began 
arriving off the Canadian coast to continue the attacks begun with Paukenschlag.  As soon as 
reports of operation Paukenschlag reached Doenitz, however, the primary American hunting 
grounds were shifted to the waters off North Carolina.  It did not take much to convince Doenitz 
to make these waters the primary patrol areas for his U-boat fleet since both the Germans and the 
Americans already recognized that the attacks of Hardegen and Zapp exposed the most 
productive waters along the American East coast.  The primary battleground off the American 
Coast had been set in the waters off North Carolina, an area that ―was starting to be called a new 
name by the freighter and tanker crews: Torpedo Junction‖ (Hickam Jr. 1989:22).  
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The NANCF made no pretense of the fact that the waters off Cape Hatteras were already 
becoming a hotspot for U-boat activity.  The numbers of vessels sunk in these waters alone was 
certainly a cause for concern.  In the War Diary of the NANCF, the Frontier revealed, 
The sinking of the Norness was the signal for the opening of an unprecedented submarine 
attack upon the merchant shipping in the coastal waters. In the remaining 17 days of the 
month, 13 vessels were lost through enemy action. The worst day of all was the 19th, when 
three ships went down off Cape Hatteras. This area, where the land reaches out almost to the 
100-fathom curve, proved to be a favorite hunting ground for the U-boats. The losses in these 
waters during the month were six vessels, almost half the total for the whole Frontier 
(Freeman 1989:21).   
 
If the NANCF had known that West Notus was sunk east of Hatteras, the total number of ships 
lost in these waters would have been exactly half of all ships lost within Frontier waters.  
Unfortunately, just recognizing the most dangerous area for shipping would not stop the U-boat 
offensive.  This was especially the case as Hardegen returned from his patrol and presented his 
report to B.d.U. on February 8, touting opportunities available to U-boats off Hatteras.   
The B.d.U. summarized Hardegen‘s patrol stating that, "The expectation of encountering 
many independently routed ships, clumsy handling of ships, slight, inexperienced sea and air 
patrols and defenses was so truly fulfilled that conditions had to be described as almost 
completely of peacetime standards‖ (B.d.U. 1942:67).  Hardegen ―found such an abundance of 
opportunities for attack in the sea area south of New York to Cape Hatteras that he could not 
possibly utilize them all:  At times there were as many as 10 ships in sight that were sailing with 
lights on peacetime courses‖ (B.d.U. 1942:67).  If the promising reports of Hardegen were not 
enough to reinforce Doenitz decision to keep sending U-boats to the coast of North Carolina, the 
additional merchant ships already being sunk off the Carolina coast certainly were. 
 On February 3, U-106’s Kapitänleutnant, Hermann Rasch, reported heavy ship 
movements off Norfolk and Cape Hatteras, and that, despite many ships now travelling darkened 
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and zigzagging sharply, he managed to destroy three of them.  One of those, the 15,355 gross ton 
Swedish vessel Amerikaland, which was ―one of the largest and fastest freighters in the world,‖ 
was sunk on the night of February second in the waters off Hatteras (Lloyds Register of Shipping 
1942-1943:AME-AMM; Hickam Jr. 1989:31).  Before all survivors of Amerikaland had been 
recovered or the United States Navy even announced the sinking, Rasch‘s message relating his 
successes around Hatteras began drawing additional U-boats to this area.  As Rasch took U-106 
away from America, having utilized all his torpedoes since he had missed targets with five of 
them and had three dud torpedoes, U-107 and U-108 came to take his place (B.d.U. 1942:53-54; 
New York Herald Tribune 1942a; Hickam Jr. 1989:31-32, 330).   
On February 6, Oberleutnant zur See Harald Gelhaus and U-107 moved into the waters 
off North Carolina and sent Major Wheeler to the bottom without a trace.  As late as February 
17, representatives of the Baltimore Insular Line, which Major Wheeler operated through, were 
still attempting to discover whether the United States Navy knew the fate of the ship (Kiggins 
1942).  Unfortunately, for the Baltimore Insular Line, and United States Navy, the crew of U-107 
would take the whereabouts of the ship with them back across the Atlantic on February 15 
(B.d.U. 1942:77).  Soon after Gelhaus destroyed Major Wheeler, Korvettenkapitän Klaus 
Scholtz, in U-108, moved into the area around Hatteras, and sank Ocean Venture on February 8, 
Tolosa on February 9, and Blink on February 11 (B.d.U. 1942:65; Hickam Jr. 1989:39, 330).  
The crew of Tolosa would never be heard from again, and only six of Blink’s 30-man crew 
would survive after spending 66 hours in a lifeboat watching 17 of their crew pass away from 
exhaustion and exposure.  Three additional members of the crew died in the torpedo blasts and 
four other survivors vanished from sight after boarding a life raft (New York Herald Tribune 
1942b; Hickam Jr. 1989:39).   
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On February 14, U-432 torpedoed and sunk the neutral passenger-cargo ship Buarque off 
Currituck Inlet, marking the first act of aggression towards a Brazilian ship by a German 
submarine in World War II and the first vessel sunk by a type VII U-boat in American waters.  
While only two passengers of the 83 people aboard perished in the attack, the event sparked such 
outrage amongst Brazil‘s leaders that the sinking was not immediately announced.  Since it was 
Carnival time, officials feared the public might riot and destroy the property of German nationals 
in Brazil.  When Buarque survivors finally landed at Norfolk, many women refused photographs 
until they could apply makeup to disguise the effects of seasickness, and a five-year-old boy 
named Freddie Ferreira even declined a jelly desert because he said it reminded him of the ocean 
waves (Christian Science Monitor 1942; New York Times 1942a; Lenton 1967:85; Hickam Jr. 
1989:42).  Despite the passengers scare, they were finally on solid ground and could seek respite 
from the ravages of the sea.   
Unbeknownst to the NANCF, which had just been renamed the Eastern Sea Frontier 
(ESF) on February 6, and the merchant ships sailing around Hatteras, they were also about to get 
a brief respite from the U-boat onslaught as the next wave of submarines were just leaving or 
preparing to leave their home ports in France.  After the sinking of Buarque on February 14, the 
next attacks off North Carolina did not occur until February 27 and 28, when Marore and Leif 
were sent to the bottom.  Marore was destroyed by U-432 which was still operating off the 
American Coast and just reentered the waters of North Carolina, and Leif was sunk by U-653 
another type VII U-boat that had just been given operational freedom to operate off the 
American coast on February 16 (B.d.U. 1942:79,101-102,121; Lenton 1967:124; Freeman 1987: 
43; Hickam Jr. 1989:330).  These two events helped the ESF realize that the brief respite only 
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occurred because German submarines were crossing the Atlantic and the incoming U-boats 
would resume the battle with full vigor.              
 In an unexpected turn of events, however, these two attacks did not quite mark the 
beginning of renewed aggression off the North Carolina coast.  The next major wave of U-boats 
would not begin their attacks until March 7 when U-155 torpedoed and sunk another Brazilian 
vessel, Arabutan.  Fortunately, for the crew of Arabutan, only one member of the crew, who was 
asleep in his bunk, perished in the attack.  The rest of the crew abandoned the stricken ship in an 
orderly fashion, undoubtedly led by Elyseu Propheta Nascimento who had seen this entire 
scenario played out less than a month before when he was a crew member aboard Buarque (New 
York Times 1942b:5).  As Nascimento sat in Norfolk shaking his head in disbelief at his terrible 
streak of luck, several additional U-boat commanders were steering their vessels toward North 
Carolina, destined to litter the ocean floor with the hulks of merchant ships and the bodies of 
their crews in a streak of attacks more severe than any the ESF had previously witnessed.  After 
the initial attack on March 7, ―the submarines maintained the most severe attack yet felt on this 
coast. In the course of 14 days, 21 ships were sent to the bottom‖ (Freeman 1987:94).  Fifteen 
were lost in North Carolina waters and another two were damaged (Freeman 1987:127; Hickam 
Jr. 1989:331-332). The most activity occurred when ―[e]ight vessels, almost onethird [sic] of the 
total for the month, were destroyed in the three days from the 16th through the 18th. After that 
the velocity of the sinking rate diminished, but as the month ended, vessels were going down at 
an average of one a day‖ (Freeman 1987:94).  This month the successful German submarine 
commanders were Kapitänleutnant Erwin Rostin in U-158, Kapitänleutnant Johannes Liebe in U-
332, Kapitänleutnant Johann Mohr in U-124, Kapitänleutnant Walter Flachsenberg in U-71, 
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Kapitänleutnant Reinhard Hardegen in U-123, Oberleutnant zur See Georg Lassen in U-160, and 
Heinrich Schuch in U-105 (Hickam Jr. 1989:331-332; Rohwer 1999:84-87).  
 Erwin Rostin started the string of carnage by sinking the 2,609 gross-ton Caribsea, which 
he mistook for a coastal patrol vessel, on March 11, and the 11,641 gross-ton John D. Gill on 
March 12.  Of Caribsea’s 28 crew members, 21 would not survive the sinking and another 23 of 
the 49 men aboard John D. Gill would perish at sea (B.d.U. 1942:129-130; OCNO 1942f; USCG 
1944h:1,2; USCG 1944m:1,2).  Rostin would strike again on March 14, severely damaging the 
7,118 gross-ton Olean with two torpedoes, and once more on March 15, this time destroying the 
6,952 gross-ton Ario with one torpedo and approximately 20 shells from U-158’s deck gun.  
Fortunately, for the crews of both vessels, the casualty rates aboard each were slightly less, with 
six of the 42 men aboard Olean dying in the attack and another eight of the 34 men aboard Ario 
losing their lives (USCG 1944b:1,2; USCG 1944j:1,2).  After Rostin destroyed Ario, he sent the 
report of his accomplishments back to B.d.U. and began his transatlantic voyage.  The message 
must have taken Doenitz aback slightly as Rostin reported that the Cape Hatteras Lighthouse was 
operating like it was peacetime and that the enemy surface and aerial patrols off the coast of 
North Carolina were virtually nonexistent (B.d.U. 1942:129).  This was still the case on March 
16, when Johann Mohr brought U-124 into North Carolina waters destined to become one of the 
most successful U-boat captains to operate in that zone.  
 Before arriving off the American coast, Mohr had sunk one merchant ship, British 
Resource, on March 14 north of Bermuda.  Once Mohr entered the fruitful waters off North 
Carolina, however, he continued to attack with an intensity that the U-boat high command had 
not witnessed since Hardegen first arrived off the American coast during Operation 
Paukenschlag and turned the waters around his submarine into a veritable killing field.  In a 
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quick streak of attacks, Mohr would sink most of the ships the ESF reported lost between March 
16 and 18.  On the night of March 16, the crew of U-124 spotted a vessel travelling off Hatteras 
entirely blacked out and decided to set up for a shot.  After getting into position, 124 loosed one 
torpedo, which struck the Honduran vessel Ceiba on the port side beneath the bridge.  Within 
three minutes, the ship had listed over and sunk, leaving those passengers lucky enough to get 
into life rafts afloat at sea.  Shortly after, the submarine surfaced in the middle of the life rafts 
and an officer aboard U-124 began questioning the survivors as to the name and tonnage of the 
vessel they had sunk.  Once they received an answer that did not match the actual gross-tonnage 
of the vessel that the Germans had recorded in their register books, the submarine officer 
corrected the survivors, informing them of the actual size of their ship.  Upon finding out that 
Ceiba was merely carrying bananas and had women and children aboard, the U-boatmen 
appeared surprised and left the scene.  Sadly, those aboard Ceiba would not be discovered until 
March 18, at which point only six survivors remained of the 38 crewmembers and 12 passengers 
originally aboard.  Before the Destroyer Hambleton managed to recover the survivors, Mohr 
struck again (B.d.U. 1942:139-140; OCNO 1942g; Freeman 1987:146). 
 On the evening of March 17, the crew of U-124 spotted a group of southbound merchant 
vessels passing the Diamond Shoals Buoy and attacked.  At 1750 EWT, one of U-124‘s 
torpedoes slammed into the stern of the American Tanker Acme killing 11 and causing extensive 
structural damage to the vessel but leaving it afloat.  As the captain of Acme told the rest of his 
crew to stand by the lifeboats, two airplanes flew by and dropped at least one depth charge where 
they believed the U-boat launched its attacked.  Then the Destroyer Dickerson, which was in the 
vicinity, spotted a periscope and carried out an attack.  U-124 escaped unscathed, however, and 
as the USCG Cutter Dione and the navy tug Umpqua proceeded towards Acme to rescue its crew 
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and tow the vessel to port, the crew of 124 was busy preparing for another attack.  Mohr swung 
his submarine around after attacking Acme and lined up a shot on the Greek vessel Kassandra 
Louloudis, heading south behind Acme.  At 1915 EWT, Mohr sent another torpedo streaking 
through the waters of the Diamond Shoals.  This torpedo ran its course and connected with the 
Greek ship.  This time, however, the vessel would not remain afloat and sank with three masts 
and two stacks showing.  The crew of Dione, who had just finished recovering the survivors of 
Acme, brought their small cutter toward where Kassandra Louloudis had just been sunk.  In a 
stroke of good fortune, the men aboard Dione found the entire crew of the Greek vessel alive.  
After recovering the 20 survivors of Acme and the 35 crewmembers of Kassandra Louloudis, the 
crowded Coast Guard cutter made its way towards Norfolk to put them ashore (Navy Department 
Division of Naval Intelligence 1942:Table B; OCNO 1942h; USCG 1942, 1955; Freeman 
1897:144,146).  Mohr, on the other hand, still had torpedoes to use before turning to port and he 
intended to utilize them. 
 An hour and a half past midnight on March 18, the crew of U-124 spotted another tanker 
22 miles southwest of the Diamond Shoals Buoy.  This vessel was the 9,647 gross-ton E.M. 
Clark carrying 118,000 barrels of heating oil destined for New York.  Utilizing squally 
conditions, Mohr managed to bring 124 close to E.M. Clark and fired one torpedo into the 
tanker‘s port side, which buckled the deck and brought down the foremast and radio equipment.  
While the crew of Clark attempted to rig an emergency radio, another of Mohr‘s torpedoes 
ripped through the stricken vessel, sinking it in ten minutes and ensuring its cargo would never 
reach New York (OCNO 1942c:7, 1942e; USCG 1944f:1,2).  By the night of March 18, EWT, 
Mohr had travelled south of Cape Lookout and found two more tankers.  Hardly able to believe 
his luck, Mohr fired two torpedoes into the tanker Papoose at 2235 EWT, and another two into 
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the tanker W.E. Hutton at 2310 EWT.  Both tanker crews quickly abandoned their vessels and 
left them afloat.  W.E. Hutton would sink an hour and five minutes after it was attacked, but 
Papoose would continue to drift for two days before finally sinking (USCG 1944k:1,2, 
1944l:1,2; Freeman 1987:145,146).  Despite having already established himself as one of the 
most successful U-boatmen to operate off the American Coast, Mohr still had four more 
torpedoes and plenty of fuel.   
 While Mohr did not sink any vessels on March 19 and March 20, this was beneficial 
since he saved his remaining torpedoes for three fully loaded tankers.  Two of these torpedoes 
were used 15 minutes after midnight on March 21, when Mohr attacked Esso Nashville laden 
with 106,720 barrels of fuel oil.  The first torpedo struck just aft of the bow causing little 
damage, but the second torpedo struck just aft of amidships and broke the vessel in half, causing 
the entire crew to abandon the ship.  The bow of Nashville ultimately sank, but the stern was 
towed into port, fitted to another vessel, and put back into service.  The crew of 124 was unaware 
of this, however, and counted the vessel as a total loss before speeding off to severely damage 
the 11,355 gross-ton Atlantic Sun a couple of hours later.  Had Mohr realized the tanker was 
loaded with 156,840 barrels of crude oil, he may have used his final torpedo to ensure that the 
tanker sank, but for whatever unknown reason, Mohr decided to save that torpedo for another 
day and another vessel.  That unfortunate vessel, the 5,342 gross-ton Naeco, would come into the 
crew of 124‘s sight early on the morning of March 23.  In a virtually perfect attack, Mohr sent 
his final torpedo into the port side of Naeco, just aft of amidships.  The blast of the torpedo 
ruptured the tanker‘s deck, ignited its cargo of 72,000 barrels of kerosene, and broke it in half.  
Unlike Esso Nashville, however, Naeco would not be salvaged and the crew would not escape 
without casualties as 24 of the 38 men aboard perished in the oil fire or from drowning after 
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jumping overboard (B.d.U. 1942a:139-140; USCG 1944c:1,2, 1944g:1,2, 1944i:1,2).  Mohr 
utilized his final torpedo in this attack, having fired all that his submarine carried with 
devastating results in an astonishing nine days.  As soon as he could, Mohr radioed B.d.U. his 
successes in his now-famous verse: 
     The new moon-night is black as ink. 
     Off Hatteras the tankers sink. 
     While sadly Roosevelt counts the score. 
     Some fifty thousand tons – by Mohr. (Miller 1996:295) 
 
Mohr‘s success earned him the Knights Cross and made him one of the most successful U-boat 
commanders in American waters.  This sortie also allowed him to join Erwin Rostin as one of the 
German heroes for the month of March. 
 Although Mohr and Rostin certainly were the most successful U-boat commanders off 
the American coast during March, they were not the only successful commanders.  On March 16, 
at about 1400 EWT, U-332 torpedoed and sank the 11,728 gross-ton Australia laden with 
110,000 barrels of fuel oil destined for New York, and at 1015 EWT on March 19, U-332 
torpedoed and sank Liberator carrying 11,000 tons of sulfur (USCG 1944d:1,2, 1944p:1,2).  The 
sinking of Liberator was an unfortunate event since the entire attack might never have occurred 
had the gun crew of Liberator not fired upon a vessel they identified as a submarine at 0220 
EWT the morning of March 19.  With a couple well-placed shots from Liberator’s four-inch 
gun, the gunners managed to score two hits on the vessel they believed to be a submarine and 
claimed they saw it roll over.  Unfortunately, for the crew aboard the USS Dickerson, the well-
aimed shots were directed at their vessel, which had been zigzagging and following Liberator 
northward (COMINCH 1942:4; Freeman 1987:103-104).  One shell ―entered the chart house 
where it detonated.  As it exploded it killed a seaman outright and inflicted mortal wounds upon 
the Commanding Officer, the sound operator, and the radar operator all of whom were in the 
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charthouse‖ (Freeman 1987:104).  Severely damaged, Dickerson headed towards Norfolk for 
repairs, and the Captain died just minutes before reaching port and hearing that Liberator had 
been torpedoed and sunk just a few hours earlier (Freeman 1987:104).  Losing one of the few 
destroyers the ESF had to an attack by a merchant ship was not something the Frontier could 
afford as additional U-boats were still moving into the area.   
 On March 20, U-71 torpedoed Oakmar just outside waters patrolled by the ESF, then 
moved into the zone off Diamond Shoals where Dickerson would have been patrolling had 
Liberator not damaged it.  The absence of this patrol vessel allowed Kapitänleutnant Walter 
Flachsenberg to bring U-71 close to Diamond Shoals during daylight hours on March 26 and to 
sink Dixie Arrow, carrying 86,136 barrels of crude oil, with three torpedoes (USCG 1944e:1,2, 
1944r:1,2; Freeman 1987:148,154,478).  That night, one of the ESF‘s old enemies, Reinhard 
Hardegen, made his presence back in American waters known, by sinking the American decoy 
ship USS Atik, ex-name Carolyn, somewhere off North Carolina in a strange series of events that 
the US Navy would only learn about through German radio broadcasts and by recovering 
Hardegen‘s KTBs after the conclusion of the war.   
Upon arriving off the American coast, Hardegen approached a merchant ship generating 
lots of steam and with the name Carolyn written on it.  After thinking the amount of steam being 
produced looked suspicious, Hardegen decided to write it off as being overcautious and attacked 
the vessel with one torpedo, causing the ship to settle with a list to port.  As the crew aboard the 
torpedoed ship started launching a lifeboat, the merchant vessel turned towards the submarine 
and began to close the distance between the two vessels.  As Hardegen immediately turned his 
submarine away, he witnessed the crew of Carolyn dropping tarps and covers to reveal several 
guns that quickly opened fire.  Fortunately, for Hardegen, the shells from the deck guns missed, 
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but 20-mm machine gun bullets began strafing his deck mortally wounding a crewmember as a 
―20 mm round detonated in his right thigh, ripped open the flesh from the hip joint to the knee 
and partially removed it. One could not see if the bone had been shattered. The leg was only 
hanging on small flaps of skin‖ (Hardegen 1942:9-12).   
As the U-boat continued turning away, it was obscured by Carolyn’s smoke.  Suddenly, 
however, the U-boatmen witnessed several large objects flying through the air towards their 
submarine.  As these settled into the water, large geysers showered the U-boat.  Quickly 
Hardegen realized his mistake, Carolyn was firing depth charges out of launchers and he was 
still on the surface.  After running a quick pressure check, Hardegen crash-dove and got a safe 
distance away.  Once composure had been regained aboard U-123, Hardegen returned to Carolyn 
and fired a Coup de Grace at the submarine decoy, which sent the vessel to the bottom of the 
Atlantic.  As Carolyn sank heavy detonations were heard within the submarine, possibly from 
the Carolyn’s exploding boilers or depth charges that remained aboard the stricken ship 
(Hardegen 1942:9-12; Navy Department 1946:1,2).  If the explosions were caused by armed 
depth charges detonating as the ship sank, this may explain why none of the navy sailors aboard 
Atik were ever seen again (Hickam Jr. 1989:117).  When Hardegen made his report of this 
sinking to Doenitz, Doenitz must have been mystified since he had reprimanded some 
inexperienced U-boatmen earlier in the month for making claims that the United States was 
using submarine decoy ships.  Doenitz knew that most of these claims were just from 
inexperienced crews blaming their lack of success on merchant ships behaving strangely instead 
of on their own inability to fire torpedoes.  After all, Doenitz reasoned that, ―It is scarcely to be 
expected that the enemy who is so short of shipping should employ vessels which must be 
valuable to him as submarine decoy ships, especially so as the chances of success for these craft 
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in this war have shown themselves to be very small‖ (B.d.U. 1942:123).  Now that a seasoned 
officer like Hardegen had confirmed the use of decoy ships, the U-boats would have to remain 
cautious.  If these decoy ships were the best idea the Americans could muster to counter the U-
boats this late in March, however, future prospects for the Germans in American waters looked 
promising. 
This assumption was further confirmed at the end of March as Georg Lassen brought U-
160 into North Carolina waters and sank Equipoise on March 26 and the American passenger-
freighter City of New York on March 29, and U-105 destroyed the Norwegian tanker Svenør 300 
miles east of Hatteras (USCG 1944o:1,2; Freeman 1987:209).  Unfortunately, for the ESF, as 
March ended, April did not look any more promising because there was no lull in U-boat activity 
towards the end of the month, as was the case in previous months.       
 In the waters around Hatteras, now the preferred hunting grounds for German 
submarines, the tempo of attacks remained constant for the entire month of April.  The ESF 
could do little but admit they had been severely defeated once again.  Their summary of the 
month was quite bleak: 
April was almost an exact repetition of March.  Twenty-four vessels, a total of 138,121 tons, 
were sunk in the last 30 days.  Thus, once again, the ESF was the most dangerous area for 
merchant shipping in the entire world.  Of the 73 ships sunk by U-boats in April, 33% went 
down in the Frontier.  Seventeen, or 23% of the world total, were lost in the Mid-Atlantic 
area, the second largest theater of U-boat activity.  The remaining 33 sinkings were scattered 
fairly evenly over the face of the oceans (Freeman 1987:166). 
 
The only difference between this month and previous months within the ESF was that not one 
individual U-boat captain turned the waters of North Carolina into his personal stage of 
devastation, but that many different commanders, sank merchant vessels.  The German list of 
successes for North Carolina alone was atrocious, reading: U-84 – one ship sunk; U-109 – one 
ship sunk; U-123 – one vessel sunk, one damaged; U-136 – one ship damaged; U-160 – three 
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vessels sunk, one damaged; U-201 – one ship sunk; U-203 – two ships sunk, two damaged; U-
402 – one ship sunk; U-552 – five ships sunk; U-571 – two ships sunk; U-572 – two ships sunk, 
one damaged; U-654 – two ships sunk; U-754 – two ships sunk (Hickam Jr. 1989:332-333; 
Rohwer 1999:88-92).  As distress calls from merchant vessels continued to clutter airwaves off 
the coast for the first two weeks in April, the ESF appeared to have very little to look forward to 
for the remainder of the month.  About the only positive thing that had occurred in Frontier 
waters during these first two weeks happened after U-160 sunk the British passenger liner 
Ulysses with three torpedoes on April 11.   
After leaving Panama destined for Halifax, Ulysses was damaged in a collision with 
another ship in the Florida Straits.  Since Ulysses was not able to travel at full speed, the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic and West Indies provided the master with a safer route to 
follow towards Halifax.  The master ignored these routing instructions, however, and took his 
damaged vessel straight up the coast towards Norfolk without notifying any naval office.  This 
prevented the ESF from providing aerial or surface support for the vessel as it traversed the 
dangerous waters off North Carolina and placed Ulysses right in the path of U-160.  Quickly, 
Lassen ordered three torpedoes fired at the 14,647 gross-ton ship, which sank it in thirty minutes.  
Fortunately, the crew of Ulysses was able to send a distress call with their location, which was 
received and checked by a B-17 aircraft.  After finding lifeboats in the water, the B-17 directed 
the destroyer Manley to the site of the sinking.  What awaited the crew of Manley must have 
astounded them.  Loaded into ten lifeboats were all 290 passengers and crewmembers of Ulysses 
only one of whom sustained an injury (Lloyds Register of Shipping 1942-1943:ULS-UMT; Sixth 
Naval District Public Relations Office 1942:1-7; Freeman 1987:193-194,219).  Everyone aboard 
Ulysses was fortunate, but the event greatly aggravated the ESF who knew that it was hard 
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enough to protect merchant vessels whose whereabouts they knew, but to protect merchant 
vessels that were not sailing on prescribed shipping routes was virtually impossible.  They also 
knew that not every merchant crew would be lucky enough to send out a distress signal with 
locations provided and that something needed to change.  The ESF needed to win this battle 
raging just miles off the coast of America, and for that, they would almost need a miracle. 
The ESF never could have predicted that that ―miracle‖ would appear just three days later 
on April 14, in the form of two radio messages, the likes of which had not been heard before in 
the Frontier.  Both messages came from the destroyer USS Roper.  The first proclaimed, ―At 
0345 Roper (DD) reports she sighted sub on surface in 35-55 N., 75-13 W. Engaged with 
gunfire. Sub crew abandoned ship and sub apparently sank. Made two runs dropping DC's. Will 
stand by until daylight and endeavor to pick up survivors‖ (ESF 1942b:Serial #84,Appendix 
VII).  The second message, received after daylight, stated, ―ROPER picked up 29 bodies 
including 2 officers from sub she attacked at 35-55 N., 75-13 W. at 0130 April 14.  Hull in 20 
fathoms.  Divers to investigate‖ (ESF 1942b:Serial #85,Appendix VII).  By April 18, it was 
official, a navy diver had discovered the wreckage of the German submarine, identified as U-85 
through personal effects found on the bodies of the crew, lying on the ocean bottom just miles 
out of Oregon Inlet.  As the details began to pour in, the ESF was able to reconstruct the events 
of Roper‘s attack on U-85.  Early in the morning on April 14, the radar aboard Roper picked up a 
contact approximately 2,700 yards away.  Very shortly afterwards, the sound operator picked up 
the sounds of rapidly turning propellers in the same direction.  As Roper began to move towards 
the contact, one of the lookouts spotted a small wake in the distance running away from Roper.  
The speed aboard the destroyer was then increased to 20 knots and a pursuit began.   
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As the distance between the vessels began to decrease, the unknown vessel turned sharply 
to port.  In anticipation of a possible stern fired torpedo, the crew of Roper kept the destroyer 
slightly to the starboard side of the fleeing vessel.  When the distance between vessels had been 
reduced to 700 yards, the wake of a torpedo was seen heading towards Roper.  It quickly passed 
by the port side of Roper and vanished.  The fleeing vessel then cut sharply to starboard and was 
illuminated by the searchlight aboard Roper.  Immediately, the crew of Roper recognized it as a 
submarine now only 300 yards ahead.  Almost instantaneously, gun crews aboard the destroyer 
opened fire with machine guns, mowing down the German sailors as they attempted to operate 
their guns.  Soon after, fire was brought to bear with one of Roper’s three-inch deck guns.  The 
range was quickly found and one of the three-inch shells struck the submarine‘s conning tower 
(Figure 3.2).  The crew of Roper then watched the submarine sink, leaving about 40 members of 
its crew swimming on the surface.  Fearing a trap, the crew of Roper sped through the survivors 
floating in the water and dropped 11 depth charges on the spot where the submarine had gone 
down before standing-by for daylight.  In the morning, a PBY aircraft appeared and dropped 
another depth charge on an oil slick and debris that was over the site of the attack.  As Roper 
reproached during daylight all they found left in the water was oil, debris, and dead bodies.  
After recovering the bodies and dropping four more depth charges on another sound contact, 
Roper proceeded back to port carrying 29 German corpses and the distinction of being the first 
vessel to sink a submarine in Frontier waters (Freeman 1987:178-180).  While the remainder of 
the month would still be difficult for the ESF, this event at least gave them a small glimmer of 
hope that the submarines could be defeated. 
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Conclusion 
 
At U-boat headquarters, the loss of U-85 was not realized until April 20, after the crew of 
the submarine failed to respond to multiple messages asking them to report about their patrol 
(B.d.U. 1942b:28).  This must have taken Doenitz entirely by surprise as he wondered if it was 
possible that the Americans were finally starting to defend their coastline.  Could it be that after 
four extraordinarily successful months for the German submarines the Americans had finally 
decided to fight back?  
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FIGURE 3.2.  Diagram depicting USS Roper’s attack on U-85 (ESF 1942b:Appendix III). 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: AMERICA FIGHTS BACK 
 
Introduction 
 
Unbeknownst to Doenitz, American forces had actually been attempting to fight back the 
previous four months.  As far as preparing and planning for battle against German submarines 
was concerned, the Americans had reviewed many scenarios and drafted operational orders 
before the United States even entered World War II.  Most naval officials believed that, should 
America enter the war, attacks by U-boats, would be inevitable since the long coastline of 
America‘s East Coast made it difficult to protect merchant vessels while it provided excellent 
hunting grounds to enemy submarines.  They assumed that, since U-boats had operated 
successfully off the American coast during World War I, it was reasonable to surmise that the 
Germans would again attack with their vastly improved submarines during this war (NANCF 
1942a:4,chap.II).  For this very reason, the United States navy began to revitalize plans for 
coastal defense that were created as soon as World War I ended. 
These once theoretical plans, drafted in 1927 under the Naval directive ―FTP-155,‖ 
created hypothetical boundaries for Naval Coastal Frontiers by dividing American waters into 
different zones.  Each Coastal Frontier, if actually created, would be responsible for defending 
American ports, harbors, and merchant shipping within that Frontier.  FTP-155 further divided 
each Frontier into incrementally smaller sections and subsections known as Naval Districts, 
sectors, and sub-sectors, intended to help facilitate planning and ensure better defenses.  The 
theoretical boundaries were modified between 1935 and 1940 in order to definitively create these 
Frontiers, and to provide commanders of each Coastal Frontier with the executive power to 
instate rules and regulations within the Frontier they commanded.  In March 1941, after the navy 
finally legitimized the idea of ―Coastal Frontiers,‖ by getting permission from the Secretaries of 
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War and of the Navy to create positions for commanders and staff, Admiral Adolphus Andrews 
became the first official Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier (CNANCF) 
(NANCF 1941:9-14,Appendix 3).  The NANCF boundaries included 
The First, Third, Fourth and Fifth Naval Districts, with coastal boundaries extending from the 
International Boundary to the southern extreme of Hatteras Inlet. This area was divided into 
three sectors: New England sector, New York sector, Delaware Chesapeake sector. These 
sectors were further subdivided into the Portland sub-sector, Boston sub-sector, Newport sub-
sector, Long Island sub-sector, New Jersey sub-sector, Delaware sub-sector and the 
Chesapeake sub-sector. (NANCF 1941:10,Appendix III)  
 
On December 7, 1941, these boundaries were modified slightly and extended further south to 
Onslow County, NC (see Figure 3.1).  Within these waters, Andrews and the staff of the NANCF 
were given the following responsibilities:    
     A. The Defense of the North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier. 
     B. The Protection and Routing of Shipping. 
     C. The Support of the United States Fleet. 
     D. The Support of the Army and associated forces within the Frontier. (NANCF 
1941:5,chap.1)  
 
While Andrews knew immediately that his task would be futile with the assets provided by the 
United States Navy, he set about preparing the forces he had available and began the long and 
tedious process of attempting to ready the NANCF for an already battle-hardened enemy.  The 
process of readying nearly an entire coastline for a war against German submarines would be a 
slow one that consisted of mustering the few American forces available and hoping the U-boats 
delayed their attacks until sufficient naval vessels were available for escort and patrol duties.  In 
the end, however, Admiral Andrews knew that the U-boats would soon be on their way and that 
if he could not provide convoy escorts or sufficient surface and aerial patrols, he must begin 
bringing merchant vessels into waters where they had a greater chance of being protected.    
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Merchant Vessel Routing 
 
 Given that the number of naval vessels available within the NANCF was so severely 
limited, Admiral Andrews determined that one of his first orders of business, in the event the U-
boats crossed the Atlantic, was to route merchant vessels through corridors that were easier to 
patrol and protect.  This was quickly decided upon since the current American shipping lanes 
stretched many miles off the Atlantic Seaboard (Figure 4.1) and were well known and 
documented by German Intelligence (Figure 4.2).  
 
FIGURE 4.1. Shipping Routes off the Eastern Seaboard in 1940 (National Archives, 
Cartographic Records Branch, College Park, MD). 
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FIGURE 4.2.  German chart depicting shipping routes off the East Coast in 1937 (National 
Archives, College Park, MD). 
 
 Since the shipping routes along the Eastern Seaboard were well established, Andrews 
decided that the best way to hinder U-boat attacks, should they occur, was to delineate shipping 
corridors that would be implemented once hostilities began.  The original corridors were 
constructed by creating an imaginary ―reference line‖ that ran along the coast connecting various 
aids to navigation.  Northbound shallow draft vessels would be routed close to this reference line 
while shallow draft southbound traffic would be routed a couple miles inshore of the reference 
line.  Three to six miles seaward of the reference line would be the corridor for all other 
southbound traffic, and all other northbound vessels would be required to operate seven or more 
miles seaward of the line.  By bringing all traffic within known corridors, patrol vessels could 
ensure more efficient coverage and better protect merchant vessels.  On December 22, 1941, 
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these routes were slightly modified so that all deep draft, northbound vessels would proceed nine 
miles seaward of the reference line to allow a three mile barrier, vacant of traffic, between deep 
draft vessels heading north and south.  By keeping this area clear of traffic, it would prevent 
vessels that were blacked out and zigzagging from running into each other (NANCF 1941:20-
23,chap.3).  With plans set and shipping routes ready to be implemented, the NANCF would 
claim, ―[t]his December has been a period in which the whole structure of defense built up 
during the past years -- plans, material, and forces was being organized for a test of strength. But 
at no point within the Frontier has the structure been actually tested by enemy action‖ (NANCF 
1941:24,chap.3).  Unfortunately, for the Frontier, it would not have to wait long for these plans 
to be tested. 
 After the sinking of Norness in Frontier waters on January 14, 1942 and the subsequent 
torpedoing of vessels within the Fifth Naval District, which encompassed the waters of North 
Carolina, it became evident that modifications to the shipping routes must be initiated.  On 
January 22, Admiral Andrews changed the routes slightly to route vessels sixty miles seaward of 
Diamond and Wimble Shoals in hopes that the U-boats operating close to shore would be 
bypassed.  When this failed to produce the results Andrews was seeking, the routes were shifted 
back inshore eight days later and every vessel was commanded to travel ―as close to shore as 
safe navigation‖ allowed (ESF 1942a:1,chap.4).  It was quickly discovered, however, that 
masters of merchant ships were ignoring the established shipping routes fearing collision with 
other darkened ships.  This finding greatly disturbed Admiral Andrews, who was now considered 
the Commander Eastern Sea Frontier (CESF) after the Sixth Naval District was transferred to the 
NANCF from the Southern Naval District on February 4, and the NANCF was renamed the 
Eastern Sea Frontier on February 6.  This change gave Andrews control of waters from the 
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international boundary of coastal Maine to the border between St. John‘s County and Duval 
County in Florida (Figure 4.3) and allowed him to modify most East Coast shipping routes.  By 
changing the routes again, Andrews hoped to curb inappropriate behavior by merchant 
shipmasters (NANCF 1942b:1; chap. 1; ESF 1942a:1-2,chap. 4; Hickam Jr. 1989:6). 
 
FIGURE 4.3.  Boundary line of the Eastern Sea Frontier upon addition of the Sixth Naval 
District to that Frontier, Google Earth image adapted by author from coordinates given in the 
North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier War Diary (NANCF 1942b:1, chap.1).  
  
On February 25, CESF recommended to Admiral King, Commander-in-Chief United 
States Fleet (COMINCH), that the shipping lanes should once again contain a buffer area of at 
least two miles between north and southbound traffic.  King quickly agreed to this proposal and 
on March 6, he gave Andrews permission to change the shipping routes.  This time, Andrews 
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requested that the Routing Officer in the Third Naval District draft a proposal for shipping from 
New York to Key West following many aids to navigation and never allowing the north and 
southbound lanes to come within two miles of each other.  Additionally, the ESF discovered that 
vessels routed around Diamond and Wimble Shoals during daylight hours were relatively free 
from attack and mandated that all vessels modify their speeds to pass through these dangerous 
waters only during daylight.  Another discovery of the Frontier was that many vessels were 
leaving ports in South America and the Caribbean, not passing routing information on to the 
ESF, venturing well out to sea beyond Frontier waters, and being sunk without any chance of 
protection.  In order to prevent these needless losses, Andrews and King agreed that vessels 
sailing from these southern ports should be required to enter Frontier Waters and shipping lanes 
between Cape Canaveral and Cape Hatteras so the Frontier could attempt to provide them with 
protection as they rounded ―Torpedo Junction.‖  With shipping routes modified, the ESF began 
to wait and hope that keeping merchant vessels close to shore would stop or hinder U-boats 
operating relatively unchallenged (ESF 1942a:2-3, chap. 4, 1942a:appendix 1).  Unfortunately, 
the Frontier soon discovered that individually routed merchant ships were still being sunk at an 
alarming rate, and that, until a convoy system was feasible, other measures intended to make 
coastwise sailing safer needed to be implemented.        
The Cape Hatteras Minefield 
 
 One of these measures, intended to reduce the destruction German U-boats were causing 
in the deadly waters of North Carolina, began getting serious consideration by COMINCH and 
CESF.  This option would ultimately become one of the Frontier‘s worst blunders of the war.  
The idea consisted of placing networks of mines along the coast to ward off U-boats and allow 
merchant vessels to travel along the coast in relative safety.  The idea of emplacing passive 
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defense systems was not new as ideas ranging from submarine nets to minefields had been 
discussed well before the United States entered the war.  Admiral King, who was just the Chief 
of Naval Operations (CNO) at that time, measured the best locations for minefields should the 
US enter the war, and had already ordered mines placed in front of several important navy bases 
and harbors.  Soon after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, however, the Navy rapidly 
expanded passive defenses and deployed additional minefields.  On January 15, 1942, a naval 
meeting was held in Washington to determine additional defensive measures.  In an effort to 
provide extensive minefield coverage off the East Coast, the CNO proposed that mines should be 
planted from Cape Cod to Cape Ann.   
While the First Naval District attempted to acquire ships necessary for laying minefields 
and waited through weather delays, the CNO suggested that the Third Naval District mine the 
waters off New York as well.  This proposed minefield was immediately greeted with 
reservation by Admiral Andrews, who believed the minefield would be more of a danger to 
shipping than a hindrance to enemy actions.  The CNO dismissed these concerns after some 
deliberation and felt that the potential for minefields to deter submarines was worthy of the effort 
it would take to maintain them (Freeman 1987:50-61).  While Andrews remained leery about 
placing mines around busy shipping lanes and harbors, it quickly became evident to him that the 
naval high command was entirely in favor of implementing minefields and he had little choice 
but to move ahead with the CNO‘s proposals (ESF 1943:2,chap.5).  As laying the Cape Cod to 
Cape Ann minefield was delayed, however, Andrews‘ objections began to carry some weight 
and in a lengthy letter to the CNO, he advised that placement of any additional minefields be 
reconsidered.  Andrews expressed that the best way to curb the U-boat threat was a quick offense 
against the submarines, that vessels required to patrol minefields could be better used elsewhere, 
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and that mines would not safeguard the relatively unprotected waters the U-boats were already 
operating in (Freeman 1987:50-62).  While the CNO capitulated for the time being and ordered 
that instillation of minefields be put on hold, it would not take long for the Navy to be obliged to 
act on Andrews‘ admonishment that ―Mine fields are a menace to friendly as well as enemy 
vessels.  To require the Frontier to protect friendly vessels from its own weapons is a task that 
should be forced upon it by the enemy – not voluntarily adopted‖ (Freeman 1987:61).  
Unfortunately, for the navy, the number of merchant vessels falling victim to U-boats 
necessitated discussion of additional minefields just two months later.  This time, however, the 
deadly waters off North Carolina and particularly those around Cape Hatteras became the center 
of discussion.   
In February 1942, the Commander of the Inshore Patrol of the Fifth Naval District 
submitted a proposal for laying mines all along the coast in areas that appeared favorable for U-
boat operations.  The proposal suggested that since the current number of surface craft and 
aircraft available was far from adequate, the next best way to combat the German U-boats was 
through minefields.  By April 1942, the CNO and CESF had modified and debated the proposal 
for additional mined areas until two emerging ideas were considered more thoroughly (Freeman 
1987:191-193).  While the CESF still did not fully believe minefields would solve any of the 
navy‘s problems, it was evident that one option would be implemented and he must attempt to 
choose the one he believed to be the lesser of two evils (ESF 1943:3,chap. 5).  The first option 
consisted of placing 30,000 mines seaward of the coastal shipping lanes to provide a defensive 
barrier from Cape Hatteras to Cape Canaveral.  This barrier would allow merchant ships to ply 
coastal waters beyond the reach of U-boats and would allow aerial and surface craft coverage to 
be consolidated behind this line.  The drawbacks of this type of mining would be the cost, both 
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monetarily and in personnel, of setting the mines, keeping them serviced, and continuously 
sweeping shipping channels for loose mines.  The mine barrier advocates could not guarantee 
that submarines would not penetrate the defense to make an attack, nor that the minefield would 
not hinder surface craft attempting to chase a U-boat.  Additionally, any vessel that found itself 
adrift would run the risk of entering the minefield. 
The second choice revolved around placing a series of mined anchorages along the East 
Coast so that vessels could stop at a safe anchorage during nighttime hours when U-boats attacks 
were prevalent.  By placing six anchorages along the coast, the Navy could ensure relative safety 
for merchant vessels from the Florida Straits to New York.  The anchorage option would only 
require 14,000 mines, which would decrease the expense of laying and maintaining minefields 
and would require fewer patrol craft to monitor.  The downsides of using mined anchorages 
included the fact that merchant ships would need to be routed further out to sea to get around the 
minefields, further exposing them to U-boats during the day and making it harder to provide 
them with coverage, and requiring them to plan their travel times around stopping at anchorages.  
This would ultimately increase the travel time required to complete a voyage and slow 
transportation of supplies (Freeman 1987:191-193).  It was also feared that, ―50 vessels huddled 
together present a large and attractive target to any submarine bold enough to breach the integrity 
of the field‖ (Freeman 1987:192).  In the end, the Navy decided that it would be more 
economical and safer to install a series of anchorages along the East Coast and charged Admiral 
Andrews with the task.  Andrews quickly suggested that areas below Hatteras be mined first and 
gave Cape Hatteras and Cape Fear top priority for the installation of minefields (Freeman 
1987:193).  
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Throughout April 1942, plans for the Cape Hatteras minefield continued to be rehashed 
and revised until a projected deadline of May 22, 1942 was drafted for completing the mined 
anchorage.  Despite the priority of mine laying that Andrews placed on the North Carolina fields, 
work was begun first off Key West, Florida in the Southern Sea Frontier.  This meant that 
installing the mined anchorage off Cape Fear, and another one off Cape Canaveral, was 
postponed until necessary manpower and vessels required to patrol all four anchorages could be 
mustered.  Even though the completion of these two anchorages was postponed, the Commander 
of the Fifth Naval District felt there were still too few vessels to guard the Hatteras Anchorage.  
Despite these concerns, Admiral King, newly appointed COMINCH (who at this time still 
maintained the position of CNO), ordered Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANT), 
Royal Ingersoll (who was given this position when King was promoted) to continue preparations 
for laying the minefield and to establish a task force to carry it out (ESF 1943:4,chap. 5; Runyan 
and Copes 1994:107,114).  The commanders of the vessels Keokuk (AN-5), Miantonomah (CMc-
5), Monadnock (CMc-4), Wassuc (CMc-3), and any other vessel capable of assisting establishing 
the minefield were ordered to head north as soon as the Key West anchorage was completed. 
The minefield envisioned by the naval high command consisted of two separate crescent 
shaped legs curving so as to cover Cape Hatteras with around 2,860 mines.  At the western end 
of the minefield a safe passage was to be left free of mines so that merchant vessels could enter 
the anchorage.  This passageway into the anchorage would be guarded by a former lightship that 
would perform the dual functions of watching for enemy traffic, and informing neutral and allied 
vessels of how to proceed into the anchorage.  As the navy continued to make preparations for 
the anchorage, it became evident that in order to house the patrol vessels and their crews a 
section base was needed in the vicinity.  Ocracoke Island was quickly chosen and a small base 
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established to provide support for the patrol vessels assigned to the minefield (ESF 
1943:4,5,12,chap 5).  This base quickly became a complex and expensive undertaking requiring 
the complete attention of a competent officer.  Andrews decided to appoint Coast Guard Officer, 
Captain Henry Coyle the responsibilities of ―organization and supervision of the anchorages and 
dispatching of vessels from the anchorages at Lookout Bight, Hatteras Cove, and Cape Fear,‖ 
and gave him the title ―Convoy Dispatcher, Hatteras, Lookout and Cape Fear Area‖ (ESF 
1943:5-6,chap. 5).  In early May, the Navy began laying marker buoys to delineate the zone for 
the minelayers that would soon be heading to Hatteras.  On May 6, 1942, in a Notice to Mariners 
bulletin, the Navy officially disclosed that there was a ―danger area‖ around Cape Hatteras that 
needed to be avoided (Figure 4.4) (ESF 1943:6,chap. 5).   
On May 20, a more specific notice in Hydrographic Special Warning No. 175 delineated 
the exact boundaries of the ―danger area.‖  This notice read: 
A dangerous area has been established off Cape Hatteras as follows: from a point on the 
beach of Ocracoke Island in Longitude 75
o58‘ West, thence due South to Latitude 34o53‘ 
North, thence due East to Longitude 75
o31‘ West, thence Northeasterly to Latitude 35o05‘ 
North, Longitude 75
o22‘ West, thence due North to Latitude 35o08‘ North, thence 
Northwesterly to Latitude 35
o17‘ North, Longitude 75o28‘ West, thence due West to the 
beach.  Within this dangerous area a safe anchorage is being established, bounded on the 
South by the parallel 35
o06‘18‖ North, on the East and West by the meridians 75o40‘ West, 
and 75
o47‘ West, respectively, and on the north by the coast line.  The anchorage area is 
marked by four buoys each painted White and showing a flashing White light. (ESF 1943:6-
7,chap. 5) 
 
On May 22, the Commandant of the Fifth Naval District (ComFive) ordered Coyle, the 
newly appointed Convoy Dispatcher, Hatteras, Lookout and Cape Fear Area, to make 
preparations for 24-hour patrols of the minefield that was in the process of being laid and to 
ensure these patrols kept merchant vessels clear of the minefield.  To perform this task, Coyle 
was given only five 83-foot Coast Guard cutters, and the converted fishing trawlers YP-388 and 
YP-389, which were still on their way after being lent from the Third Naval District.  This small 
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group of vessels was given the unimposing title of the ―Hatteras mine field patrol‖ (Headquarters 
Fifth Naval District 1942:9; ESF 1943:7,chap 5; Freeman 1987:328,352). 
 
FIGURE 4.4.  Chart Depicting ―danger area‖ off Cape Hatteras. (NOAA Historical Chart 
Collection, Cape Hatteras to Charleston Light, Chart No. 1110, September 1942). 
 
Finally, by the end of May, the minefield had been completed.  In the end, the field 
consisted of two crescent shaped fields each 17 miles long and overlapping in the center for a 
distance of two miles, and spaced approximately a mile and a half apart in the center.  The 
easternmost leg (leg No. 2) consisted of three separate rows of mines, each spaced 500 yards 
apart, that began south of Cape Hatteras Light and bent southwest towards Ocracoke Inlet.  The 
westernmost leg (leg No. 1) consisted of four rows of mines, also spaced 500 yards apart, 
commencing just northeast of Ocracoke Inlet and curving northeast towards Cape Hatteras Light.  
In each row, ―[t]he individual mines were laid with chain moorings at three different case levels: 
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15 feet, 30 feet and 60 feet.  There were three different spacings [sic] of mines: 425 feet apart in 
row number 1; 240 feet apart in row number 2 and in row number 3; 200 feet apart in row 
number 4‖ (ESF 1943:12,chap. 5).  Upon completion of the minefield, 2,500 mines littered the 
waters off Cape Hatteras in the hopes of protecting the anchorage from the threat of U-boat 
attacks (Figure 4.5).  The only thing left for the Fifth Naval District to do was patrol the 
minefield and wait to see if it proved effective.  
FIGURE 4.5.  Locations of the Minefield and Anchorage in Relation to the ―danger area‖ 
(Freeman 1987:421b). 
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The Fifth Naval District would not have to wait long to observe the effectiveness of the 
minefield.  Unfortunately, the demonstration of the minefield‘s potential had nothing to do with 
the purpose for which it was intended.  In the first week of May, before the minefield was laid, 
the tanker F.W. Abrams left Aruba destined for New York with 90,000 barrels of oil.  The master 
was provided with sailing instructions by the British at Orangestad, Aruba, but these instructions 
said nothing about the minefield scheduled for completion by the end of the month.  After an 
uneventful passage from Aruba Abrams entered North Carolina waters on June 10, about two 
weeks after the completion of the minefield.  That evening the tanker pulled into the Cape 
Lookout Anchorage escorted by CG-484 to an area where the ship could stay overnight.  The 
next day a heavy rainstorm and severe waves set in which caused Abrams to lose sight of CG-
484, which was attempting to escort the tanker out to the open sea.  Unfortunately, the Abrams’ 
master still had not been warned about the minefield around Hatteras, and he attempted to steer 
his vessel back to sea without an escort.   
While blundering through the rainstorm, Abrams was suddenly jolted by an explosion at 
0640 EWT.  A call for help was sent out and the master assessed the situation.  When he realized 
the vessel would not sink immediately he attempted to have his crew drop anchor (a gutsy move 
in waters full of U-boat activity).  F.W. Abrams rotten luck continued though as the anchor chain 
fouled and could not be freed.  The vessel continued to drift helplessly and moved further into 
the minefield.  At 0717 EWT, a violent explosion again rocked the starboard side of the Abrams.  
Although still afloat, Abrams was heavily damaged and in a precarious position still within the 
minefield.  Twenty minutes later, Abrams tripped a third mine and the starboard side of the 
vessel was blown open causing it to start sinking by the bow.  The crew of the stricken vessel 
 
 
92 
 
quickly abandoned ship in lifeboats leaving Abrams and its 90,000 barrels of oil to the ravages of 
the Atlantic (Figure 4.6). 
 
FIGURE 4.6.  F.W. Abrams sinking in the middle of the Hatteras minefield (Courtesy of the 
National Archives, College Park, MD). 
 
When Captain Coyle contacted the Coast Guard vessel to find out why F.W. Abrams was 
not protected he began getting strange and conflicting stories.  Men aboard the vessel reported 
that the master of Abrams had refused to follow orders and would not respond to blinker signals.  
Once on shore, reports from the Coast Guard men became even stranger with some reporting that 
they were travelling on a different heading than others, and several reporting that they had even 
seen the wake of a torpedo before Abrams was sunk (ESF 1943:7,8,chap. 5; Freeman 1987:345-
346).  While the fabricated stories continued, one fact remained, the Cape Hatteras minefield had 
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claimed its first victim and given credence to Admiral Andrews‘ claim that minefields ―are a 
menace to friendly as well as enemy vessels‖ (Freeman 1987:61). 
Unfortunately, for the Fifth Naval District, this would not be the only event impelled by 
the implementation of the minefield.  By early June, converted fishing trawlers YP-388 and YP-
389 had assumed their roles as patrol vessels at the Hatteras Minefield.  With the sinking of F.W. 
Abrams, these vessels were needed to warn merchant shippers of the minefield.  They were very 
ill suited for the job of patrolling in the open ocean, however.  On their way down the coast, the 
vessels had been outrun by a convoy they were supposed to be escorting because the convoy was 
too fast, even though it was travelling a mere 8.5 knots.  On top of their lack of speed, they 
constantly had to stop into ports for minor repairs required by the abuse of the ocean upon the 
vessels.   
Regardless of these setbacks, the two YP boats successfully arrived in North Carolina 
waters and dutifully took up their patrol missions.  On one five-day patrol offshore, from June 11 
to 16, YP-389‘s crew discovered that their 3 inch 23 caliber gun would not fire due to a faulty 
firing spring.  When the vessel returned to the Ocracoke Inlet section base for provisions, the YP-
389’s commander, Lieutenant R.J. Philips, requested that the gun be fixed before the vessel 
sailed again.  Soon after, however, word was received from the operations base at Morehead City 
that since the vessel was operable it was to resume its patrol duties.  With his request unfulfilled, 
Philips took the small vessel back to the outskirts of the minefield on June 17 (Headquarters 
Fifth Naval District 1942:3-6, 9, 10; ESF 1943:8,chap. 5; Freeman 1987:352,353).  As Phillips 
began heading back to the minefield, he had no way of knowing that a very frustrated U-boat 
captain was closing in on the same position.   
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Kapitänleutenant Horst Degen had left Lorient on May 20, 1942, in U-701, with full 
provisions and ready to sail to the productive waters off the American coast.  Degen and his crew 
were excited to sail and hoped to have the same success the U-123 and U-66 had off Cape 
Hatteras.  The 701’s war cruise started slowly and few ships were spotted while crossing the 
Atlantic.  Once across the Atlantic, the 701 attempted to chase a passenger liner only to discover 
that the vessel was the Swedish ship Drottningholm carrying Axis diplomats.  Frustrated that he 
had wasted a day and a half chasing a false target, Degen swung his submarine back towards 
America.  Shortly after this event, Degen spotted another vessel heading east.  This vessel turned 
out to be a 15,000-ton British liner which would have been an extraordinarily valuable target, but 
the vessel was too fast and Degen had to call off the chase after losing another day and a half.   
On June 12, just off the Atlantic shelf, 701 was spotted on the surface by an allied aircraft 
and had to make a crash dive.  U-701 was able to dive to a depth of 40 feet before the aircraft 
dropped a spread of five bombs, which straddled the U-boat and caused the submarine‘s lights to 
fail and glass from many instrument panels to shatter.  The crew of 701 quickly repaired the 
damage, but their nerves were slightly frazzled and they realized they had to be extra careful and 
watchful while on the surface.  That evening 701 moved into Chesapeake Bay and proceed to lay 
mines across the entrance to the shipping channel.  After successfully laying these mines, U-701 
headed for Hatteras where it was given ―freedom of action‖ to sink merchant vessels.  On June 
16,
 
Degen attempted to sink an 8,000 ton freighter with two torpedoes.  Both torpedoes missed 
and the freighter continued on its way unscathed.  This additional annoyance coupled with the 
stifling heat the U-boat crew was subjected to from the warm waters of the Gulf Stream caused 
Kapitänleutenant Degen much aggravation and increased his desire to sink something.  Had 
Degen known that his mines in the Chesapeake Bay had already sunk two ships and severely 
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damaged two more, he may have been less annoyed with a patrol boat he thought attempted to 
ram him on the night of June 17 and attempted to depth charge him on June 18 (B.d.U. 
1942b:78-79,117; OCNO 1942b:10-12; Hickam Jr. 1989:267-261,281). 
 When Degen brought his submarine to the surface on the early morning of June 19, he 
again saw a small patrol boat that he assumed was the same one from the previous two days and, 
fearing that his U-boat was falling into a trap, finally let his frustrations boil over.  
Unfortunately, for the crew of YP-389 the patrol boat driving back and forth between the 
minefield buoys happened to be theirs.  Around 0220 EWT on June 19, U-701 surfaced inshore 
of YP-389 and immediately began firing machine gun tracer bullets at the patrol boat, followed 
shortly after by shells from the U-boat‘s 88mm deck gun.  The crew of 389, taken completely off 
guard, sounded the alarm and desperately attempted to man their two 30 cal. machine guns since 
the 3 in. gun was broken.  The patrol boat also turned to present its stern to the U-boat in an 
attempt to present the attacker with as small a target as possible.  Once the crew of 389 realized 
their machine guns were not having any effect, other than directing the submarine‘s shellfire 
towards the vessel, all firing was ceased and the vessel attempted to outrun the U-boat.  On two 
occasions, YP-389‘s crew released spreads of two depth charges to try to slow their assailant.  
Since the charges exploded too deep, and one turned out to be a dud this proved a futile effort.  
After an hour and a half of the vessel being shelled ―to splinters‖ and the loss of six men out of 
the 24 man crew, the order was given to abandon ship.   
Phillips let the remaining 17 crewmembers abandon the ship over the side, since the rafts 
had been destroyed and the lifeboats could not be reached, while he took over steering the vessel.  
Once the men were overboard, Phillips left the throttle of 389 wide open and jumped overboard 
to rejoin his crew.  U-701 followed the patrol boat and unrelentingly shelled it until it finally 
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sank about a half hour later.  At approximately 0730 EWT, surviving crew members of YP-389 
were picked up by two coast guard cutters fortunate to be alive after being shelled for an hour 
and a half by, semi-armor-piercing, incendiary, and high-explosive shells in an engagement 
Degen would later call ―a wasteful and untidy piece of work‖ (Headquarters Fifth Naval District 
1942:1-5,7; ESF 1943:8,chap. 5; Freeman 1987:354).   
Although not sinking by striking a mine within the Hatteras Minefield, this patrol by a 
vessel ill-suited for the task and without proper weaponry, underwater listening devices, or 
degaussing equipment, contributed to the loss of six sailors and a craft never built for the open 
sea.  The loss of YP-389 caused the ESF to rethink their defensive barriers and postpone 
construction of any additional minefields until vessels capable of patrolling them could be 
spared, since YP-389 was assigned because ―no ships adequate to the task were available in the 
Frontier‖ (ESF 1943:8,chap. 5; Freeman 1987: 355).  While a second vessel had been lost in 
connection with the Cape Hatteras minefield, the last and most destructive event within the 
minefield still had yet to occur. 
 At 0430 EWT the morning of July 14, 1942, 19 ships in convoy KS-520 left port near 
Hampton Roads, Virginia, for a voyage south through the waters of the ESF.  By 0700 EWT the 
next morning, the ships had rounded Cape Hatteras and continued south.  Maintaining a course 
just inside the 100-fathom curve, the convoy passed 20 miles outside Ocracoke inlet at 1600 
EWT without any problems.  Five minutes later, a contact was picked up and bombed by the 
convoy escorts without result.  This contact aroused the suspicion of the convoy escorts and extra 
vigilance was put into scanning the horizon for submarines.  Despite this extra vigilance, a 
torpedo struck SS Chilore, lead vessel in the second column of ships at 1620 EWT, sending a 
geyser of water over the vessel, which momentarily obscured it from the air escorts.  Unable to 
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react quickly enough and alter course, Chilore was struck by a second torpedo one minute later.  
Moments after the second torpedo rocked Chilore, J.A. Mowinckel, lead vessel of the convoy, 
was shaken by a violent explosion (Freeman 1987:411-412).  The blast of the torpedo was 
devastating: 
The shock of the blow ran down through the entire ship, breaking china in the galley,    
overturning chairs and tables, knocking men off their feet.  Black water shot in a great plume 
over the poop deck.  Dense, pungent smoke poured into the after compartments bringing with 
it the smell of gas and powder.  The steering machinery was carried away as the explosion 
blasted a hole 20 by 20 in the stern of the Mowinckel. One man was killed outright, while 20 
were injured, some severely (Freeman 1987:412).   
   
As the convoy began to break apart to avoid additional attack, a torpedo struck Bluefields.  
The submarine carried out its entire attack in less than six minutes before popping to the surface 
in the middle of the convoy and being fired upon, aerial bombed, and depth charged in an attack 
that, depending on the account, may have sunk the German Submarine U-576.  Chilore and 
Mowinckel despite being severely damaged were still afloat, but Bluefields slipped beneath the 
surface by 1700 EWT.  After securing the corvette Spry as an escort for the two stricken vessels, 
they were permitted to run for the safety of the North Carolina shoreline while the convoy 
continued south.  Since the attack destroyed Mowinckel’s steering machinery, the master had to 
steer using its engines, which caused the vessel to follow a wavering course.  With Spry in the 
lead, the vessels began their journey towards shore.       
 The route chosen by the commodore to take the vessels to shore put them on a direct path 
to Hatteras Inlet.  This path, also led them directly through the ―danger area‖ discussed in the 
notice to mariners.  Unfortunately, the notice only referred to a ―danger area‖ and many mariners 
simply thought this zone had become a graveyard of sunken ships and underwater hazards, not a 
minefield.  While the Spry’s commander knew the danger area was a minefield, he did not know 
exactly where he was since he had taken part in the hunt to find the submarine that attacked the 
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convoy.  By doing so, he had made so many changes in position and speed that he could not plot 
the Spry’s exact location.  Using dead reckoning in attempting to figure out where they were, the 
commander accidently positioned all three vessels 60 miles south of where they actually were 
(Figure 4.7).  Had the vessels really been at this point, the course of 315
o
 the vessels followed 
would have allowed them to reach shore south of the ―danger area‖ (ESF 1943:10,chap. 5; 
Freeman 1987:413-415).  Adding to the confusion was that the Convoy Commodore aboard 
Mowinckel knew exactly where the ships were but had a ―rather hazy recollection‖ about 
anchoring around Hatteras, and the master of Mowinckel claimed he was told the restrictions 
around Hatteras no longer applied (Freeman 1987:415).   
With this misinformation, the three vessels took the most direct course toward land.  As 
the vessels continued towards shore, the commander of Spry became uneasy about the route and 
radioed Mowinckel to get their position.  Mowinckel responded that they were 20 miles SE of 
Hatteras Inlet.  Fearing the ships would end up in the minefield, Spry’s commander suggested a 
route change that would bring the ships well south of Hatteras.  The crew aboard Mowinckel 
heard this transmission incorrectly and when they plotted the course they heard transmitted, 
realized it would take them north of Hatteras and through dangerous waters, so they kept their 
heading and did not send a response to Spry.  Although still uneasy about the situation, the 
commander of Spry decided not to resend his transmission because he did not want to question 
the Convoy Commodore‘s decision since the Commodore, although retired, was a senior officer.  
Shortly after, the three vessels passed one of the patrol boats stationed on the outskirts of the 
minefield.   
Seeing that the merchant ships were led by a naval vessel, the patrol boat decided not to 
contact the small convoy and resumed its patrol.  As the ships closed on the minefield, a blimp 
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began dropping smoke bombs to alert the convoy to the danger they were heading toward, but 
the Commodore assumed the blimp was just warning them that submarines were in the vicinity 
and continued steaming ahead. 
 
FIGURE 4.7.  Paths of Spry, Chilore, and Mowinckel leading into the Hatteras minefield 
(Freeman 1987:421b). 
 
In a final warning, the crew of patrol boat 462, which had just returned from taking 
gasoline to a YP boat that ran out of fuel at sea, attempted to chase down the three vessels, 
 
 
100 
 
signaling as fast as they could and even firing the boat‘s guns into the air.  Unfortunately, the 
vessels continued on their way and at 2000 EWT, several loud explosions shook the night air.  
Chilore and Mowinckel had both passed over contact mines in the Hatteras minefield and been 
shaken by explosions, while Spry escaped danger.  While the two merchant crews, fearing they 
had been torpedoed, abandoned ship, 462 caught up to Spry and informed the commander of the 
danger.  The commander of Spry, realizing for the first time where he actually was, knew he 
could do nothing for the merchant ships and followed 462 out of the minefield before heading 
south to try to catch up with convoy KS-520.   
The crews of Chilore and Mowinckel soon reached shore in lifeboats, while the merchant 
ships remained afloat within the minefield.  Over the next few days, channels were swept to the 
vessels so that they could be towed in and salvaged.  On July 19, two tugs were sent to recover 
the merchant ships, but at 1630 EWT, one of these, Keshena, struck a mine and sank almost 
instantly.  Finally, the remaining tug removed Chilore and Mowinckel from the minefield and 
brought them to Ocracoke for basic repairs before they were sent to Hampton Roads for salvage.  
Unfortunately, the Chilore’s terrible saga was not complete until 1700 EWT on July 23, when 
the vessel capsized and sank while being towed past Cape Henry.  Mowinckel, on the other hand, 
made it safely to Norfolk, but the Hatteras Minefield had claimed two more victims and severely 
damaged another (ESF 1943:8,chap. 5; Freeman 1987:415-419). 
 These events were the last needed to convince ComFive to begin lobbying for removal of 
the minefield.  ComFive suggested to CESF that the minefield could be replaced with anti-
torpedo netting.  Admiral Andrews agreed with this suggestion and on July 21, 1942, forwarded 
the proposal on to COMINCH with his personal approval.  Andrews further stated that he had 
never been in favor of the minefield and its usefulness was obsolete.  In fact, the convoy system 
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along the coast had been initiated before the minefield was completed, nearly relegating it 
pointless from the beginning.  CESF also added that the term ―danger area‖ might be giving 
merchant captains a false sense of security because they did not realize the area was mined.  
Admiral King sent his response on August 4, stating that anti-torpedo netting was not practical in 
the waters around Hatteras and the minefield would remain.  He did capitulate, however, that the 
area could be declared mined so that merchant shipmasters would understand the severity of 
straying into those waters.  An additional problem with the minefield soon became evident as 
well.   
The small vessels that were patrolling the minefield required constant maintenance at the 
section base on Ocracoke and often could not put to sea if the weather worsened.  The wear and 
tear on the vessels and crews also seemed superfluous since only one merchant ship used the 
anchorage between August 6 and November 6.  Andrews again petitioned Admiral King on 
November 6 to allow the minefield to be swept and deactivated, but to allow the area to still be 
referred to as a ―danger area‖ on charts and not reveal the mines were gone (ESF 1943:8-
11,chap. 5).  King retorted, saying that minesweepers could not be spared because they were ―in 
such constant demand at the time for maintaining swept channels at the entrance to important 
harbors‖ and that the matter would be taken up again the following spring (ESF 1943:11,chap. 
5).  In April 1943, CESF again pressed the matter with COMINCH, this time employing an 
entirely new tactic.  Andrews noted that no vessel had been lost to U-boats in Frontier waters 
since July 15, 1942, and that the minefield was destroying the economy of the Outer Banks.  The 
later argument was based on the Department of the Interior‘s Deputy Coordinator of Fisheries 
stating that restrictions on fishermen in the area had already decreased the catch by a staggering 
80,000,000 pounds.   
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On April 21, 1943, Admiral King agreed that the minefield should be removed but left 
removal of the mines to the Fifth Naval District.  Removal was begun on June 7 and, despite the 
fact that many mines would not fire and heavy storms hindered the operation, the work was 
completed by September 25.  Although only 1,303 of the 2,500 mines originally laid were 
recovered, the CESF considered the operation a success.  Due to the undetonated mines, 
however, the area continued to be labeled a ―danger area‖ through the rest of the war and is still 
labeled as such today.  With the sweeping of the minefield, a destructive chapter in Fifth Naval 
District waters was closed (ESF 1943:11-13,chap. 5).  The ESF would sum up the minefields 
history most succinctly: 
Thus ended the ―Battle of the Hatteras Mine Field.‖  In retrospect, it is easy enough to 
consider that the sanctuary failed to accomplish its intended purpose of saving ships from 
submarines; that to the contrary, four ships were lost.  On second thought, however, it is clear 
that the project was undertaken at a time when one could not predict the manner in which the 
U-boat campaign would develop; the simple fact was that there were not enough escort and 
patrol vessels or planes to drive the subs from our shore, and that some kind of defense had to 
be made as a stop-gap.  That was exactly the function of the Hatteras mine-protected 
sanctuary.  Considering the outcome, it is fortunate that the shift of U-boat concentrations 
permitted the well-intentioned sanctuary to pass into ―innocuous desuetude.‖ (ESF 
1943:13,chap. 5)   
 
Although the Hatteras Minefield never lived up to the expectations placed upon it by the naval 
high command, it was not necessarily because the minefield was not effective but more likely 
because the minefield was replaced by a more effective alternative. 
The Convoy System 
 
With the valuable lessons the United States Navy learned during World War I about how 
convoys offered the best form of protection against submarine attacks, it seems surprising that 
none were initiated off the coast of America when U-boat attacks seemed imminent.  Despite 
these lessons, the outbreak of hostilities found no American convoys plying the waters of coastal 
America.  While the naval high command agreed that methods of fighting submarines had 
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changed very little since WWI and that convoys and aircraft were still the best ways to combat 
them, they also recognized that a convoy‘s strength was only as good as its escorts and a poorly 
protect convoy could be more disastrous than letting vessels travel independently.  With these 
considerations in mind, Admiral King requested that Admiral Andrews begin drafting a plan for 
initiating a convoy system on February 12, 1942.   
Upon requesting input from the commanders of each naval district as to their thoughts on 
coastal convoys, Andrews received votes of overwhelming opposition to the idea of starting a 
convoy system at this time since the Frontier could not provide adequate convoy escorts.  After 
further discovering that an average of 120 to 130 merchant vessels sailed each day in Frontier 
waters, Andrews agreed that the convoy system would not work.  By the estimates of Andrews, 
the number of naval vessels required to operate an effective convoy system would be 64 ships, 
twice the number capable of convoy escort currently available.  Convoy duty would also require 
additional ships to take over tasks currently performed by the better vessels so that they could be 
assigned to the convoys.  In light of these observations, Andrews passed his recommendation 
along to Admiral King, suggesting the convoy system be postponed until the current efforts of 
protecting merchant shipping failed, and sufficient escort vessels and aircraft could be spared.  
Admiral King heeded this advice, and on March 6, ordered initiation of any coastal convoy 
system put on hold (Freeman 1987:23,52-56,107). 
 The desire for coastal convoys did not go away, however.  On March 6, the same day 
Admiral King ordered postponement of any convoys, the Commander of Task Force 21 
suggested that, based on the predictions of U-boat attacks for the month, it might be advisable to 
alter cross-Atlantic convoys already in place to allow some of their escorts to assist coastal 
convoys.  When the Frontier discovered that altering these convoys by even one day would 
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deprive the British of 30,000 tons of supplies per month the idea was overturned.  The following 
day March 7, CINCLANT filed a recommendation for additional protective measures that could 
be instated along coastal routes.  These measures included routing supplies and troops by rail 
along the coast as far as they could be sent and by tightening up control and administration in the 
naval districts so shipping delays were minimized, allowing the naval vessels already in use to be 
utilized more effectively.   
On March 16, Admiral King, who was still interested in initiating a coastal convoy 
system, ordered CINCLANT, CESF, Commander Gulf Sea Frontier (CGSF), and Commander 
Caribbean Sea Frontier (CCSF) to each send a representative to a meeting in the Navy 
Department.  It was King‘s intention to have these representatives discuss a convoy system 
extending from the East Coast into the Caribbean and to present him with their 
recommendations.  The meeting discovered that the number of vessels departing from Caribbean 
and Gulf ports was divided equally, requiring two separate convoy routes.  For these convoy 
routes to function properly, the representatives recommended two separate southern termini, one 
at Key West and the other at Guantanamo.  They also suggested that a convoy leave each port 
every three days.  The Key West convoy would depart at 0200 EWT on the days it sailed, pass 
through the Florida Straits and continue north along or slightly westward of the Gulf Stream.  
The Guantanamo convoy would follow an unbroken path westward of the Gulf Stream. 
While the Frontier representatives expressed hope that the convoy systems could 
eventually move ships all the way to New York, they conceded that the naval craft required did 
not exist at this time and that Hampton Roads, Virginia, would have to be the northern convoy 
terminus.  Vessels continuing north would proceed individually during daylight under the 
protection of aircraft.  Admiral King quickly approved these recommendations and speculated 
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that the Key West to Hampton Roads convoy could be initiated by May 15 and the Guantanamo 
Bay to New York convoy by July.  Although this conference laid the groundwork for a future 
convoy system, it also highlighted the severe lack of adequate naval escorts available in the 
Frontier.  To protect merchant ship convoys effectively, the conference suggested the Frontier 
would need 31 destroyers and 27 corvettes or PCs.  Only three destroyers, zero corvettes, three 
PCs, and five SCs currently existed in the entire ESF, all of which were performing other 
important duties (Freeman 1987:107-111,169).   
 Throughout April, the ESF could only plan and schedule future convoys while the U-
boats continued to attack and sink merchant ships.  Again, the waters of Cape Hatteras proved to 
be the most dangerous waters as thousands of tons of shipping were sent to the ocean floor by 
German torpedoes.  Realizing the danger the waters off Hatteras presented, Admiral Andrews 
suggested that ComFive implement a makeshift convoy system with vessels laying overnight at 
Cape Lookout, then proceeding as a convoy in the morning around Cape Hatteras and Diamond 
Shoals under the escort of naval vessels.  Andrews thought that this would minimize vessel 
losses around Hatteras and would require only forty naval craft rotating in and out of service.  
ComFive replied that a system to this effect was almost in place already as northbound vessels 
were leaving the Lookout Anchorage under escort and all vessels heading southbound were 
given aerial support (Freeman 1987:174-175).   
Furthermore, for ComFive to initiate a full convoy system, he would still need more 
naval craft specifically assigned to his naval district than the Navy could currently provide.  With 
this information, Admiral Andrews went back to drafting plans for a convoy system that would 
actually work given the limited numbers of convoy escorts available.  On April 29, he realized 
that breaking the available convoy escort vessels up into the five convoy escort groups required 
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to initiate a convoy system from Key West to Hampton Roads would leave the convoys without 
sufficient escorts and vulnerable to attacks.  Andrews then proposed that the date of 
implementing the convoys should be deferred until additional convoy escorts could be assigned.   
While this was a sharp blow to the Frontier‘s defensive measures, Andrews also 
recognized that the safety of merchant vessels could be bolstered by requiring vessels to sail in 
daylight, to anchor at night in safe anchorages, and to form short convoys with other merchant 
vessels while travelling through dangerous waters.  This system would require that vessels 
sailing from the Florida Straits anchor at Jacksonville, Florida, the first night of their voyage, at 
Charleston, South Carolina, the following night, and at Cape Fear, off North Carolina the third 
night.  Small convoys could then be established before vessels sailed around Cape Hatteras 
during daylight the next day (Freeman 1987:174-177).  While this ―proposal to extend the 
defense system south of Hatteras was admittedly less than that which could be obtained from an 
adequately escorted convoy…the dangers inherent in the broken daylight voyages and the 
protected anchorages were far less than those to be expected in an inadequately protected 
convoy‖ (Freeman 1987:177).  Even though Andrews originally proposed that the convoy 
system should be delayed beyond the middle of May, a fortuitous change occurred in the ESF 
during May that made initiation of the convoy system by May 15 feasible.  This turn of events 
came from the navy freeing up many destroyers from other duties to add 100 more days of 
destroyer patrol in the Frontier while also increasing the number of adequate patrol boats and 
aircraft by 20 percent.  To ensure that the convoy system could be initiated by May 15, Andrews 
quickly drafted schedules for air coverage and convoys that allowed one convoy to leave the 
Chesapeake, and one to leave Key West, every three days.  Departure days were staggered so the 
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convoys would not arrive too soon after the other convoy left to ensure port administrators had 
enough turnaround time to prevent routing and docking confusion.   
Although ships faster than 14 knots or less than 8 knots were excluded from these 
convoys and were still routed independently, they were encouraged to follow routes relatively 
free of danger and travel only during daylight.  Andrews also added another provision to ensure 
the safety of slower vessels, which required that the Hampton Roads to Key West convoys 
incorporate a slow convoy into every third sailing rotation.  With these measures in place, 
Andrews contacted shipping companies to obtain a list of competent shipmasters who could be 
designated convoy commodores and vice-commodores (Freeman 1987:266-267; Hickam Jr. 
1989:247-249).  As the pieces for the convoy system were set into place by the ESF, patrol 
schedules were drafted so that 
Convoys leaving from Hampton Roads would be covered on the first day by planes from 
Langley Field, Norfolk, and Elizabeth City; on the second day from Cherry Point at daybreak 
and from Wilmington and Charleston thereafter. On the third day planes from Charleston 
would cover the coast as far as Jacksonville where they would land. On the fourth day the 
patrolling force would take off from Banana River, and on the fifth day from Miami. Planes 
from these bases would perform two flights -one in the morning and one in the afternoon. 
Those from Banana River and Miami would be controlled by the Commander Gulf Sea 
Frontier and all the others by the CESF. In such fashion relatively strong and constant air 
cover could be assured. (Freeman 1987:266) 
     
Finally, on May 8, Andrews ordered the port officials at Hampton Roads and Key West to ensure 
that all vessels in port on May 10 and 11 capable of running in convoy be held over to create two 
trial convoys.  
On May 14, convoy KS-500 left Hampton Roads for Key West, and on May 15, 
northbound convoy KN-100 left Key West.  While both convoys suffered the inevitable 
frustrations of trying to get merchant captains to obey orders and stay in formation, as well as 
attempting to shuffle ships that joined the convoy along the way into formation, these minor 
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annoyances ―could not hide the fact that both convoys brought all their vessels through safely 
and on time‖ (Freeman 1987:269-270).  While these vessels arrived safely, Andrews knew that 
another convoy must make the trip along the coast before the convoy system could be considered 
functional.  On May 17, several merchant vessels began assembling at Hampton Roads to form 
the second southbound coastal convoy KS-502.  Eventually eleven ships and several escorts 
arrived and the convoy was scheduled to depart the morning of May 20.   
At 0622 EWT on the 20th, the convoy departed the anchorage and began the voyage 
south.  Although the convoy was intended as a ten-knot convoy, the Brazilian merchant ship 
Mogy kept falling out of formation and slowing the convoy to eight knots.  Despite the delay 
caused by Mogy, the convoy rounded Cape Hatteras without any problems and continued 
southward until a fire was noticed onboard the merchant vessel Bluefields.  While this event 
caused some initial concern, the naval escorts quickly discovered it was an internal fire in 
Bluefields cargo hold.  After combating the fire, Bluefields and the British armed trawler HMS 
Coventry City were sent to Beaufort so Bluefields could obtain repairs.  With the exception of 
this event, and the crew of the Coast Guard Cutter Dione having to threaten some merchant 
crews that they would shoot the lights off their vessels if they did not put them out, the convoy 
proceeded safely into Key West without having lost any vessels due to enemy action (Freeman 
1987:272-275; Hickam Jr. 1989:251-257).  Finally, after five and a half months of planning, 
debating, and acquiring escort vessels, the American Coastal Convoy system began to take shape 
and the ESF began to think that for ―the first time it is possible in 1942 to look forward with 
some confidence to the future security of the shipping in our coastal waters‖ (Freeman 
1987:271).   
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After these initial successful convoys, it would be just a matter of time before problems 
experienced with the merchant ships were smoothed out and the convoy system could prove its 
worth.  The ESF continued to run the KS/KN convoys from Norfolk to Key West and back until 
August 1942 when these convoys were superseded by even better systems running from New 
York to Key West and from New York to Guantanamo, Cuba.  These convoy routes then 
operated until VE day with only minor routing changes as navigational buoys were moved or 
removed.  While the coastal convoy system did not entirely eliminate the U-boat threat and 
prevent any more merchant vessels from being sunk, the system was operated with great success 
for the remainder of the war with less than a dozen merchant ships sunk or damaged while in 
these convoys.   
Of these few casualties, five were lost or damaged by mines laid in the Chesapeake Bay 
by U-701 and not from direct attack by a submarine.  The small number of vessels lost or 
damaged throughout the rest of the war is outstanding when compared to the number of vessels 
that travelled in these convoys.  In total, 5,009 merchant vessels and 1,817 convoy escorts 
travelled in the KS/KN and NK/KN convoys from the time they were implemented, resulting in a 
loss rate of merely 0.0016 % of all vessels travelling in these convoys (Headquarters of the 
Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Commander Tenth Fleet 1939-
1945:51,53,55,chap. 4).  These phenomenal rates finally showed that, through the effective use 
of escort vessels and properly implemented convoy routes, the war against the U-boat in East 
Coast waters could be won.  Similarly, merchant ship crews could, for the first time since the 
German submarines arrived in American waters, look forward to relatively uneventful coastal 
passages and hope to pass through ―Torpedo Junction‖ with their lives.  While the successful use 
of convoyed merchant vessels and increasing numbers of naval escorts helped immensely with 
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changing the tides of the war, one additional aspect of convoy support and coastal patrol cannot 
be overlooked in the ESF‘s struggle against the U-boat.  This aspect, which also follows the 
storyline of the Frontier‘s constant struggles with inadequate numbers of patrol craft, is the aerial 
support available during the war. 
Aerial Coverage 
 
To the consternation of the NANCF, December 1941 brought about the sobering reality 
of how terribly ill equipped the Frontier was for a potential submarine war.  Not only did the 
Frontier severely lack suitable naval vessels, but a look into the numbers of adequate aircraft 
available also revealed an alarming lack of aircraft capable of performing anti-submarine duties 
offshore.  In the entire Frontier, only 103 aircraft existed.  These planes merely consisted of ―51 
trainers, 18 scouts, 14 utility, 7 transports, 6 patrol, 3 torpedo, 3 fighters, and one bomber…3/4 
of which were unsuited to the task assigned‖ (Freeman 1987:6).  Quickly these aircraft were 
assigned inshore coverage areas around important naval bases and harbors, while the Army Air 
Forces were given responsibility for patrolling waters offshore since the Naval Frontiers did not 
have adequate aircraft.  While US forces established several aerial patrols, they recognized that 
most of these would not be able to defend against the potential threat of submarines offshore but 
hoped they would provide advanced before any merchant vessels were sunk.  By receiving an 
advanced warning, the Frontier might intercept incoming submarines and better utilize their 
limited forces (Freeman 1987:9-10).  Unfortunately for the Frontier, the rapidity with which 
German submarines brought the war to American waters in January 1942, did not allow offshore 
patrols to provide much of an advanced warning.  Even if they had been able to do so, it is 
unlikely the forces available could have curbed the blows to merchant shipping.   
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Despite Admiral Andrews requesting that the navy assign an entire squadron of aircraft to 
the NANCF, the remainder of January found few aircraft available for patrol duty.  Amphibious 
Coast Guard aircraft flying out of fields at Salem, MA, Floyd Bennett, Long Island, and 
Elizabeth City, NC, did not carry munitions with which to sink submarines.  Additionally, Army 
airplanes patrolling 40 miles offshore from Maine to Wilmington, NC, only carried enough fuel 
for a few hours of patrol and contained no weaponry.  Several lighter than air ships scanned the 
coastline around New Jersey and two flights of bombers per day left from Westover, Mitchel, 
and Langley Fields, cruised 600 miles out to sea looking for targets, then returned to base 
(Freeman 1987:24-25).  These scant air patrols were all the Frontier could muster to protect the 
Eastern Seaboard at the beginning of the war.  Each coastal frontier received a glimmer of hope 
at the end of January, however, when the Navy informed them that Atlantic Fleet aircraft could 
be used within the respective coastal frontiers they were stationed as long as these missions did 
not interfere with the regular obligations of the Fleet aircraft.   
Three more utility aircraft were also taken from the Atlantic Fleet and stationed at 
Elizabeth City, NC, in the hopes of combating the U-boats that had already shown that the waters 
off Hatteras were their best hunting grounds.  Admiral Andrews further endorsed a request sent 
from the air base at Elizabeth City to Admiral King asking for the addition of 12 more aircraft to 
the base‘s fleet.  Andrews suggested that several of the 20 Royal Air Force PBY-5 aircraft 
stationed at Elizabeth City should be manned and added to the roster of available patrol planes.  
King responded that the Navy understood the Frontier‘s needs for more aerial patrols but that 
additional airplanes were not available and would not be until the production rate of aircraft was 
increased.  King‘s response left the Frontier with only three additional utility planes and the 
extremely limited use of Atlantic Fleet aircraft by the end of January 1942 (Freeman 1987:24-
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26).  This meant that ―January closed as it began with the warning that any increase in the forces 
assigned to the Frontier, would be ‗dependent on future production.‘ Such words were indicative 
of the general plight of every command in all of our armed forces. There were not planes or ships 
or trained men enough to go around‖ (Freeman 1987:26).  
To increase effectiveness of forces available for patrol duty off Cape Hatteras, ComFive 
drafted a plan for protecting the Fifth Naval District.  This plan divided these waters into three 
different lanes between latitudes ―38-00N and 37-00N and 35-30N, and Lat. 34-00N‖ (Freeman 
1987:28).  The first sector between 38-00N and 37-00N would be patrolled by Army planes from 
Langley, the sector between 37-00N and 35-30N would be patrolled by the Fleet Air Arm, and 
the third sector between 35-30N and 34-00N would be patrolled by the Naval Air Stations within 
the Frontier (Figure 4.8).  These aircraft were to assist the nine Inshore Patrol surface vessels 
currently operating in the Fifth Naval District in defending the 28,000 square miles of water 
contained within the district‘s boundaries.   
To add to this daunting task, ComFive was told of severe limitations pertaining to the 
Atlantic Fleet aircraft and informed that many crewmembers were still undergoing training and 
not yet available for combat flights.  ComFive pointed out that the Fifth Naval District could 
function more effectively if the capabilities of the air base at Elizabeth City were utilized since 
the base could house 300 men and 50 officers, as well as additional planes, bombs, and fuel.  
This location would be optimal for allowing planes to quickly take off and hunt for U-boats 
around Hatteras, but currently only three utility planes from Elizabeth City were assigned to 
offshore patrols (Freeman 1987:26-30).  Another four planes were eventually added to the Fifth 
Naval District ―but three were experimental and the fourth was a utility requiring an hours [sic] 
notice before it could be ready for flight with a depth bomb‖ (Freeman 1987:30).  At Langley, 
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Army bombers also could not divert more than two flights per day over Fifth Naval District 
waters, further limiting the effectiveness of ComFive‘s operational plan. 
 
FIGURE 4.8.  Sectors of naval and aerial coverage within the Fifth Naval District at the end of 
January 1942 (Google Earth Image, Paths Added by Author).   
 
The strength of the plan was again limited when it was discovered that many land-based 
bomber pilots were not trained in the use of naval weaponry and could not properly deploy 
delayed trigger bombs and depth bombs.  This, coupled with the inability to rapidly 
communicate between surface craft and air forces because information was routed through 
different departments severely hampered the otherwise well-planned and potentially effective 
defensive measures outlined by ComFive.  Despite shortcomings, three aircraft began patrolling 
off Cape Hatteras, with the Diamond Shoals Light Buoy as the center point of their patrol, on 
January 25.  During the rest of the month, no additional merchant ships were attacked in these 
waters, a dramatic change from the eight vessels attacked between January 18-25.  This change 
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gave ComFive some hope that with enough aircraft the U-boat war in American waters could be 
won (Freeman 1987:30-32).   
Unfortunately, for the Fifth Naval District, February would not bring any additional 
aircraft to the frontier as all planes made available for the Navy were being added to Fleet 
Squadrons until they contained enough aircraft to assist in the Coastal Frontiers while still 
carrying out their daily training flights and normal oceanic convoy escort tasks.  Additionally, 
Admiral Andrews and ComFive received word from the Office of Naval Operations that 
informed them the Royal Air Force PBYs currently at Elizabeth City were about to be 
overhauled and sent to the British Isles.  By this time, the Commandant of the Coast Guard also 
became weary of watching his facilities operate at less than full capacity while merchant ships 
were destroyed off American beaches and requested that the Bureau of Aeronautics add 46 
airplanes to Coast Guard bases.  The Bureau of Aeronautics quickly approved of the distribution 
of 40 OS2U-3 aircraft to Coast Guard bases throughout the country.  On February 9, Admiral 
King greatly helped the East Coast war effort by requesting these aircraft only be assigned from 
Salem, MA, to St. Petersburg, FL, and not throughout the entire US.  This request was approved 
on February 13 and the aircraft were slated for delivery to East Coast bases between February 27 
and March 11.  This change resulted in no additional air support added to the Frontier during 
February, but the hopes of increased aerial defenses for March (Freeman 1987:46-48).   
On March 12, Admiral Andrews proposed what he called ―scarecrow patrols‖ to help 
keep U-boats underwater, forcing them to travel at a slower rate and out of position for attack on 
merchant vessels.  For the past three months, the ESF had noticed that German submarines 
would crash dive at the first sign of aircraft even if the airplane was unarmed.  With this in mind, 
Andrews thought the ESF could exploit the U-boats protective diving routines and suggested the 
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―scarecrow patrols‖ be made of unarmed airplanes flown by civilians with the sole purpose of 
forcing the Germans to submerge.  Although the proposal seemed feasible and offered a sound 
measure for combating the U-boat threat, Admiral King quickly shut down the idea under the 
guise of ―operational difficulties‖ (Freeman 1987:95).  This left the Frontier without the use of 
civilian aircraft, and the OS2U-3 aircraft scheduled for deployment into the ESF between 
February 27 and March 11 were delayed in being transferred.   
Finally, on March 28, 70 OS2U-3 aircraft were assigned to the Frontier for anti-
submarine duty.  While only 15 were currently operational at the Naval Air Station in New York, 
the remaining aircraft were slated for delivery to various coastal Naval Air Stations at a rate of 
four airplanes per day.  Additionally, Admiral Andrews was temporarily given one squadron 
from Carrier Replacement Group 9 that could be used for anti-submarine patrol and attack.  This 
addition brought the total number of naval aircraft within the Frontier to 86 and the total number 
of Army aircraft to 84.  Of these, 19 navy planes were stationed at North Carolina bases, while 
an additional 6 PBYs were located at Norfolk.  Army airplanes that could contribute to 
combating U-boats in North Carolina waters included four B-25s at Wilmington, NC, four B-25s 
at Charleston, SC, four B-17s, two B-18s, and four B-25s at Langley, VA, and three DB-7s at 
Savannah, GA (Freeman 1987:112-113, 130-131).  Although these aircraft fell short of Admiral 
Andrew‘s initial hopes March, ―[t]he most encouraging thing about March was not so much the 
actual material increase in our strength as the indications, growing throughout the month, that in 
the weeks to come the results of our increasing production will be felt in this Frontier‖ (Freeman 
1987:113).  
 In keeping with the terrible luck of the ESF, April would not be the month increasing 
production was felt throughout the Frontier.  Despite slightly increased numbers of aircraft, ESF 
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waters continued to be the deadliest for merchant shipping in the world because available air and 
surface vessels were still spread too thin across a massive amount of ocean.  Despite the addition 
of 126 aircraft into the Frontier, with 48 of these going to the Fifth Naval District, the Frontier 
could not prevent German submarines from sinking about the same numbers as they destroyed in 
March.  It was readily evident to the ESF that the aircraft available still only allowed coastal 
defenses to react to U-boat attacks and not preventatively patrol for them at all times and keep 
them from surfacing (ESF 1942b:3,Appendix IV, Freeman 1987:203).  Quickly, Andrews and 
the commanders of the Naval Districts were becoming anxious and demoralized about the 
outlook for the next few months.  Despite their anxiety and acknowledging that ―[t]he outlook 
for May is still almost as disturbing as it was at the beginning of April‖ they still believed that 
―pessimism should be tempered somewhat by the recognition that ships and planes are gradually 
accumulating along this coast and a protective system of considerable strength has been devised 
for the merchant vessels in our coastal waters‖ and that the month of May still may hold some 
hope for changing the tides of the battle (ESF 1942b:4, chap. 1).  On April 30, however, when 
German U-boats sunk two merchant ships in the Frontier, projections for May began to look 
bleak. 
 Then, in a twist of fate, at the beginning of May, something unprecedented since the U-
boats arrived off the American coast occurred.  The first 17 days of the month saw no merchant 
ships lost in Frontier waters, and during the remainder of May only four ships were sunk within.  
This was a startling accomplishment considering that estimates of the Frontier placed more U-
boats in coastal waters during May than any other month to date.  Commanders in the ESF 
quickly recognized that some of this success could be attributed to an additional 20 percent 
increase in vessels and airplanes.  These additional forces allowed U-boats to be hunted with 
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unprecedented force off the coastline and accounted for many more sightings and attempted 
attacks, one of which resulted in the confirmed sinking of a U-boat. 
Additionally, as the convoy system was initiated mid month, airplanes could be used 
more efficiently by having them escort convoys instead of randomly patrolling for chance 
sightings of surfaced U-boats, trails of a periscopes, or silhouettes of submarines just below the 
surface in clear waters of the Gulf Stream.  Even airplanes still used for patrols were becoming 
more effective as their pilots received better training and became more familiar with their 
instruments and weaponry as well as how to attack the U-boats more precisely (Freeman 
1987:247-249).   
On May 15, one of these patrol planes, the CG OS2U 5771 flying from Elizabeth City, 
spotted a slight wake 12 miles distant and investigated.  After closing the distance, the pilot saw 
what he believed to be a submarine on the surface.  After confirming that his radioman saw the 
same thing, he set up his attack.  Using clouds for cover and throttling down to 1/4 speed to 
reduce engine noise, the pilot got a mile and a half from the submarine before its crew became 
aware of the plane.  The submarine began a quick crash dive, leaving two crewmembers still 
standing on the deck.  In a near textbook attack, the pilot leveled off 50 feet above the water and 
dropped two depth bombs, set for a depth of 50 feet, 150 feet in front of the submarine‘s conning 
tower.  As the pilot swung the airplane around to look for damage, he soon spotted wood strips 
and oil coming to the surface in an arc away from the spot of the attack.   
Shortly after this, several additional CG airplanes, an airship, and the destroyer Ellis 
relieved the CG plane.  Over the course of several hours, Ellis delivered several depth-charge 
attacks by following the oil slick on the surface.  Although the submarine was never confirmed 
sunk, a large chunk of deck planking came to the surface along with more oil and bubbles at least 
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suggesting the submarine was heavily damaged and proving that the American coastal defenses 
were becoming better at orchestrating and carrying out attacks (Freeman 1987:258-259).  
Finally, it seemed that diligence in training and utilizing the available forces was beginning to 
pay off and there might be more hope for June.  Additionally, the increase in aircraft specifically 
assigned to the Navy grew to total 172 aircraft during May, with 45 stationed within the Fifth 
Naval District as of May 26.  The additional planes provided a great increase in the number of 
aerial patrols and convoy escorts that could be flown in June. 
 In June, the ESF again stated that, by their best estimates, there were more U-boats 
operating in Frontier waters than at any other month during the war, yet these submarines 
destroyed only 13 vessels during the entire month.  Furthermore, four of the vessels sunk were 
destroyed by striking mines laid by U-701 in the Chesapeake Bay, an action that could not be 
prevented no matter how many planes were patrolling the seas.  In addition to June being another 
successful month for the ESF, as the losses of vessels in the Frontier were kept to a manageable 
level, it was also a month for creating more efficient future plans.  Early in the month, Admiral 
Andrews recommended that the different commandants of the Naval Districts should set up Anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) training centers within their districts that had standardized layouts and 
facilities for training (Freeman 1987:331-332.  Once these centers were established in Boston, 
New York, Cape May, Norfolk, and Charleston, they were furnished with an ―Attack Teacher, 
the Dome Teacher in anti-aircraft (AA) machine gun fire, [a] lookout training room and a library 
and reading room where all available ASW publications, both US and Allied, would be readily 
accessible to officers of anti-submarine (A/S) vessels‖ (Freeman 1987:332).  Andrews also 
suggested to Admiral King that, for the first time, the 209 naval aircraft available would allow 
implementing several submarine killer combat groups.   
 
 
119 
 
These groups would be responsible for limited patrol in especially dangerous waters, but 
their true value lay in their ability to respond quickly to U-boat sightings and to exhaustively 
track and destroy those submarines.  One final suggestion that Andrews made to King was 
intended to make land-based Army aircraft more effective in anti-submarine operations.  Since 
land-based aircraft could be kept ready to fly at a moment‘s notice, Andrews suggested that 
additional airfields should be established along the East Coast that land-based craft could use to 
follow operational shifts by U-boats.  These airfields would be sparsely equipped and manned, 
but would have enough fuel and bombs to refuel and refit aircraft at these locations without 
having to cut their patrols short so they could make it back to the Army base they had left.  These 
aircraft would also, for the time being, be transferred to Navy control and the specific Naval 
District in which they were operating to streamline command and control of A/S operations.  
While this recommendation was not carried out during June, it helped the Frontier look forward 
ending the war in American waters as the coastal defenses became more efficient and better 
trained (Freeman 1987:331-334, 370).  In light of these factors, the ESF felt confident enough to 
express that 
When one considers the overall picture of the A/S warfare during the past month, two things 
are immediately apparent.  The first is that despite the increasing number of enemy 
submarines actively engaged in these waters, returns per U-boat are steadily diminishing.  
This gratifying result can be traced directly to the fact that various methods of A/S warfare 
developed during the past six months are now reaching a healthy maturity.  It is to be noticed 
also that constant effort is being made to increase the strength of the effectiveness of all of 
our weapons and men engaged in the attack against underwater intruders.  These two things 
give some tangible grounds for hope that the most disastrous period of sub warfare on this 
coast is now over (Freeman 1987:334). 
 
Fortunately, for the Frontier, July would corroborate these hopeful claims. 
At the end of July, the Frontier again claimed that more U-boats were operating in 
Frontier waters than at any other time since the first merchant vessel was sunk on January 14.  
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Despite the Frontier estimating that approximately 16 U-boats were operating off the East Coast 
each day of July, only two merchant vessels were lost to direct enemy action early in the month, 
and none were lost during the remainder of July.  Although very few merchant vessels were 
sunk, the Frontier accounted for its busiest month of the war to date, with 62 U-boat sightings, 23 
sound contacts, and 41 attacks carried out against submarines (Freeman 1987:408).   
The ESF attributed much of the success in July to the ―growing air strength in the 
Frontier‖ which ―has tended to reduce greatly the sphere of effective action by the submarines.  
The airplane, properly used, has proved of increasing significance in the kind of warfare which 
has been the main preoccupation of the ESF in this first half year of war‖ (Freeman 1987:408).  
On multiple occasions, pilots of aircraft spotted U-boats on the surface and delivered precise 
depth bomb attacks on crash-diving submarines.  Several attacks resulted in U-boats being blown 
into the air by the force of the bombs and severely damaged.  Multiple attacks, including one on 
July 14, resulted in the generation of oil slicks, bubbles, and debris rising to the surface causing 
pilots to suggest they could have destroyed the submarines by setting their depth bombs to 20 
feet instead of 50, something they should have already done considering the success scored by 
Lt. Harry Kane a week earlier (Freeman 1987:409-410). 
On July 7, 1942, at 1015 EWT, Lt. Harry Kane took his Army A-29 number 41-23392 on 
a routine patrol intending to fly from Cherry Point, NC, to the 100-fathom curve, then north 
along the curve and back.  Three hours and 57 minutes into his patrol, Kane spotted U-701 on the 
surface five miles away on his aircraft‘s port side.  As Kane lined his plane up for an attack, the 
submarine dropped below the surface while Kane was still two miles away.  Not giving up and 
steering a course straight for the submerged U-boat, Kane rapidly closed the distance to the still 
frothy surface where the submarine dove.  As the A-29‘s navigator and bombardier looked down 
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from a height of 50 feet above the submarine, they could still spot the U-boat‘s outline in the 
clear waters of the Gulf Stream.   
Quickly three MK 17 depth bombs, set for 25 feet were dropped, the last two of which 
appeared to fall directly on the submarine (Figure 4.9).  About 15 seconds later, it appeared that 
air bubbles were rising to the surface.  These bubbles were soon followed by the figure of a man.  
Suddenly, a group of between 25 and 50 men arrived on the surface, having abandoned the 
submarine while it was underwater.  Kane swung back by and dropped a raft and life preservers 
before radioing the location of the submarine survivors and heading back to Cherry Point for 
fuel.  While all but seven surviving U-701 crewmembers drowned over the course of the next 
two days and nights, the event marked the first successful sinking of a German submarine by 
aircraft in ESF waters, and more remarkably in the deadly waters off the coast of North Carolina 
(First Bomber Command 1942:1,7; Freeman 1987:427-430; Hickam Jr. 1989:306-312,338).  The 
July 14 attack by the two CG airplanes is also of interest because if the crews had set their 
charges to detonate at a shallower depth and indeed destroyed that submarine, they would have 
sunk U-404 off Hatteras.   
An additional attack on the 14th by two Navy OS2U-3s would also have spared three 
additional vessels from being torpedoed if it had been successful, as the pilots believed it had 
been.  This is because the submarine these two aircraft severely damaged instead of destroyed 
was U-576 operating in waters around Hatteras and the 100-fathom curve.  On July 15, the 
severely damaged 576, commanded by Kapitänleutnant Hans-Dieter Hienicke, spotted heavily 
guarded convoy KS-520 and managed to slam two torpedoes into Chilore, one into Mowinckel, 
and one into Bluefields.  This attack sent Bluefields to the bottom and forced the other two out of 
the convoy and into the Cape Hatteras Minefield where they would be more severely damaged, 
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eventually causing Chilore to sink while under tow.  Although U-576 was most likely sunk after 
carrying out this attack when it was bombed by escorting aircraft and rammed by Unicoi, the 
sinking of the U-boat several days earlier could have spared several merchant vessels from 
destruction (Freeman 1987:409-413,418-419, Hickam Jr. 1989:315-318). 
FIGURE 4.9.  Diagram of Lt. Harry Kane‘s aerial attack on U-701 <http://www. 
uboatarchive.net/U-701KaneAttackDiagram.htm>. 
 
While the ESF learned a valuable lesson about ensuring that the resilient U-boats were 
actually sunk in an attack, they also managed to make it through the month losing only two 
merchant vessels to direct submarine action.  They also learned the valuable lesson that it ―is 
certain that with his [the German enemy‘s] customary flexibility he will shift to new methods of 
attack, but in the last month it has been possible to demonstrate that he can be beaten even when 
using the short and most effective weapon in his command‖ (Freeman 1987:411).  This ultimate 
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realization would be what the ESF needed to give it hope for the successful future outcome of 
the war in American waters.  
Resolution 
 At the end of July, it was obvious that the ESF had come a long way since April when 24 
merchant vessels were destroyed in Frontier waters and only one German submarine was sunk.  
Since that time, Frontier forces had destroyed five more German submarines, three of which 
were sunk off North Carolina, the very waters that once teemed with U-boat activity and the 
burning hulks of torpedoed merchant ships (Hickam Jr. 1989:338).  On the other hand, the 
number of merchant vessels sunk, in proportion to U-boat activity, within the Frontier had 
decreased dramatically.  In May, the month following the devastating days of April, not one 
merchant vessel was attacked in Frontier waters during the first 17 days.  After this span of 
relative peace, only four merchant vessels were sunk within ESF waters.  Off Cape Hatteras, U-
boats kept their distance, only torpedoing merchant ships well out to sea and beyond the coastal 
waters of North Carolina (Freeman 1987:274; Hickam Jr. 1989:334,335).  The ESF did not 
attribute the lack of merchant vessel attacks within the Frontier to a lack of submarines either.  
Based upon the number of submarine sightings and allied attacks, the Frontier believed that there 
were at least 11 U-boats operating off the American Coast in May.  One of these, U-352, had 
arrived off North Carolina as early as May 2. 
 Upon arrival in this area, the crew of 352 had not spotted any merchant shipping and had 
made several crash-dives to avoid allied air patrols.  On May 5, the submarine‘s crew received a 
report that there might be a convoy headed south from Norfolk and decided to set a trap for it by 
lying in wait off Cape Lookout.  After four days, the lookouts finally spotted a vessel they 
determined worthy of sinking on the afternoon of May 9.  After maneuvering 352 so that the 
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unknown vessel was directly ahead, a torpedo was fired.  Unfortunately, for the crew of 352, the 
vessel they fired on was the USCG Cutter Icarus.  As the torpedo sped through the water, it 
missed Icarus and exploded 200 yards off its port quarter.  As the ―General Quarters‖ alarm 
sounded aboard Icarus, the captain turned the vessel towards the spot where the explosion had 
occurred since sounds of propellers could be discerned in that direction.  Arriving at the swirl left 
by the torpedo, Icarus dropped five depth charges before swinging back around and delivering 
another pattern of three charges in the same spot.   
The CG crew soon spotted a large amount of air bubbles rising to the surface, and 
dropped another depth charge on top of them.  After wheeling about again, the CG vessel 
dropped one more depth charge on the rising air bubbles.  One minute later, the crew of Icarus 
watched the submarine surface, and instantaneously greeted it with machine gun fire.  Once the 
cutter was maneuvered, the three-inch gun was trained upon the submarine and opened fire.  The 
first shell skipped across the water and slammed into the conning tower, the second round 
missed, and the following six shots all pummeled the side of U-352 as its crew came pouring out 
the conning tower.  Once the men aboard Icarus determined that the German crew was 
abandoning the U-boat and not manning its guns, firing ceased and the submarine began sinking.  
After the submarine disappeared, one more depth charge was dropped on top of it, bringing an 
oil slick to the surface, and the German survivors were picked up (Freeman 1987:259-261).  The 
sinking of U-352 brought additional hope to the ESF.  In the span of one month, two German 
submarines had been sunk, one by a naval vessel and the other by a Coast Guard vessel.  Both 
events even occurred before implementation of the convoy system, which was begun just days 
after the sinking of U-352, helping the Frontier realize that they were effectively transitioning 
from a medley of makeshift patrol craft into a legitimate fighting force. 
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 While it would have been beneficial for this transition to have occurred earlier, it 
certainly transpired at an important time as more U-boats than any previous month entered 
Frontier waters during June.  Despite the increase in the number of U-boats operating during 
June, the number of vessels destroyed by submarines did not increase proportionally.  Only 
thirteen vessels were lost to torpedoes or shells fired by U-boat and the mines the U-701 laid 
across the Chesapeake Bay destroyed another four.  Even with the additional loss of F.W. 
Abrams in the Hatteras Minefield, sinkings within the ESF for May totaled only 18 vessels.  
Although this number was close to the number lost in March and April, the ESF considered this a 
success since there were more U-boats in American Waters than ever before and because only 
four merchant vessels where sunk while sailing in  a convoy (Freeman 1987:331).  While North 
Carolina waters still contained six of the vessels lost, seven including Abrams, and another two 
damaged, the rapidity with which vessels were lost in these waters was also severely curtailed 
(Freeman 1987:369; Hickam Jr. 1989:335-336).  The Frontier managed to reduce these numbers 
even further in July. 
 During July, a month when the ESF believed there were as many as 16 U-boats operating 
within American waters, the Frontier managed to reduce losses from enemy action to two ships.  
The first sinking occurred on July 3, when U-215 torpedoed and sank Alexander Macomb, 
sailing in a convoy east of Boston.  Quickly, one of the escorting British Trawlers, Le Tigre, 
found the submarine just below the surface and dropped two depth charge patterns on top of it.  
The depth charges instantly blew the submarine to the surface before it sank to the bottom.  The 
second loss occurred on July 15, when U-576 torpedoed and sunk Bluefields, travelling in a 
convoy east of Hatteras.  Although Chilore and J.A. Mowinckel were also damaged in this attack 
and Chilore and Keshena sank after running into mines in the Cape Hatteras minefield, 
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Bluefields was the only vessel sunk by enemy action in the once deadly Cape Hatteras waters 
during the entire month.  In this attack, however, the attacking submarine, U-576, was likely also 
lost, resulting in the second German submarine sunk in the waters of North Carolina during July 
and the fourth sunk off North Carolina overall.  The losses of the submarines, U-215, U-576 and 
U-701, in July meant that, for the first time since the United States entered the war, the ESF had 
managed to destroy more German U-boats than the submarines destroyed merchant vessels 
(Freeman 1987:409,411-420,442,427; Hickam Jr. 1989:317-318).  With renewed vigor and 
confidence that the U-boats could be defeated, the ESF prepared for August. 
 In August, however, something unexpected happened; not one vessel was attacked in the 
waters off North Carolina.  On a more impressive scale, not one ship was attacked within ESF 
waters.  As American defenders continued to patrol, they looked out across an empty expanse of 
ocean dumbfounded.  Where had the U-boats gone?  It would not be until the end of the war that 
the ESF would have the answer to this question.  On July 19, Doenitz had made a difficult 
decision; in the B.d.U. operations book he entered: 
In the sea area off Hatteras successes have dropped considerably.  This is due to a drop in the 
traffic (formation of convoys) and increased defence [sic] measures.  Of the boats stationed 
there in the recent period only two, U 754 and U 701 have had successes.  On the other hand 
U 701 and U 215 have apparently been lost, and U 402 and 576 badly damaged by depth 
charges or bombs.  This state of things is not justified by the amount of success 
achieved.  The two remaining boats (U 754 and 458) will therefore be removed.  With this 
development has set in which might have been expected earlier. For occasional operations by 
single boats and minelaying operations in harbor entrances, areas along the east coast of 
America will come under consideration as before. (B.d.U. 1942c:39) 
                 
With this message, Doenitz effectively did what the Americans had been attempting to do for 
months; he ended the U-boat war against the American East Coast for the remainder of 1942 
and, more or less, for the remainder of the war.  It is unlikely that Doenitz felt no U-boat could 
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be successful against the American convoys it is probably that, in terms of cost Doenitz felt it 
was time to fully transition his U-boats south.   
This southern transition of forces was something he had been planning ever since 
Operation Paukenschlag.  As soon as Doenitz‘s U-boats began their attacks on America, Doenitz 
knew that they would have a limited amount of time to attack the American shipping lanes 
before the United States mustered a strong defense against the submarines (B.d.U. 1941:258).  In 
all likelihood, Doenitz probably thought the Americans would react quicker than they did, which 
is why he began transitioning U-boats further south before the northern hunting grounds were 
entirely depleted of targets.  As early as February, the ESF noticed a discernable southward shift 
in U-boat operations, suggesting that in the following months the South Atlantic would become 
the main theater of U-boat operations.  This shift was slightly clearer in April as more attacks 
took place south of Hatteras and not as many occurred in the northern waters of the Frontier.  
Finally, during May, when the merchant vessel losses in the ESF were severely reduced, it 
became apparent that the U-boat hunting grounds had officially transitioned to waters of the 
Southern, Caribbean, and Gulf Sea Frontiers (Figure 4.10) (Freeman 1987:45,166,248).   
In May, ―the U-boats struck in the Caribbean and the Gulf with devastating effect.  In 
these two general areas 15 ships were accounted for in April while in May the total sinkings for 
both the Gulf and Caribbean was 80‖ (Freeman 1987:247).  As the Gulf and Caribbean remained 
the primary zones of U-boat operation for the next few months, it became obvious that the 
voluntary transition of U-boats to the south had spared the ESF from having to eradicate entirely 
the submarines operating within their territorial waters (Freeman 1987:331).  Shifting the U-
boats operational area all but signaled the end of the battle for the ESF and the end of U-boat 
activity in North Carolina waters.  
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This is not because the U-boats never attacked off North Carolina again, but that by 
transitioning U-boats to the south, the Germans let the ESF build up their defenses and 
submarine hunting doctrine.  This meant that the few submarines Doenitz permitted to return 
would never attain the same victories the Germans enjoyed during the first four months of 1942.   
 FIGURE 4.10. Chart depicting U-boat attacks from May-June 1942, which clearly shows a shift 
in U-boat activity to the south Atlantic (Photo Courtesy of the National Archives, College Park, 
MD). 
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When Doenitz finally sent a U-boat back to Hatteras at the end of March 1943, after a period of 
six months since the last submarine had patrolled these waters, it was not because he believed the 
vessel would be extraordinarily successful after the hiatus in U-boat attacks, but that he had to 
assign the vessel a patrol area since it could not reach the Caribbean due to overheating batteries.  
This submarine, U-129 would sink one vessel south of Bermuda on April 2, and one well out to 
sea southeast of Hatteras on April 24 before entering North Carolina. 
Upon entering this area, the crew of U-129 managed to sink only one vessel, Panam, on 
May 4 before proceeding into deeper waters and expending the rest of their torpedoes by missing 
two ships with six torpedoes.  Despite these meager results, Doenitz decided that he would send 
three more boats to scout for merchant vessels sailing around Hatteras (B.d.U. 
1943:180,212,221,278,317,338; Commander Fifth Naval District 1943; Rohwer 1999:163,165).  
Unfortunately, for Doenitz, his U-boats would not sink another vessel off Hatteras until 
December when U-129 swept back through American waters.  While patrolling along the 
American Coast, the crew of U-129 spotted the merchant ship Libertad sailing in a convoy and 
managed to get close enough to sink it with a spread of torpedoes on December 4 (B.d.U. 
1943:370; Commander Eastern Sea Frontier 1943).  The next time a U-boat would torpedo a 
vessel off North Carolina would not occur for almost a year at a time when the United States 
Navy felt the ―submarine threat was beaten.  Submarines still had nuisance value, but their threat 
was gone‖ (Navy Department 1945:3).  
The next merchant vessel torpedoed in the waters of North Carolina would also be 
torpedoed more out of happenstance than because Doenitz desired to reopen the American East 
Coast as a theater of operations.  Since the Allies were sinking U-boats at an alarming rate, 
Doenitz knew that it might not be possible for U-boats to resupply while at sea and encouraged 
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U-boat captains to end patrols with enough supplies to reach a friendly port in the event that 
provisions could not be acquired in the open ocean.  One such boat, U-518 received these orders 
on August 7, 1944, whilst on the way to the Caribbean.  In order to ensure that his U-boat would 
not need supplies before reaching port, the captain of U-518 decided to transfer his operational 
area to the waters off Hatteras on August 11.   
Although U-518 arrived in its patrol area in mid August, it would not make an attack 
until just after midnight, EWT, on September 12.  In the early morning hours, the crew of U-518 
spotted the unescorted liberty ship George Ade sailing on its maiden voyage.  George Ade was 
blacked out and travelling north, destined for New York, on a clear sea with moderate swells.  
Neither crew could have predicted that those moderate swells were the beginning of a hurricane 
moving northward behind George Ade.  Once the captain of U-518 maneuvered his submarine 
into position, a torpedo was fired which struck the liberty ship on the starboard side near the 
rudder (B.d.U. 1944:515,525; OCNO 1944:1; The Washington Post 1944:3).  The torpedo struck 
with a ―dull thud‖ but with tremendous force that threw a sheet of water 25 feet high over the 
stern of the vessel.  The damage was severe: 
Deck buckled across #4 hatch.  Plates buckled on both sides above waterline amidships.  Stern 
plating aft buckled extensively.  After peak tank holed and flooded, shaft alley flooded, shaft 
driven ahead and Kingsbury thrust telescoped.  Steering engine destroyed immediately and 
rudder damaged and inoperative.  Deck winches aft lifted from foundations and steam lines 
broken.  Bulwarks port side forward of main deck housing cracked.  Rudder stock driven up 
through deck, carrying parts of deck up 2‘.  Berths and lockers in Armed Guard quarters aft 
knocked down.  Main engines probably knocked out of line and were secured immediately as 
ship was out of control. (OCNO 1944:1) 
 
 Despite extensive structural damage, the hardy Liberty ship remained afloat and its entire 
crew, although severely shaken, remained alive.  Quickly, crews manned the guns aboard 
George Ade as another torpedo wake was spotted passing directly under the Liberty ship and off 
into the distance.  Several men thought they spotted the submarine on the surface and a couple of 
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shells were fired toward it, but by the time the flash of the gun‘s muzzle died away, the 
submarine had vanished.  Fortunately, for everyone aboard George Ade, the submarine did not 
attack again and the vessel continued to drift dead in the water with its crew sending out distress 
signals.  Early in the afternoon on September 12, the crew of USS Escape (ATR-6), found 
George Ade and managed to secure a tow line to it before heading towards shallower waters 
while the Coast Guard cutters Jackson and Bedloe came to render assistance and protect the 
crippled ship.   
By the night of September 13 ATR-6 and George Ade were off Wimble Shoals making an 
excruciating one knot whilst being pummeled by rising waves and increasingly fierce winds.  
Around noon on September 14, the towline parted while the ships were about 12 miles off Bodie 
Island and George Ade began drifting out of control towards shore.  The crew quickly dropped 
one anchor in 13 fathoms of water, which was carried away before they dropped another with 60 
fathoms of chain attached.  This one managed to hold while the engines of George Ade were 
gently run to prevent the ship from drifting anymore.  As the crew of George Ade hoped their 
anchor would hold, they were pummeled by 100-knot winds and 50 foot high waves until the 
seas finally calmed nine hours later.  In the morning, the towline was reattached and the vessel 
towed towards Chesapeake Bay.  In one final insult to the already damaged merchant vessel, 
George Ade’s propeller fell off on the afternoon of September 16 just hours before it was towed 
into port for repairs where the entire ships compliment of 67 stumbled off the ship weather-
beaten but alive (OCNO 1944:1-2; The Washington Post 1944:3).  Sadly, for the crews of 
Jackson and Bedloe, the same could not be said for them.   
 After coming to the assistance of George Ade, both vessels had been caught in the 
hurricane and foundered.  Of the 37 men aboard Jackson, only 19 would be rescued after 
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spending 58 hours afloat at sea.  Only 12 members of Bedloe’s 38-man crew would survive 51 
hours adrift.  These men were lucky to be alive after their vessels were battered by 100-foot 
waves during the hurricane and the crews were incessantly harassed by sharks and stung by 
Portuguese Men-of-War after their ships sank (The Washington Post 1944:1).  While the loss of 
these two vessels was a very unfortunate event for the United States Coast Guard and the ESF, 
there was an uplifting part to it.  During the entire year of 1944, the Atlantic weather had proven 
more deadly than German submarines off North Carolina since no additional vessels were 
attacked the during remainder of the year.  The loss of no vessels and only one damaged due to 
enemy action gave the ESF hope that the war had been won in their waters and that 1945 would 
witness no U-boat activity in the waters off North Carolina.  
 The ESF‘s wish for no U-boats in 1945 did not come true entirely as a couple of 
submarines were sent as a last-ditch effort in the spring of 1945.  On April 14, one of these 
submarines torpedoed and sank the merchant ship Belgian Airman, loaded with a cargo of 
sorghum and dairy feed, off the coast of North Carolina.  Quickly, 46 of the 47 man crew were 
rescued and brought to shore after one man died while attempting to jump into a lifeboat, hit his 
head, fell overboard, and drowned (CESF 1945; ESF 1945a:1-2,chap.2).  The Belgian Airman 
was the last merchant ship sunk by German U-boat in the waters of North Carolina.  Just nine 
days later, the Norwegian vessel Katy became the last vessel attacked off North Carolina.  
Despite being torpedoed, Katy remained afloat and proceeded under its own power to Lynnhaven 
Roads, Virginia, for repairs.  The U-boat or U-boats that attacked these two merchant vessels 
remain a mystery, however, as the ESF quickly sought the submarines and discovered two U-
boats, U-857 and U-879, and probably destroyed both of them before they could report any 
successes.   
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While 857 is tentatively credited with the attacks, the patrol areas and final coordinates of 
both submarines are not known since neither submarine was positively sunk (ESF 1945a:3,chap. 
2; Rohwer 1999:199).  Although the ESF reported two ―probable sinkings‖ in the waters off 
Virginia and North Carolina on April 18 and April 30, neither was definitively confirmed.  The 
event on April 18 was carried out by a blimp and several surface ships on a series of sonobouy 
contacts that gave ―positive evidence of a submarine.‖  Once the vessels concluded their attack, 
the sonobouys ―indicated [a] successful attack‖ (ESF 1945a:87,Appendix E).  The attack carried 
out on April 30, had similar results.  After the crew of the American patrol frigate USS Natchez 
spotted a submarine‘s periscope and schnorkel on the surface on April 29, Natchez, and destroyer 
escorts Thomas, Coffman, and Bostwick carried out a series of searches and depth charge attacks 
on the submarine which immediately submerged.  Over the course of the next seven hours, the 
American vessels made nine attacks bringing lots of oil to the surface before the contact was lost.  
Since the attack occurred in 1,323 fathoms, positive confirmation of the attack was impossible at 
the time (ESF 1945a:115,117,Appendix E).  Regardless of whether these attacks sank the two 
submarines, U-857 and U-879 were never heard from again and no further attack was ever 
carried out in the waters off North Carolina. 
 Although one enemy submarine was spotted patrolling off Hatteras at the beginning of 
May, and one submarine sank the merchant vessel Collier, travelling off Rhode Island loaded 
with 7595 tons of coal, on May 5, the waters of the ESF had become a dangerous place for U-
boats to operate.  Within three hours of the attack on Collier, three American vessels, Ericsson, 
Moberly, and Atherton had sonar contact on the submarine just five miles from the spot of the 
attack and began laying down a barrage of depth charges.  Soon oil and debris with German 
markings began floating to the surface.  On May 6, divers confirmed that this attack resulted in 
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the sinking of another German submarine in ESF waters.  This U-boat was lost with all hands 
just two days before the official German surrender of their submarines (ESF 1945b:1-2,chap. 1; 
ESF 1945b:1,chap.3).  Finally, the ESF had defeated the German submarines and had even sunk 
one of the last U-boats destroyed by the Allies in war related incidents.  After five long years of 
planning, fighting, and incessant patrolling, the forces of the ESF claimed victory in the form of 
a German submarine lying on the bottom of the Atlantic off Rhode Island.  With jubilance, the 
ESF expressed, 
So ended the Battle of the Eastern Sea Frontier, about sixty miles from the scene of the first 
sinking on 13 January 1942 when the tanker NORNESS was torpedoed.  In the intervening 
forty months, 114 merchant vessels, 678,669 gross tons, and five men-of-war were sunk by 
submarine action.  An additional 23 ships were damaged by submarine attack but reached port 
after the action.  Two merchant vessels and one British trawler were sunk by enemy mines 
and two ships damaged by enemy mines reached port.  Six submarines were definitively sunk 
and at least two more probably sunk. (ESF 1945b:2-3,chap. 2) 
 
Conclusion 
 
As each vessel‘s hulk and the bodies of its crew came to rest on the bottom of the, they 
presented future generations with a valuable opportunity to observe the destruction German U-
boats brought to the American Coast during World War II and to learn about an often forgotten 
time in American history when victory in the Battle of the Atlantic was not certain.  
Unfortunately, not all individuals respect the sacrifices the many men who died off North 
Carolina made while attempting to keep the shipping lanes open and supplies flowing to 
America‘s allies overseas.  It is for this reason that a boundary needs to be applied to the abstract 
area defined by the term ―Battle of the Atlantic‖ off the North Carolina coast.  By using these 
historical events and the coordinates of each to analyze where the most U-boat activity occurred, 
and using theories of battlefield archaeology to define limits of the battle, protective boundaries 
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can be instated to safeguard these relics of American history and offer a small tribute to the many 
brave sailors that plied the deadly waters off North Carolina in World War II. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: UNDERSTANDING THE BATTLEFIELD 
 
Introduction 
 
 Before geospatially defining the battlefield‘s extent and hotspots of activity within it, it is 
important to understand the events and vessels that comprise the battlefield.  Since locations of 
many events historically defined as occurring ―east of Hatteras‖ were first included in the Access 
database, it was important to discover how many actually occurred within North Carolina waters.  
This task was greatly simplified by adding the point shapefile representing all historical events to 
ArcMap, along with the line shapefile of ships‘ routes, and the polygon shapefile of the ESF 
boundaries.  Once each of these elements had been imported into ArcMap along with a shapefile 
outlining the state (Figure 5.1), the events shapefile could be edited so it contained only those 
points occurring within the latitudes of North Carolina.  
Since the purpose of this study was to delineate battlefield boundaries within North 
Carolina waters, the ESF boundaries were selected to represent the easternmost extent of North 
Carolina waters.  This was done since the American Navy selected these boundaries to mark 
waters under their protection, which meant that events occurring beyond these borders were not 
recognized by the United States as occurring within American waters.  Once these broad 
boundaries were selected, the events shapefile was edited so that only events occurring within 
these boundaries were chosen for analysis (Figure 5.2).  Upon determining which events 
occurred within North Carolina waters, statistical analysis of these events became possible. 
This chapter analyzes these events in several different ways beginning with the broadest 
battlefield elements and narrowing the research to reveal minor statistical trends within the 
battlefield.   
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FIGURE 5.1.  Locations of all historical events listed as occurring ―East of Hatteras‖ in 
historical documents. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.2. Events occurring within the waters of North Carolina. 
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The statistical analysis begins by examining the number of events that took place within 
the study area as well as the nationalities that contributed to battle-related events.  Once the 
major nationalities are revealed, it becomes possible to analyze how costly the battle was to each 
nation in terms of vessels and gross tonnages lost or damaged.  The cost of the battle can then be 
studied in relation to the chronology of the battle to determine if trends identified in historic 
documents are prevalent in the regional waters of North Carolina.  The remaining analyses 
conducted determine what vessel types were most affected by the battle and which U-boats were 
most successful.      
Event Statistics 
 
Upon completion of editing the events shapefile so that it only consisted of actions 
occurring within the territorial waters of North Carolina, it was discovered that 71 different 
vessels contributed to 142 events for which coordinates are known or speculated.  These event 
types range from attack locations, to attack types, to sinking locations, to survivor rescues, and 
even to those locations where disabled vessels were towed within the study area.  While event 
locations will not be discussed in this chapter, the proportions of the events contained within the 
study area can be seen in Table 5.1.  The most numerous events occurring are German U-boat 
torpedo attacks on merchant vessels.  This type of event accounts for 50 of the 142 historical 
events, or 35.2% of all events occurring, suggesting the study area‘s moniker of ―Torpedo 
Junction‖ is quite fitting. 
The next two most frequent events were the reporting of speculated and known vessel 
sinking locations.  Speculated wreck locations accounted for 21.8% of event locations and 
known sinking locations accounted for another 14.8% of the events occurring within the study 
area.  It is important to note, however, that due to the geographical nature of this study, these 
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percentages only represent events for which coordinate data was recorded at the time of the 
incident, or, in the case of known shipwrecks locations, subsequent surveys determined their 
final resting locations.  This means that popular events such as survivor rescues and attempted 
attacks on U-boats for which no coordinates were recorded are statistically underrepresented.  
This data nevertheless, allows additional statistical observations about the battle to be made and 
reveals the major combatants within the battlefront. 
Action Type 
Frequency of 
Action 
Percentage of Total 
Events 
Known sinking location of a vessel's bow 1 0.70% 
Known sinking location of vessel 21 14.79% 
Last known location of vessel (possibly still 
afloat) 1 0.70% 
Speculated vessel sinking location 31 21.83% 
Stern of vessel towed for salvage 1 0.70% 
Survivors rescued 3 2.11% 
U-boat attacked (aerial bombs and ramming) 1 0.70% 
U-boat attacked (aerial depth charge) 1 0.70% 
U-boat attacked (gunfire, shellfire & depth 
charges 2 1.41% 
U-boat attacked an Allied vessel with gunfire 1 0.70% 
U-boat attacked an Allied vessel with 
torpedo(s) 3 2.11% 
Vessel anchored at location 2 1.41% 
Vessel and survivors taken to location 2 1.41% 
Vessel attacked (shellfire) 3 2.11% 
Vessel attacked (torpedo & shellfire) 2 1.41% 
Vessel attacked (torpedo) 50 35.21% 
Vessel attacked by friendly fire 1 0.70% 
Vessel beached 1 0.70% 
Vessel Caught in Hurricane 2 1.41% 
Vessel collided with a war related shipwreck 1 0.70% 
Vessel collided with another vessel 2 1.41% 
Vessel docked for repairs 1 0.70% 
Vessel foundered under tow 1 0.70% 
Vessel struck mine/mines 4 2.82% 
Vessel towed to location 4 2.82% 
TABLE 5.1. Frequency and percentage of events occurring within the study area.  
 
 
140 
 
Events by Nationality 
 
 Further examination of the historical events reveals that 12 different nations are 
represented in the battleground.  As could be hypothesized, American vessels comprise most of 
the events.  The additional actions are divided amongst the remaining 11 nations in much smaller 
proportions (Figure 5.3). 
 
FIGURE 5.3.  Nationalities of vessels that contributed to events within North Carolina waters, 
n=142. 
 
While this diagram represents the nationalities of vessels that contributed to events off the coast 
of North Carolina, it does not represent the number of vessels involved from each nation.  This is 
because some vessels like U-576 torpedoed three merchant vessels in quick succession, 
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accounting for multiple events for which coordinates were recorded.  By examining the 
nationality of each vessel and only counting the vessel once, as opposed to counting it each time 
it was involved in an incident, it is possible to represent the number of vessels involved from 
each of the 12 nations (Figure 5.4). 
 
FIGURE 5.4.  Number of vessels from each nation contributing to events within the 
battleground, n=71. 
 
One important factor to consider is that most events occurring within the battleground are 
attacks on merchant vessels by U-boat.  This means that each attack event also represents a 
German action.  This also means that, in reality, the proportion of German actions and vessels in 
these waters is likely as high as the proportion of American actions.  The difference, however, is 
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that the locations the U-boats attacked from are not represented in the Allied attack and sinking 
reports but are represented in the microfilmed German KTBs which are still in German.  If ever 
anyone undertakes the painstaking process of translating these records, additional georefrenced 
information can be added to a GIS of the battle, fully representing the actions of the German U-
boats in American waters.  This will allow the battle to be viewed from the perspective of the 
German submariners and not just in light of the actions and reactions of Allied and neutral 
vessels. 
 Since the majority of events occurring within the battlefield are German attacks on Allied 
and neutral vessels, it is possible to break these events by nationality to represent which nations 
were most affected.  The number of vessels sunk from each nation can also be plotted to show 
how many attacks resulted in a lost vessel.  While this portrays the numbers of vessels attacked 
and sunk, it does not fully represent the destructive nature of the battle since additional ships 
were damaged and sunk due to war related accidents including collision, friendly fire, foundering 
while on patrol, or running into the Cape Hatteras minefield.  By plotting the occurrence of each 
damaging event in relation to one another (Figure 5.5), a better understanding of the destructive 
nature of the battle can be obtained.  While proportionally more American vessels were attacked 
and sunk than vessels of any other nation, they also accounted for more maritime accidents than 
any other nation, many of which had devastating results.  With the exception of British and 
Panamanian vessels, more American vessels were sunk through accidents than vessels from 
other nations were sunk by U-boats.  
These figures can be further analyzed to reveal the loss to each nation in terms of gross 
tonnage (Figure 5.6).  Again, it is possible to see that American vessels accounted for the largest 
gross tonnage lost, with Britain a very distant second and Panama third.  It is also apparent that 
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the American maritime accidents accounted for the loss of more gross tonnage than any other 
nation, again with the exception of Britain and Panama. 
 
FIGURE 5.5.  Number and nationality of vessels damaged and lost in battle related events. 
 
When the gross tonnages lost are summed, the overall devastation wrought by the war off 
the North Carolina coast becomes evident.  America lost 188,185 gross tons.  Even when 
tonnages of the American military vessels sunk in the engagement are subtracted, America still 
lost 187,533 gross tons of merchant shipping.  Belgium lost 6,959 gross tons, Brazil lost 8,387 
gross tons, Britain lost 48,242 gross tons (excluding the armed trawlers Bedfordshire and 
Senateur Duhamel), Greece lost 5,106 gross tons, Latvia lost 3,779 gross tons, Nicaragua lost 
2,063 gross tons, Norway lost 7,866 gross tons, Panama lost 25,681 gross tons, the USSR lost 
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5,284 gross tons, and Yugoslavia lost 3,289 gross tons.  This means that the waters of North 
Carolina served as the catalyst for the loss of 304,189 gross tons of merchant shipping during the 
war, of which 278,172 were lost as a direct result of U-boat attacks.  When these figures are 
analyzed based on chronology, the trends they reveal can help substantiate the historic record. 
 
FIGURE 5.6.  Gross tonnages damaged and lost in war related events. 
 
Chronological Statistics 
 
 As revealed through historical research, the battle off the coast of North Carolina had 
virtually ended by the close of July 1942 with relatively few attacks or events occurring the 
remaining three years of the war.  By chronologically charting the number of attacks and 
sinkings (Figure 5.7) within the study area as well the gross tonnages attacked and lost (Figure 
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5.8), it is possible to determine which months of the battle were the most costly.  Although 
Doenitz originally ordered few U-boats to enter North Carolina waters during Operation 
Paukenschlag, the eventual appearance of Hardegen and Zapp in these waters caused January to 
be a relatively productive month for the U-boats off this shoreline.  Despite the successes of 
these commanders around Hatteras, however, the number of attacks occurring off North Carolina 
dropped during February 1942 despite continued attacks in ESF waters (Freeman 1987:44).   
 
FIGURE 5.7.  Number of vessels attacked and sunk throughout the war. 
 
The months of March and April on the other hand would not witness this same decrease in 
attacks within the waters of North Carolina as both months saw increased U-boat attacks and 
sinkings.  May 1942 remains an interesting phenomenon as very few attacks occurred in North 
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Carolina waters and the entire ESF (Freeman 1984:247).  
FIGURE 5.8.  Gross tonnage of vessels attacked and sunk throughout the war. 
Although the ESF officially initiated the coastal convoy system on May 15, 1942 
(Freeman 1987:249), this does not explain the lack of attacks in North Carolina waters since no 
merchant vessels were attacked during the entire month and the only vessel lost was the British 
armed trawler HMT Bedfordshire.  While the U-boats were able to recoup some of their lost 
opportunities in June 1942, it appears that Doenitz‘s shifting of U-boat operations to the south 
Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico, combined with his withdrawing of U-boats from Hatteras for the 
remainder of 1942, forever sealed the fate of the German submarines off North Carolina.  After 
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the first six months of 1942, German U-boat successes would never again equal those obtained at 
the beginning of that year.  
Despite April 1942 being the month that the most merchant vessels were attacked, it was 
not the costliest month in terms of vessels and gross tonnages lost.  March 1942, witnessed the 
most vessels sunk and almost 20,000 gross tons of shipping more than the month of April.  
Similarly, while only two vessels were sunk in February, they accounted for more tonnage lost 
than in July when the ESF predicted there were as many as 16 German U-boats operating in 
Frontier waters (Freeman 1987:408).  Even with increased numbers of U-boats operating in the 
waters of the ESF, it is readily apparent from the downward shift in attacks and losses, that U-
boats reached the pinnacle of their success in North Carolina waters during March and April 
1942.  Unfortunately, for the Germans, these success rates could not be maintained after April 
1942 and their success rate in terms of attacks, successful sinkings, and gross tonnages destroyed 
began declining once April ended. 
Vessel Types 
 
 In order to recognize the objectives of U-boats in American waters, the types of vessels 
attacked and sunk off North Carolina can be charted to show which types of vessels U-boats 
sought to destroy and which types of vessels were more susceptible to maritime accidents 
(Figure 5.9).  By examining the types of vessels attacked by U-boat, it becomes notably apparent 
that the two vessel types most commonly attacked were merchant vessels and tankers.  The stark 
number of military vessels attacked or sunk by U-boat demonstrates that the German 
submariners had no intention of becoming involved in a battle of naval superiority but were 
merely interested in raiding commerce and destroying supply ships. 
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 FIGURE 5.9.  Types of vessels damaged and sunk in the battle. 
 
Furthermore, the only two naval vessels sunk by enemy fire were armed fishing trawlers.  
This suggests that these vessels were merely targets of opportunity or the recipients of attacks by 
frustrated U-boat captains.  The first armed trawler sunk was HMT Bedfordshire, sunk in the 
second week of May 1942, a month in which no other vessels were attacked, and the second was 
USS YP-389 sunk by U-701 after its commander, Horst Degen, thought he was falling into an 
Allied trap (Headquarters Fifth Naval District 1942:1-5,7; ESF 1943:8,chap. 5; Hickam Jr. 
1989:216-218).  Both events further illustrate that U-boat commanders sunk these vessels out of 
necessity or frustration and not because the Germans intended to include naval vessels as ships 
worth engaging off the North Carolina coast.  Similarly, the majority of vessels damaged or sunk 
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in war related accidents were naval vessels and one yard tug responsible for towing the damaged 
vessels J.A. Mowinckel and Chilore out of the Cape Hatteras minefield (ESF 1943:8,chap. 5).  
This suggests that the continuous patrols these vessels endured made them more likely to become 
involved in a maritime accident.  When the losses of all vessels are graphed in relation to 
tonnage attacked and sunk during the battle (Figure 5.10), another noteworthy trend is revealed.
FIGURE 5.10.  Gross tonnages of vessel types damaged and destroyed during the war. 
While U-boats sank three more merchant vessels than tankers, tankers accounted for 
almost 50,000 more gross tons lost than the merchant vessels.  This revelation allows additional 
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analysis regarding the sizes of merchant ships and tankers.  This analysis reveals a large 
difference between the sizes of vessel types and accounts for the additional tonnage destroyed 
when tankers were sunk.  This is because the average merchant vessel attacked in the battle was 
5,150 gross tons while the average tanker attacked was 8,131 gross tons.  Similarly, the average 
merchant vessel sunk weighed 4,973 gross tons while the average tanker sunk weighed 8,127 
gross tons.  There is also discrepancy between minimum and maximum sizes of these two vessel 
types.  The smallest merchant vessel sunk was 2,063 gross tons and the largest was only 8,310 
gross tons, while the smallest tanker sunk was 5,335 gross tons and the largest was 14,054 gross 
tons.  
The loss of so many of these vessels is staggering when one considers that the Quonset 
Point, Rhode Island Naval Air Station training manual printed during the war reveals that 
[t]he massacre enjoyed by the U-boats along our Atlantic Coast in 1942 was as much a 
national disaster as if saboteurs had destroyed half a dozen of our biggest war plants….If a 
submarine sinks two 6000-ton ships and one 3000-ton tanker, here is a typical account of 
what we have totally lost: 42 tanks, 8 six-inch Howitzers, 88 twenty-five-pound guns, 40 two-
pound guns, 24 armored cars, 50 Bren carriers, 5210 tons of ammunition, 600 rifles, 428 tons 
of tank supplies, 200 tons of stores, and 1000 tanks of gasoline.  Suppose the three ships had 
made port and the cargoes were dispersed.  In order to knock out the same amount of 
equipment by air bombing, the enemy would have to make three thousand successful 
bombing sorties. (Morison 2001:127-128) 
 
When merchant vessel and tanker losses are examined in relation to the amount of supplies they 
could have provided to the war effort, it is no wonder the Germans were willing to send their U-
boats across the Atlantic to ravage merchant shipping in the previously unmolested waters of 
America‘s Atlantic seaboard.  The discrepancy between merchant vessel and tanker sizes and the 
survival rate of each vessel type brings to light two different characteristics that can also be 
analyzed.  The first characteristic is whether there is any correlation between vessel size and 
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survivability, and the second is whether there is a correlation between the length of the vessel‘s 
career and the chances of it surviving an attack. 
 The correlation between vessel gross tonnages and chances of surviving an attack can be 
examined by creating a stacked bar chart for the merchant vessels and tankers where the x-axis 
represents ranges in gross tonnages in increasing order and the y-axis represents the percentage 
of vessels that survived or were sunk in an attack.  Once a stacked bar chart is created for both 
vessel types, they can be examined to determine if there is any trend in survivability as gross 
tonnages increase.  Charts for both vessel classes show some very interesting trends.  The chart 
for the merchant vessels (Figure 5.11) reveals that merchant vessels larger than 6,500 gross tons 
begin to have a greater chance of surviving an attack.  On the other hand, the size of tankers 
seems to have no effect on a vessel‘s chances of surviving an attack.  
As the gross tonnage of tankers increases, there is little change in the proportion of vessel 
survival versus vessel loss (Figure 5.12).  This may be due to the volatile nature of the cargoes 
carried by tankers or partially due to structural instability caused by the placement of hollow fuel 
bunkers throughout the tankers to transport fuel products.  One other important statistic is 
missing, however, that precludes making a definitive conclusion about any correlation between 
vessel sizes and survivability.  This is the number of torpedoes fired at each vessel.  Once again, 
a translation of the German U-boat war diaries will fill in this gap in information and provide 
insight into the possibility that large tankers may have had a greater chance of survival than 
smaller ships, but were often torpedoed multiple times by U-boat captains wanting to ensure 
their destruction. 
Although this same factor also prevents definitive conclusions from being drawn about 
the age of a vessel and the chances of it surviving an attack, this information can be plotted 
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nevertheless and can serve as an initial observation about how the lifespan of a vessel may have 
contributed to its chances for surviving an attack.  These observations can then be tested by 
future studies that examine the number of torpedoes fired at each individual vessel.  Preliminary 
analysis of the date range vessels were built during versus their chances for surviving an attack 
reveal that more modern vessels of both types stood a greater chance of surviving an attack. 
 
FIGURE 5.11.  Proportion of merchant vessels surviving or sinking in an attack based upon 
ranges in gross tonnage. 
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FIGURE 5.12.  Proportion of tankers surviving or sinking in an attack based upon ranges in 
gross tonnage. 
 
  The stacked bar chart of merchant vessels (Figure 5.13) reveals that vessels built after 
1920 had better prospects of being damaged than being sunk in an attack, while the stacked bar 
chart of tankers (Figure 5.14) portrays that vessels built after 1925 maintained increasingly 
greater odds for surviving an attack by a U-boat with the exception of those built between 1936 
and 1940.  This is because both tankers built between these dates were sunk in the attacks carried 
out on them.  
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FIGURE 5.13. Proportion of merchant vessels surviving or sinking in an attack based upon 
ranges in build dates. 
 
It should be noted again that while chances for survival appear better for newer vessels, 
this does not reveal how many torpedoes were fired at each vessel, or where those torpedoes 
struck each ship.  Similarly, while it is tempting to claim that larger vessels could withstand a 
torpedo attack better than smaller ships, it must be noted that only three merchant vessels and 12 
tankers survived attacks by U-boats, which makes the sample size far too small to make concrete 
statistical analyses about the probability of survival after a submarine attack.  This also shows 
that while the size of a vessel may increase its chances of surviving an attack, the U-boats were 
nevertheless extremely efficient war machines armed with weapons capable of inflicting serious, 
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and often catastrophic, damage on vessels of any size or type that were unfortunate enough to 
pass in front of the watchful eyes of the German submariners.  Since much of the previous 
analysis has focused on the losses incurred by the Allied and neutral nations, it is the deadly U-
boats and their contribution to the battle that will be analyzed next. 
FIGURE 5.14. Proportion of tankers surviving or sinking in an attack based upon ranges in build 
dates. 
 
The U-boats 
 
 Although the four German U-boats sunk within North Carolina waters receive the most 
attention from the diving and maritime exploration community, an examination of the 
submarines that attacked vessels off the coast of North Carolina reveals the presence of far more 
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submarines.  There were 21, possibly 22, different U-boats responsible for attacks on vessels in 
the study area.  The slight uncertainty in numbers is because precisely which submarine or 
submarines attacked Katy and Belgian Airman in 1945 remains a mystery.  A graph representing 
each of these U-boats and the number of vessels they attacked and sunk (Figure 5.15) reveals an 
extraordinarily high success rate per U-boat.  Only three U-boats, U-136, U-518 and U-576 sank 
fewer than half of the vessels they attacked in the waters of North Carolina.  When one 
considers, however, that U-576 torpedoed Chilore, which struck a mine in the Hatteras minefield 
attempting to reach port after the attack, and later sank while under tow, the success rate of U-
576 can be weighted slightly higher. 
The most successful U-boat within the study area was U-124 captained by Johann Mohr.  
Mohr attacked eight vessels, sunk six, and destroyed 41,084 gross tons of merchant shipping.  
Georg Lassen in U-160 and Erich Topp in U-552 are the second most successful in the number 
of merchant vessels sunk.  Lassen, however, attacked one more vessel than Topp, but Topp had 
an astounding success rate, sinking every vessel he attacked.  In terms of gross tonnage 
destroyed, the two commanders are again very close.  Lassen sunk 36,731 gross tons of merchant 
shipping, while Topp sunk 37,037 gross tons.  What is surprising, however, is that Reinhard 
Hardegen and U-123 account for very little gross tonnage sunk.  This is because reducing the 
study area to boundaries depicted in Figure 5.2 reveals that several vessels destroyed by 
Hardegen fall outside North Carolina‘s territorial waters.  The gross tonnages attacked and sunk 
by each U-boat are represented in Figure 5.16. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.15.  Number of vessels attacked and sunk by each U-boat commander in the study area. 
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FIGURE 5.16.  Gross tonnages of vessels attacked and sunk by each U-boat. 
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Conclusion 
 
Even though the battle events, nationalities, tonnages, and other characteristics of the 
vessels contained within the battle area can undoubtedly be studied and analyzed in numerous 
other ways, this basic summation provides the background for the battlefield‘s geospatial 
analysis and provides a brief representation of the events, nationalities, and vessels contributing 
to the battle.  By taking a generalist approach to this data, overall trends in events, types of 
vessels attacked, and most successful U-boats are revealed for the engagement off the North 
Carolina coast.  It is these events and vessel characteristics that will be analyzed in the next 
chapter to place the battle events within their geographical context and to delineate the 
boundaries for the Battle of the Atlantic as it transpired in North Carolina‘s territorial waters. 
 
  
 
CHAPTER SIX: GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD 
 
Introduction 
 
 Although the purpose of this thesis is to determine the overall extent of the Battle of the 
Atlantic in North Carolina‘s waters and to determine the feasibility of assigning geographical 
boundaries to that area based upon wartime events occurring within these waters, several other 
geographical interpretations of the battlefield will be explored first.  These additional ways of 
analyzing the battlefield stem from this study‘s secondary research questions and provide 
information about the battle‘s supplementary characteristics and trends in a geographical context.  
By geographically examining the battle in relation to smaller trends, a greater appreciation of the 
battle can be obtained than by just examining the overall extent of the battlefield.  Additionally, 
overall trends in the war off the American coast can be compared to trends occurring within the 
waters of a single state to determine if overall shifts in battle activity are mimicked on a 
statewide basis.  This can reveal whether or not battle activity within North Carolina waters 
occurred randomly, or if it centered around certain geographical areas of the shoreline.  This is 
done in this chapter by using basic geospatial analysis tools to determine smaller battlefield 
elements that help comprise the battle‘s totality.   
 By mapping smaller battlefield elements such as centers of activity, densities of activity, 
and extents of activity over time, analyses can be conducted that reveal hotspots of activity while 
at the same time revealing the extent of sea the battle transpired on.  Additional analysis 
involving mapping vessel attack locations in conjunction with shipping routes provides an 
opportunity to analyze how effective the shipping routes were at keeping merchant vessels safe 
and how many vessels were following those routes when attacked.  In a similar fashion, 
individual U-boats can be tracked across the seascape by mapping locations where they carried 
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out an attack.  This allows observations to be made about the success of U-boats in regard to 
distances covered and areas patrolled.  In conjunction, each individual element helps delineate 
the overall battlefield boundaries.  Each of these analyses are discussed in further detail in this 
chapter beginning with measures of centrality and density of battle-related events.    
Centrality and Density of the Battle 
 
 One way the battle can be analyzed is in terms of the centrality of battle activity.  By 
analyzing where the geographic center of battle activity for each month fell, it is possible to 
determine to what extent the hot spots of battle activity shifted during the war.  While overall 
battle activity along the American coastline transitioned from the East Coast to the Gulf of 
Mexico and Florida in a drastic southward shift in U-boat activity (Freeman 1987:45,166,248), 
this overall southern shift in activity is not apparent in the waters of North Carolina (Figure 6.1).  
Most battle activity remained in the waters between Cape Hatteras and Cape Lookout with a 
gradual eastern shift into deeper waters after the convoy system was initiated and brought 
merchant ships closer to the 100-fathom curve (Freeman 1987:411).  Since there are so few 
events occurring in 1943, 1944, and 1945, these events are represented by year and not on a 
month by month basis. 
Even though the centers of battle activity for these years, as well as for May 1942 are 
depicted, it is important to note that the dearth of events occurring during these times means 
there is not a large sample size of geographical events with which to weigh the battle‘s centrality. 
In addition to the battle centrality by month and year, the geographical center of all battle related 
events can be mapped (Figure 6.2).  This point lies approximately 19.43 miles southeast of 
Ocracoke Inlet.  The exact coordinates are given in Table 6.1.  
When analyzed in light of the battle‘s historical record, these geographic centers of 
  
 
 
FIGURE 6.1. Centrality of battle activity throughout the war. 
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FIGURE 6.2. Centralities of battle events, including the center of activity for the entire battle.  
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activity add credence to the ESF‘s continuous observation that the waters around Hatteras were 
the U-boats preferred hunting grounds (Freeman 1987:21,27,50,94,166,174).  Although the 
center points of battle activity help substantiate the historic record and are important for tracking 
the center of activity throughout the war, they do not depict the clusters of events that represent 
why the centrality of the battle is weighted the way it is.   
In order to depict why the centers of battle activity occur in the locations they do, the 
density of battle events for a defined geographical area must be mapped to show where the 
majority of battle events took place.  Since this analysis requires a defined area to determine the 
density of events occurring within that area, the smallest German Kreigsmarine grid square was 
chosen to define the areas for analysis.  Since these smallest grid squares are six nautical miles 
by six nautical miles, results of the analysis are represented by the number of events occurring 
within a 36 square nautical mile rectangle around each event (Emmerich 2010).  The map of this 
analysis (Figure 6.3) shows that because of the great amount of ocean the battle took place 
within, the density of events occurring within any 36 square nautical mile area remained quite 
small.  The only area that had over six events occur lies off Avon, NC.  The other areas with a 
high density of events are off the tip of Diamond Shoals, and where U-576 attacked a convoy 
and was sunk in turn. 
 Coordinates UTM 
Datum WGS 1984 
Coordinates Lat/Long 
Datum WGS 1984 
Center of All Battlefield Activity 18S      433864 
            3864300 
34
o.55‘ N 
75
o43‘ W 
TABLE 6.1. Coordinates for the center of all battle activity. 
This information is important because it shows the dynamic nature of the battle and that 
U-boats probably would not have obtained the same success had they all been ordered to the 
same grid square off Hatteras.  This map also suggests areas where archaeological surveys may 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.3.  Densities of battle related events for the entire battle as defined by the area of sea contained in the smallest German 
Kriegsmarine grid square. 
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have the best success locating previously undiscovered shipwrecks.  While measures of battle 
centrality and density represent geographical areas where most of the battle was centered or 
where many events took place, they fail to depict the geographical extent of the battle for a 
particular timeframe. 
Battlefield Extents over Time 
 
 Since the geographical centers and density of battle events fail to represent the area of sea 
the battle took place in over the course of the battle, the events of each month and year can be 
outlined and mapped using a GIS ―Convex Hull‖ tool to show the overall extent for each time 
span.  The generation of convex hulls is akin to placing thumb tacks in a corkboard and 
stretching a rubber band around all the outer points so that every thumb tack is enclosed by the 
rubber band (Brimicombe 2003:75).  This same concept can be applied to the historic events 
occurring during the battle by treating each event location as a tack in the corkboard and drawing 
a convex hull polygon around all points, then cropping it along the shoreline.  Although 
analyzing battle events in this manner is beneficial because it depicts how much area of sea the 
battle took place over, it has one major drawback.  Since the convex hull envelops all the events 
occurring in North Carolina waters for a particular time span by drawing a polygon around the 
outermost events, the extent of the polygon is severely affected by extreme outlying events.   
 Since outlying points affect the convex hull polygon, the battle area depicted by creating 
these polygons is often over representative of the area where most battle related events took 
place.  Another limiting factor is that a convex hull polygon for 1945 cannot be created since the 
year consists of only two battle related events.  Despite these shortcomings, some valuable 
observations can be made from the convex hull polygons.  For the purposes of clarity, the battle 
was divided into two time spans and mapped with the convexes for those periods depicted.  
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Convexes for events occurring before implementation of the convoy system are mapped in 
Figure 6.4, and convexes for events occurring after the convoy system began are mapped in 
Figure 6.5.  
While April 1942 was the month that the most merchant vessels were attacked within the 
study area, it was also the month that witnessed the greatest dispersal of events across the waters 
of North Carolina.  Events for this month envelop an area of roughly 9,122 square miles of sea.  
After April, the polygons of battle activity become smaller and, by 1944, the three events for that 
year occur within a polygon of roughly 271 square miles.  The two 1945 events occur within 
roughly 47 linear miles of one another.  An additional interesting trend revealed by the polygons 
is that the events of February, March, and April 1942 are stretched from north of Cape Hatteras 
to south of Cape Lookout, while events occurring after these dates tend to be localized around 
one of the two capes.   
This suggests that the extent of U-boat movements decreased after April or that there 
were fewer opportunities to attack merchant vessels travelling between the capes once the 
convoy system was implemented and convoys were routed into deeper waters.  When the battle 
areas are charted (Figure 6.6), a fascinating discovery comes to light.  The areas for each time 
span follow a similar trend as the attack chronology depicted in Figure 5.7.  The months that 
witnessed the most U-boat successes were the same months U-boats appeared to spread out over 
a greater expanse of sea.  This observation suggests a strong correlation between U-boat 
movement patterns and their success.  It seems that by spreading out across North Carolina 
waters, U-boats could ensure more attacks than by patrolling the same zones as their counterparts 
and making themselves susceptible to the same American aerial patrols.
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.4. Convex hull polygons for the first five months of the battle. 
1
6
8
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.5. Convex hull polygons for the remainder of the war with 1945 event locations also depicted.   
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One additional noteworthy trend revealed by mapping the extent of the battle by time span is the 
number of events occurring well offshore, potentially signifying less than optimal route 
following by merchant shipmasters.  
 
FIGURE 6.6.  Trend in size of battle areas throughout the course of the war. 
 
Routing Vs. Attack Locations 
 
 One characteristic of the event locations and convex hull polygons that quickly becomes 
apparent is that there are many events occurring beyond the buoys and routing lines used for 
coastal navigation and coastal shipping routes.  This realization allows mapping of shipping 
routes for a particular time span in relation to routing dependent events during that same period 
to show the extent to which vessels were attacked while not following the shipping routes 
mandated by the ESF.  To represent this information, events occurring during each month were 
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filtered so that only events dependent upon the vessel‘s route were selected.  These events 
include where vessels were attacked, where they collided with other vessels, and where they ran 
into the Cape Hatteras minefield whilst not on a shipping route.  Events involving military 
vessels were not included since patrol vessels were not bound by shipping routes.  Similarly, 
events occurring after an attack, such as survivor rescues or striking a mine whilst fleeing an 
attack, that were not dependent upon shipping routes but more dependent upon ocean currents or 
random paths of retreat were not chosen for analysis. 
 As expressed in Chapter Four, the NANCF initiated merchant vessel shipping routes as 
soon as U-boats began appearing in Frontier waters and they infrequently changed them 
throughout the war.  Since there are few route changes, it is possible to map the events of a 
particular time span with the corresponding shipping routes.  In January 1942, the shipping 
routes that were initiated consisted of shipping corridors that followed a routing line connecting 
different lightships and other aids to navigation (NANCF 1941:20-23,chap.3).  In January 1942, 
when it became apparent to the ESF that the waters around Hatteras were the favored hunting 
grounds of the German submarines, the shipping corridors were modified from January 22 
through January 30 to carry vessels sixty miles seaward of Hatteras and hopefully around the 
patrolling U-boats.  By January 31, it was obvious to the Frontier that this shift failed to work, so 
they again changed the routes to bring vessels as close to the coast as they safely could.  This 
change was left in effect until March 6 (ESF 1942a:1-2,chap.4).  When attack locations for 
January and February are mapped in relation to the initial shipping corridors, however, an 
intriguing pattern is revealed (Figure 6.7).   
Virtually every vessel attacked was travelling along the original shipping corridors.  This 
includes the three vessels attacked in January after the route was modified to direct ships 60  
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.7.  Attack locations for January 1942 and February 1942 in relation to the initial shipping corridors. 
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miles offshore of Hatteras.  Similarly, the vessel attacked during February was travelling along 
the old corridors and not as close to shore as possible, and the one vessel involved in a collision 
appears to be in line with the shipping routes even though the routes did not span the entire state 
of North Carolina.  Although events occurring along the routing line in January are explainable 
by the fact that Hardegen quickly realized merchant vessels were following the lighted buoys 
along the coast (Hardegen 1941-1942:19), it is interesting that not one attack occurred outside 
the original shipping routes during these two months.  Although the reason no attacks occurred 
sixty miles off the coast of Hatteras or closer inshore would be a study in itself, it provides some 
interesting questions about the effectiveness of the NANCF in dispersing information about 
shipping route changes to port authorities around the globe.  This is further exemplified the next 
time the shipping routes were modified.    
 At the end of February 1942, the newly renamed ESF discovered that shipmasters were 
not following routing orders because they feared colliding with other vessels that were blacked 
out and travelling as close to shore as possible.  Although only one collision occurred in 
February, the ESF decided to move the shipping lanes once again.  This time, however, corridors 
were not specified but specific lanes following many different aids to navigation were.  The 
CNO approved these routes on March 6 (ESF 1942a:1-2,chap.4; ESF 1942a:Appendix I).  These 
routes remained in place until late May when the laying of the Cape Hatteras minefield and 
implementation of the convoy system necessitated another change.  Despite the specificity of the 
routes implemented at the beginning of March, mapping of attack locations for March and April 
in conjunction with shipping routes reveals some disturbing findings (Figure 6.8).  Since no 
attacks occur on merchant vessels during May 1942, this month is not included even though the 
shipping routes remained in effect for most of that month.  
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.8.  Attack locations for March 1942 and April 1942 in relation to the shipping routes for the corresponding period.  Note 
the extraordinarily seaward attack locations of most vessels departing Caribbean and South American ports. 
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One feature that is quickly apparent from mapping these attack locations is that very few 
attacks during March and April occurred in close proximity to shipping routes.  While there are 
likely many factors contributing to this occurrence, several are readily apparent in the historic 
record.  The first is that as early as March 12, the ESF lamented the fact that many merchant 
vessels leaving ports in the Caribbean or South America were not reporting their sailings to the 
ESF and were travelling several hundred miles offshore along the coast destined for northern 
ports.  For this reason, the ESF recommended that vessels should be ordered to enter American 
coastal shipping lanes between Cape Canaveral and Cape Hatteras so they could head north in 
waters patrolled by the ESF.  The CNO quickly approved and dispatched this information to 
vessels in the Atlantic on March 17.  
In theory, this dispatch should have brought merchant vessels closer to the American 
coast resulting in fewer attacks further out to sea.  When the four easternmost attack locations are 
analyzed, however, they reveal that each vessel departed ports in the Caribbean well after March 
17.  One of these, Chenango, departed St. Thomas Harbor in the Virgin Islands on April 14, 
carrying instructions from the St. Thomas routing officer telling the shipmaster to stay well 
offshore of the American coast and to never come within 30 miles of Cape Hatteras (Routing 
Officer, St. Thomas, V.I. 1942:1).  While additional research may assign some blame to the 
routing officer in St. Thomas for failing to read dispatches from the ESF, a failure in 
disseminating routing instructions on the part of the ESF must also be considered.  This is 
especially the case when one considers that E.M. Clark, torpedoed on March 18, departed Baton 
Rouge, LA, on March 11 with routing instructions from the commandant of the Eighth Naval 
District informing him to follow the reference line established in January, a reference line that 
had theoretically been abolished since January 31 (Commandant Eighth Naval District 1942:1).  
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If the ESF could not effectively transmit routing information across naval district boundaries, 
one must question how effectively they were able to disseminate that same information to other 
nations. 
The final historic factor that may have contributed to merchant shipmasters failing to 
follow the shipping routes is the abstract nature of the routes along certain areas of the coast.  Off 
North Carolina, northbound vessels were supposed to follow the ―approximate 10-fathom curve 
in Raleigh Bay,‖ while southbound traffic was supposed to follow the ―approximate 8-fathom 
curve in Raleigh Bay‖ (ESF 1942a:Appendix 1).  With vessels blacked out and zigzagging, 
shipmasters may have found it too hard to follow bottom contours and decided to simply cut 
across Raleigh Bay to save time and avoid collisions, or, as was the case of E.M. Clark, they may 
have been following older shipping corridors which fit the pattern of attacks better than the 
newer routes.  Whatever the reason shipmasters were not on the shipping routes, it appears that 
routes for March and April were not readily followed, and it may not have been the fault of 
disobedient shipmasters intent on delivering cargoes quickly with no regard for life.  Even 
though the issue of blame has yet to be proven, the fact that vessels were not travelling along 
patrolled routes could have contributed to these months being the two most destructive in terms 
of U-boat attacks and successes. 
Once the Cape Hatteras minefield was laid and the convoy system initiated, the ESF 
changed the shipping routes once again.  This change was especially important since the old 
shipping routes went directly through the Hatteras ―Danger Area.‖  Unfortunately, 
documentation of route changes made in May 1942 has remained elusive after archival and 
historic research, so the shipping and convoy routes published in 1943 are used to represent 
routes for the remainder of the war.  Presumably these routes are virtually identical to those 
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implemented in May 1942 because they are nearly the same as the routes used during March and 
April with the inclusion of a couple additional buoys to guide vessels around the Hatteras 
minefield and with convoy routes clearly defined.  While routes for May 1942 will undoubtedly 
be discovered in time, it is unlikely that they will depict any noticeable differences from the 1943 
routes. 
After the convoy system was initiated in May 1942, most attacks on merchant vessels 
occurred along convoy routes for the remainder of the war (Figure 6.9).  This is because three of 
the seven vessels attacked in June 1942 were travelling in convoys, while one more was escorted 
by a coast guard airplane and cutter (Commandant Fifth Naval District 1942; Freeman 
1987:402,403).  Similarly, every attack in July 1942 was carried out by U-576 against the same 
convoy; the only attack in 1943 occurred on a vessel that became stranded from a convoy; and 
no attacks happened in North Carolina waters in 1944.  The two 1945 attacks were on vessels 
sailing independently and probably captained by shipmasters who felt confident the war was 
virtually over in North Carolina waters (Commandant Fifth Naval District 1943; ESF 
1945a:1,3,chap.2).  Although the number of attacks taking place after April 1942 was severely 
diminished, their geographical extent is suggestive of how effective the ESF was becoming at 
combating U-boats.  After implementing the convoy system, no attack occurred along individual 
shipping routes with the exception of the attack on YP-389, which was not following a shipping 
route but merely patrolling the Hatteras minefield outskirts.  One way of examining the 
effectiveness of the ESF is to inspect how U-boat travel patterns changed throughout the battle.  
This can be done by mapping attacks carried out by individual U-boats in relation to the same 
time span breakdowns as above to determine if the range of attacks by individual U-boats 
changed.                    
  
 
 
FIGURE 6.9.  Attack and maritime accident locations for the remainder of the war in relation to the shipping and convoy routes for 
the corresponding period. 
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Individual U-boat Attack Locations 
 
 Since many of the previous analyses have focused on the battlefield‘s extent and the 
location of attacks on merchant vessels in relation to shipping routes, it is important to balance 
the study by observing where individual U-boats attacked.  Examining the attack locations by U-
boat allows two different observations about the battlefield to be made.  The first observation 
simply reveals the operational range of each U-boat in North Carolina waters, and the second 
relates to the effectiveness of ESF patrols as the war progressed.  Fortunately for the purposes of 
the study, the brunt of U-boat activity within ESF waters coincides with changes in the shipping 
routes, which allows attack locations to be broken down into the same chronological spans as the 
shipping route figures.  
 One aspect of the U-boat attacks for January and February 1942 (Figure 6.10) that is 
readily apparent is that attack locations for each U-boat are confined to a small area along the 
Outer Banks and that they follow a linear pattern along the shipping routes.  Despite the confined 
area of attack locations, the freedom of the U-boats to move and operate along the coast is 
obvious when the dates and times of attacks are examined.  Hardegen, in U-123, managed to 
travel approximately 61 linear miles along the coast of North Carolina in one day and attack five 
merchant vessels without being challenged by any American naval vessels or airplanes 
(Hardegen 1941-1942:18-22).  Similarly, Zapp, in U-66, traveled approximately 68 linear miles 
from January 22 to January 23 and attacked three merchant vessels without putting his submarine 
in danger.  Although U-432 only attacked one vessel off North Carolina, the submarine was 
previously operating and sinking ships off Virginia before transitioning south and reporting 
―[m]uch careless air patrolling‖ (B.d.U. 1942a:87).  Even though the submarines had not spread 
through all territorial waters of North Carolina by the end of February 1942, these initial attacks        
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.10.  Attack locations by U-boat for January and February 1942. 
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helped the U-boat high command realize that their commanders should fully exploit North 
Carolina waters for the next few months.  They further realized that submarines could attack with 
impunity because of the ineffectiveness of the ESF.  This realization meant the worst two months 
for the ESF were about to occur. 
By the time March and April 1942 ended, there was an evident expansion in U-boat 
activity and attack locations within the waters of North Carolina.  These two devastating months 
witnessed twelve different U-boats enter the waters of the state and attack merchant shipping.  In 
May, one additional submarine destroyed HMT Bedfordshire, the first naval vessel lost to enemy 
action off North Carolina.  While the limited number of attacks during May began to signify a 
decrease in U-boat effectiveness within the ESF, the map of U-boat attack locations during these 
months (Figure 6.11) reflects the aggressiveness with which the U-boats waged war along the 
North Carolina coast.   
During March and April, U-boats expanded the battle area, and distances travelled by the most 
successful U-boats also increased.  U-124 travelled approximately 152.3 linear miles between 
attacks.  U-158 transited approximately 175.2 linear miles of ocean between successful attacks.  
U-160 travelled approximately 165.8 linear miles between attacks.  U-203 moved approximately 
198.5 linear miles between attacks, cruising from north of Hatteras to south of Morehead City, 
and back to the Diamond Shoals. U-552 logged approximately 172.5 linear miles between 
attacks.  Although the number of miles travelled by the most successful U-boats during March 
and April suggests that they were able to operate with impunity, it must be noted that many U-
boats attacked only a few merchant vessels and that two U-boats were sunk during these months. 
 This means that even though these months witnessed the loss of the most merchant 
vessels, successful U-boat captains had to work much harder for each victory.  This alludes to the  
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.11. Pre-Convoy U-boat attack locations for March 1942 through May 1942. 
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fact that the ESF was becoming a more effective fighting force and that the directive to route 
merchant vessels around Hatteras during daylight was beginning to have an effect (ESF 1942a:2-
3,chap. IV).  Once the convoy system was initiated in the middle of May 1942, the U-boats 
would never again be able to move about in the same way.  The map of attacks for the remainder 
of the war (Figure 6.12) clearly depicts how efficient the ESF became at routing vessels through 
the deadly waters off Hatteras and in hunting and destroying any U-boat that carried out an 
attack.  
  In June 1942, Horst Degen, in U-701, managed to travel approximately 152.8 linear miles 
between successful attacks in North Carolina waters; however, his patrol resulted in the loss of 
his submarine.  The only other successful U-boat commander to appear in North Carolina waters 
during June 1942 was Otto von Bülow in U-404.  After spending much of his patrol beyond ESF 
boundaries, Bülow entered North Carolina waters and successfully attacked three merchant 
vessels on June 24, all in approximately the same location.  After these attacks, Bülow retreated 
into waters beyond the ESF for the remainder of his patrol (Hickam Jr. 1989:335,336).   
In July 1942, only Hans-Dieter Heinicke in U-576 attacked vessels within the waters of 
North Carolina.  Heinicke torpedoed three vessels in the same convoy over a linear distance of 
approximately 14.1 linear miles (depending on the validity of the attack coordinates) before 
being sunk by the convoy‘s escorts.  After this attack, only U-129 attacked a merchant vessel in 
North Carolina waters during 1943.  No vessels were attacked in 1944, and U-857 or U-879 
(possibly both) attacked two vessels approximately 46.3 linear miles apart in 1945.  The attacks 
on these vessels put the ESF on alert and both submarines were destroyed in waters off the 
American Coast demonstrating how skilled the ESF had become in hunting U-boats after the 
initial four months of attacks within American coastal waters.
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.12.  Attack locations for the remainder of the war with the attacks of U-576 blown up to show clarity.  
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The rapidity with which the ESF was eventually able to combat U-boats, in conjunction 
with Doenitz shifting submarines south, is what eventually brought  the battle off the coast of 
North Carolina to a close and kept the damages from being far worse and the engagement from 
lasting much longer. 
Defining the Battlefield 
 
Despite the fact that the U-boats were more or less beaten in North Carolina waters by the 
middle of 1942, whether by the ESF or because Doenitz ordered them to the Caribbean and Gulf 
of Mexico, they exacted a great amount of damage in the few months they appeared at ―Torpedo 
Junction.‖  In just six months, German submarines managed to litter the ocean bottom off North 
Carolina with hundreds of thousands of tons of shipping, thousands of barrels of oil, and the 
bodies of numerous sailors from Allied, Neutral and Axis nations alike.  In these same few 
months, more merchant ships were sunk in North Carolina waters than off the coast of any other 
state, and several hundred war related events transpired in these deadly waters. 
While geographical coordinates for only 142 of these events are currently known, the far-
reaching extent of these events means that creating another polygon around them, to determine 
the battlefield‘s extent, would incorporate most events for which coordinates are unknown.  The 
battle was not simply defined by where events took place, however, but also by shipping routes 
vessels followed, the minefield that claimed several victims, and vessel paths in the study area.  
For this reason, these factors were all used to delineate the boundaries of the battlefield.  Inshore, 
shipping routes and the ports to which crippled vessels limped were used as boundary points to 
limit the battlefield‘s western extent, while entrance points of shipping and convoy routes into 
the study area were used to determine the southern and northern extents.  The remaining borders 
were generated using the first historic event location inside the study area. 
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By using each element that contributed to the battle, the overall boundaries could be 
mapped (Figure 6.13) and represented without having to declare all North Carolina waters as the 
battleground.  Upon completing the battlefield map it was possible to determine its geographical 
extent.  The Battle of the Atlantic off North Carolina took place within an area of approximately 
16,042.8 square miles over the course of four years.  While hundreds of vessels traversed these 
waters during this same time span and naval ships and aircraft logged thousands of patrol hours 
sweeping these waters for German U-boats, this map represents the battlefield based upon 
events, geography, minefields, anchorages, ports, and shipping routes that in some way affected 
the course of the battle. 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6.13.  Map representing the extent of the battle within the waters of North Carolina.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
 This study followed a generalist approach towards researching and defining a maritime 
battlefield in light of the tangible heritage the engagement left behind in the form of vessel 
casualties and the intangible heritage left behind as action reports, war diaries, and routing 
instructions.  By maintaining a broad view of the battle and the events occurring during it, 
regional observations pertaining to vessels, nationalities, and U-boat commanders contributing to 
the engagement have been made.  Similarly, geographical analyses pertaining to battle extents, 
battle centrality, and U-boat movements have been conducted to depict geographical trends 
inherent in the battlefield and to generate boundaries on the ocean where the battle took place.  
These analyses have provided a broader understanding of the Battle of the Atlantic as it 
transpired in the waters of North Carolina and have portrayed the human dynamics that impelled 
events occurring during the engagement. 
 By following the theories of generalist archaeological studies and battlefield archaeology 
in conjunction with some theories of geospatial analysis as presented in Chapter One, and 
expanding upon them, it has been possible to propose a model for defining boundaries of 
maritime engagements based upon archaeology and history.  Chapter Two showed how 
historical, archaeological, and geographical components of this study were merged to answer this 
thesis‘ research questions.  Chapters Three and Four presented historical events occurring along 
the east coasts of America and North Carolina throughout the war.  These historical chapters 
identified key factors contributing to the battle and laid out many of the historical events 
originally believed to have occurred within North Carolina waters. 
Chapter Five dissected these historical events and limited them to those actually 
occurring off North Carolina as determined by the state‘s northern and southern borders and the 
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eastern boundary of waters patrolled by the NANCF and ESF.  This chapter also statistically 
examined battlefield events as well as nations and vessels affected by the conflict to provide a 
greater understanding of the multitude of factors influencing the battle and to provide substance 
for the battlefield‘s geographical analysis.  These geographical analyses, contained in Chapter 
Six, revealed several geographical trends in the battle. 
Observations 
 
 There are several major geographical trends revealed by mapping battle centralities, event 
densities, battle extents, merchant vessel routes, and U-boat activity during the war.  The analysis 
of battle centrality corroborates historical documentation of the entire Battle of the Atlantic along 
the American coast as well as suggests regional differences particular to the geography of North 
Carolina.  The centrality of the battle for most months and years of the engagement reveals that 
the main area of U-boat attacks and battle related events rested in the waters off Cape Hatteras 
and Ocracoke.  This finding supports the ESF‘s observation that waters around Hatteras were the 
U-boats primary hunting grounds (Freeman 1987:21,27,50,94,166,174).  On the opposite end of 
the spectrum, activity focused around Hatteras and Ocracoke suggests that the battle did not 
follow an overall southern shift on a regional level.  This is likely because the U-boats were 
hesitant to leave productive hunting grounds to seek success in unfamiliar waters and because the 
geography around Hatteras allowed U-boats to remain hidden in deeper waters during the day 
and to raid shallower shipping lanes at night (Freeman 1987:45,166,248; Hickam Jr. 1989:11).   
The density of battle events depicts much of the same information as the measures of 
battle centrality in that it depicts hotspots of activity occurring around Hatteras, Ocracoke, and 
Oregon Inlet.  This information differs, however, by revealing the number of events occurring 
within a particular area of ocean, 36 square nautical miles, or the equivalent of the smallest 
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German Kriegsmarine grid square (Emmerich 2010).  This information reveals where the 
heaviest battle activity occurred as well as the least amount, which helps depict why the center of 
battle activity lies where it does.  The remaining analyses of battle extents, vessel routing, and U-
boat activity must be addressed together since each affects the others during the span of the 
battle. 
 The overall extent of the battle for each month or year of the war was largely affected by 
movement of individual U-boats and where those U-boat crews were able to find targets.  This 
means that during the first two months of the battle, when U-boat activity was concentrated 
along the navigational buoys off the North Carolina coast, the area of ocean the battle transpired 
in was quite small.  In March and April 1942, when many U-boats entered North Carolina 
waters, attack locations and where the battle transpired was greatly expanded.  The range of 
attack locations throughout most of North Carolina‘s waters brings to light the fact that many 
vessels attacked during these months were not following shipping routes, whether out of 
disobedience to routing orders, or the failure of port officers or the ESF in disseminating 
information about new shipping routes.  Regardless of where blame lies, the widespread nature 
of attacks during these months reveals that many vessels may not have been following the 
shipping routes since the beginning of the war, but the limited number of U-boats in American 
waters during January and February 1942 could not exploit this behavioral factor along the North 
Carolina coast.   
By the time the convoy system was initiated, and merchant vessels were drawn into 
convoys, most battle activity had already moved to the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico, resulting 
in few attacks in North Carolina waters and a much smaller theater of U-boat operations for the 
remainder of the war.  When these base elements and characteristics of the battle are mapped in 
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conjunction with all other geographical and historical elements, it is possible to portray the 
extent of the Battle of the Atlantic in the waters of North Carolina.  Although this map answers 
the feasibility of mapping battle events transpiring over four years, as was the primary intent of 
this thesis, some limitations affected the study‘s outcome, and many more questions about the 
battle were generated that can hopefully be addressed through future scholarship. 
Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
 
 The largest limitation revolves around the scope of study for the thesis.  Since it is far 
beyond the ability and practicality of this study to find and document locations and identities of 
all the vessels sunk within the study area during the battle, all known and speculated resting 
locations of war casualties are accepted at face value and believed to be accurate to an acceptable 
degree of error.  Although this is a limitation to the accuracy of specific locations of vessels sunk 
in this engagement, it does serve as a baseline from which to measure the accuracy of historic 
events occurring during the battle.  Through future archaeological surveys intended to discover 
and identify the remains of vessels discussed in this study, the accuracy of historic documents 
can be tested to help determine the accuracy of additional shipwreck locations. 
 An additional limitation to this study is the necessity to analyze only events contributing 
to the battle.  Although there are many reports of Allied vessels attacking sound contacts, 
fishermen sighting U-boats, and airplanes attacking potential targets, only events that could be 
corroborated based upon the chain of events they incited were included.  While this means that 
some definite attacks on U-boats have probably been overlooked since they did not produce 
results, the decision to leave some events with known geographical locations out of the study 
was made so that only events directly contributing to the battle were chosen for analysis.  Again, 
while this may leave out some battle related events, it increases the likelihood that no 
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superfluous events having no bearing on the battle‘s outcome skewed the statistical and 
geographical analyses. 
 One final limitation that suggests avenues for future research is the lack of information 
from the German U-boat commanders.  Although uboatarchive.net has translated war diaries for 
some of the Paukenschlag U-boats, translation of the remainder of the submarine war diaries 
would contribute greatly to understanding the battle.  This information would help with the 
statistical analysis of the sizes and ages of vessels sunk by adding the variable of number of 
torpedoes fired at each merchant ship as well as the running depths of those torpedoes.  It would 
also allow the paths of the U-boats to be tracked for each day they were in North Carolina waters 
and not just when a merchant vessel was attacked.  This data can depict whether the linear nature 
of the U-boat travel depicted in the geographical analysis is correct or if U-boats carried out 
searches in different patterns. 
 These facts, as well as other statistical analyses of the battlefield and geographical trends 
in a particular region, will greatly benefit from similar generalist studies of the Battle of the 
Atlantic in other regions.  This will allow the comparative analysis of sizes of vessels attacked, 
sizes of vessels sunk, nationalities most affected, extents of battle areas, and successful U-boat 
captains to be made to determine if behaviors of U-boat captains, merchant captains, and Allied 
forces differed across the globe.  By undertaking these analyses, a broader understanding of the 
Battle of the Atlantic can be made so that the memory of the brave sailors from each nation 
affected by the war can live on far after remnants of their once proud vessels cease to exist. 
Archaeological and Environmental Implications 
 
 Although this study has not undertaken fieldwork to survey known shipwrecks or to find 
additional undiscovered shipwrecks, the archaeological implications behind a GIS based 
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inventory of historic wrecking coordinates are many.  Through the use of GIS analysis tools, 
areas of battle and wrecking density can be examined to determine areas likely to contain 
significant amounts of cultural deposits.  The environmental importance of being able to 
determine these areas should not be understated.  Since many vessels were sunk with volatile 
cargoes including fuels of all types, the potential for those substances, not burned in the attack, to 
have an enormous impact on marine life must be considered.  
 Similarly, the use of a GIS based study of historic coordinates and event locations of the 
battle shows that these historic coordinates have the potential to help identify shipwreck sites that 
have been tentatively identified or identified incorrectly through previous surveys.  One of these 
wrecks, the Papoose, was incorrectly identified as a wreck lying south of Beaufort.  This 
incorrect identification stuck with this wreck for years and the so-called Papoose site became 
one of the prime diving spots off Morehead City.  Over the years, however, the identification of 
this site as well as others came under criticism by wreck divers who felt that the Gentian Survey 
conducted in 1943 may have misidentified shipwrecks and did not provide definitive proof for 
identification of others.  In the case of the Papoose, historic documents revealed that the 
Papoose drifted for two days after being torpedoed and sank north of Hatteras (USCG 1944k:1; 
Barnette 2006:77-79).  The Gentian Survey, however, concluded that it ―is quite apparent that 
the rate of drift could not have carried the PAPOOSE in two days time to the positions north of 
Cape Hatteras mentioned in the Coast Guard reports,‖ and determined a wreck two miles from 
the spot the Papoose was torpedoed was the Papoose (Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution et 
al. 1944:15).   
 Not believing this assumption, several divers hypothesized that the Papoose might rest 
north of Hatteras, and following the belief that ―[o]nly the recovery of a definitive, identifying 
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artifact and further investigation will prove whether this hypothesis holds‖ (Hudy 2007) set 
about systematically vandalizing the cultural heritage of the North Carolina coast in the hopes of 
finding that ―definitive identifying artifact.‖  Finally, Barnette researched the serial number of a 
helm stand manufactured by MacTaggart Scott and Company of Edinburgh, Scotland, that was 
recovered from a wreck northeast of Hatteras by Gene Peterson in 1997 and discovered the stand 
was manufactured for the vessel Silvanus, the former name of the Papoose (Barnette 2006:81).  
This discovery allowed the correct identification of the Papoose to be made and placed the 
Papoose‘s final resting location in the same vicinity as historic documents and the GIS this study 
created show the vessel should rest.   
This means that the careful analysis of historic documents, coupled with a GIS of 
locations revealed in these documents and archaeological measurements of defining elements of 
shipwrecks can entirely remove the supposed need to recover artifacts to identify shipwrecks.  
This is especially important when those artifacts simply end up in private trophy cases and slight 
the memory of the sailors who lost their lives throughout the war.       
Conclusion 
 
 While the primary research objective of this thesis was to test the feasibility of mapping 
the geographical extent of a maritime battlefield based upon its tangible and intangible cultural 
heritage and to provide a model for defining the extents of similar battlefields, this research in no 
way suggests that this is the only model available for defining regional areas of naval 
engagements.  Furthermore, this study does not imply that the only way to protect the cultural 
heritage of World War II is through creation of a 16,042.8 square mile national battlefield.  This 
thesis simply reveals the major battle components within North Carolina‘s waters.  The 
geographical extent of those battle elements shows how much of the state‘s seascape was 
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affected by the engagement offshore.  It is the author‘s hope that this study will open up a 
dialogue that will test the validity of this model for defining maritime battlescapes and bring to 
light the necessity of protecting the cultural heritage of World War II for future study and future 
generations, and so the memory of the sailors plying the oceans during this battle for the benefit 
of their countries will survive.     
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